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ABSTRACT
This project is a theory-driven secondary data analysis of state-level incarceration
trends in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005. I replicate and advance Smith’s (2004) study
of the relationship between the socioeconomic, demographic, political, electoral, and
criminal justice factors and incarceration rates at the state level. The purpose of this
project is to determine the empirical validity of the major explanations of the
incarceration trends in the U.S. I advance Smith’s (2004) study using important novel
elements. First, I extend the scrutinized historic period by a decade by compiling timeseries data for 1980-2005. Second, I employ a more sophisticated analytic technique by
utilizing multilevel linear models designed to control for repeated measures of state-level
data. Third, I include the measures of partisan state government control and district
electoral vulnerability, utilizing the Ranney index (1965; 1976) and Holbrook Van Dunk
(1993) measure. The major finding of this project is the lingering association between the
percent of state residents that are African American and incarceration rates net of violent
crime and socioeconomic disadvantage. Results of hypothesis testing suggest that both
utilitarian and extrajudicial factors are associated with incarceration in the U.S. hence
both consensus and conflict views of incarceration are supported.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the project and to situate incarceration
growth, the phenomena which I explore, within the theoretical, historical, and
disciplinary context. First, I will provide a brief historic background of imprisonment as a
form of punishment emphasizing its trajectory in the United States. Second, I will discuss
the recent empirical trends in incarceration. Third, I will describe the major dimensions
of the current project, including the major goal of testing the validity of six competing
accounts of the incarceration growth in the U.S., significance of the current study, as well
as specify six hypothesis which I intend to test to determine which factors affected statelevel incarceration rates in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005. Fourth, I will close this
chapter with an outline of the study and provide a brief discussion of the content of each
chapter of my dissertation.
History of Incarceration
Although precise data are scarce, corporal punishment seems to be prevalent in
medieval Europe, and Spierenburg (1998a) talks of five degrees of public punishment,
such as whipping, branding with iron, mutilation including blinding and cutting off ears,
prolonged executions such as burning at stake or quartering, and capital punishments per
se. Yet the practice of punishment was not uniform or monolithic, as some scholars
suggest. Punishment in medieval Europe was characterized by both retributive cruelty
and progressive reform towards more measured and proportionate responses to crime, so
that England seemed to rely more on punishment targeting the offenders’ body while
Italy seemed to rely more on punitive imprisonment, as it could be reversed while
execution could not, and more so from fifteenth century onward (Peters, 1998).
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In the early modern Europe, fines and banishments, not imprisonment, were more
frequent punishments, yet various forms of penal bondage were developing, including
public works, imprisonment or forced labour at the workhouse, galleys, and
transportation to colonies such as America or Australia. Literature suggests that penal
bondage was aimed at poor, marginal populations rather than crime per se (Spierenburg,
1998a). In the 1550s, Bridewell, previously used as a royal palace in London, was
transformed into an institution housing the poor, “sturdy beggars and disordered persons”
who were “compelled to work for their sustenance” (Langbein, 1998, p. 12). The first
precursor of contemporary correctional facilities, the workhouse or Rasphaus, was
established in Amsterdam in 1596, and its main goal was to eliminate idleness, which
Protestants linked with sinfulness, and to combine isolation with hard labour to reforge
and resocialize displaced agricultural toilers, vagrants, and paupers into productive
workers (Shelden, 2001). Yet, based on documents from England, few criminal laws
required prolonged imprisonment for common crimes prior to 1750 (Hirsch, 1992).
Two accounts of the decline of public punishments exist, with Foucault (1979)
emphasizing new strategies of power and increased capacity for population control
associated with creation of brick and mortar disciplinary institutions, and Spierenburg
(1998a) emphasizing that both elite and commoners’ attitudes towards execution
spectacles changed around seventeenth century, as crowds ridiculed the law, convicts
pronounced rebellious speeches, and elite showed signs of distaste. Foucault (1979) sees
the disappearance of public executions as a result of changes in the legal and political
realm mostly and reformers as driven by utilitarian goals of increased control rather than
humanitarian concerns. Spierenburg (1998b) points to the primacy of change in
2

sensibilities, expressions of anxiety or repugnance which led to subsequent political and
legal change, exemplified by the decision to move gallows away from the road since
travelers were horrified. I think both points have merit and elite sensibilities could have
been changed by royal executions in England, rise of republics, and fear of the mob after
the French revolution, the latter being significant in Georgian England (Hughes, 1987).
In the United States of the eighteenth century the emergence of imprisonment is
tied to abolition of the death sentence for most crimes, and with ideas that adopting less
severe but certain punishments together with a less rigid class system and openness of
economic opportunity would reduce crime (Rothman, 1998). The new republic needed
different prisons, so two distinctly American systems emerged: the New York’s
congregate system and the Pennsylvania’s separate system, the former emphasizing
inmates’ joint work, in silence, and allowing inmates to eat outside of their cells, while
the latter emphasized continuous confinement, lack of communication, and only short
periods of exercise time in the prison yard (Shelden, 2001). Both the New York and
Pennsylvania systems were structured around confinement of one inmate per single cell,
and emphasized spiritual, religious rehabilitation rather than deterrence or retributive
cruelty, and used a high degree of isolation so that distinction between the two systems is
of a degree rather than quality (Rothman, 1998; Shelden, 2001).
The decline of the American prisons around 1850s was contingent on factors
described above, due to the growth of the prison population and influx of Irish
immigrants who were strongly resented in New England, moral rebirth ceased to be
achievable or desirable at the mass-scale, and there was cynicism about reform and a
move towards warehousing inmates rather than facilitating epiphanic spiritual
3

reformation (Rothman, 1998). In the post-Civil War period, prison design was driven by
budgetary concerns, keeping costs low and maximizing profit from prison labour, which
was also frequently leased to private entrepreneurs, so most prisons operated on the New
York congregate system designed around joint work during the day and warehousing
individual inmates at night in numerous small cells within multi-tiered blocks (Rothman,
1998). Overall, the state prisons in New England, the Midwest, and the West, were not
profitable, and actually incurred substantial expenses totaling respectively $1,204,029,
$1,850,452, and $1,572,316 in 1890 (Du Bois, 2013, p. 401).
Striking racial disparities in incarceration can be seen in the post-Civil War South
so that African Americans comprised 33 percent of inmates at the Nashville, Tennessee
state prison in 1855 but 58 percent in 1867, and the number hovered in the mid-sixtieth
percentile until 1900 (Shelden, 2001, p. 171). Absolute growth of prison populations in
post-Civil War South was staggering as North Carolina had a tenfold increase, from 121
to 1,302 inmates between 1870 and 1890, Georgia had a tenfold increase between 1868
and 1908 as well, and Florida and Mississippi experienced substantial growth also,
perhaps tied to the post-Civil War realignment in economic and racial relations, as well
as to the convict-lease system (Ibid). Southern state prisons returned profit via renting
inmates to businesses so that in 1890 prison earnings exceeded spending by $47,974, and,
in conjunction with crop-lien system of mortgages controlling the labour, dwelling
arrangements, and other economic aspects of freed Blacks’ daily lives, convict lease
system could be conceptualized as an adjusted form of bondage replacing the slavery
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment (Du Bois, 2013, p. 401)

4

Attempts at reform were seen between the 1890s and 1920s as a part of the
Progressive Era, so development in science led to psychotherapeutic reinterpretation of
crime and deviance as problems amenable to medical treatment rather than to corporal
punishment or spiritual reformation, and inmate classification by security levels arose, as
well as attempts to encourage a sense of responsibility through various forms of inmate
democratic self-government (Rotman, 1998). New ideas mitigated depersonalization of
the Auburn system, allowed more privileges to inmates, and introduced indeterminate
sentencing, yet inadequate training and high-turnover of personnel stifled the progress.
The Big House became a new paradigm of incarceration for the period between 1900 and
1950, exemplified by Leavenworth (1897) and Alcatraz (1934) prisons, and in many
ways it was a continuation of the Progressive Era ideas, a more rationalized environment
managed by professionals (rather than politically appointed wardens) who controlled
large inmate populations with a highly routinized regime of leisure and work rather than
relying on corporal punishment (Rotman, 1998; Shelden, 2001).
Contemporary Trends in Incarceration

Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011
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For half a century, since the mid-1920s until the early 1970s (see Figure 1 above),
there was little or no change in prison population or incarceration rates in the U.S. In
1930, the total number of sentenced prisoners under the jurisdiction of state and federal
correctional authorities was 129,453 which translates into an incarceration rate of 104
inmates per 100,000, 200 male and 8 female inmates per 100,000, and twenty years later
the rates were roughly the same as there were 109 inmates, 211 male inmates, and 8
female inmates per 100,000 resident population in each group, and in 1970 the numbers
were slightly lower as there were 96 inmates, 191 male inmates, and 5 female inmates per
100,000 resident population in each group (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011).
Figure 1 above shows that for the country as a whole, incarceration rates growth began in
1974.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011
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Figure 2 above provides additional information by disaggregating incarceration
rates by gender and ethnoracial category. Black men have the highest incarceration rates
which exceed by almost seven times the incarceration rates for their White counterparts
and by two and a half times the incarceration rates for Hispanic men (U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2011). Comparable disparities exist in some European countries, so in
England incarceration rates for Black men are six times higher than for White men
(Christie, 2000, p. 98). In regard to immigrants, the foreign-born account for 6 percent of
the population and 30 percent of all those sentenced to imprisonment in France (Pager,
2008, p. 378), and Denmark, Norway, and Finland have 18, 17, and 8 percent of inmates
that are foreign-born, which is actually more than in U.S. as foreign-born account for
only 6 percent of all American inmates (Lacey, 2008, p. 60).

Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011
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Figure 3 above provides specificity in regard to breakdown of incarceration rate
by gender and ethnoracial category. Women, who account for roughly seven percent of
total U.S. prison population in 2005, are incarcerated at lower levels than men, so that
White women are ten times less likely to be incarcerated than White men, Hispanic
women are sixteen times less likely to be incarcerated than Hispanic men, and Black
women are twenty times less likely to be incarcerated than Black men (U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2011). For both men and women, Hispanics are incarcerated at a rate
higher than Whites but lower than Blacks.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011

To provide context for the whole project, Figure 4 above portrays the
contemporary expansion of various branches of criminal justice system between 1980
and 2005 in absolute numbers, and Figure 5 above shows the rise in state governments’
spending on corrections. Every branch of the criminal justice system has experienced
profound growth, with the population on probation and the population on parole almost
quadrupling, and the population in jail and the population in prison more than
quadrupling, and the total adult population under correctional supervision exceeding
seven million by 2005 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). Prisons have both
collateral costs (Mauer and Chesney-Lind, 2002; Pager and Quillian, 2005), such as
diminished labour market success for whole segments of the population and prisonization
of offenders’ families and communities, and direct economic costs which increased
ninefold between 1980 and 2005 as Figure 5 shows (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
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2011). It is the goal of the current project to explore the factors which affected the growth
of the criminal justice system, spurring unprecedented expansion which began in the mid1970s after half a century of stability, testing six major theoretical accounts of the role of
incarceration in society utilizing state-level time-series data.
Description of the Study
I replicate and advance Smith’s (2004) study of the relationship between the
socioeconomic, demographic, political, electoral, and criminal justice factors and
incarceration rates at the state level. Smith (2004) tested the explanatory power of the
major theoretical determinants of incarceration at the state level using time-series data for
the period of 1980-1995 and employing ordinary least squares regression (OLS) analytic
technique. I advance Smith’s (2004) study using important novel elements. First, I extend
the scrutinized historic period by a decade by compiling time-series data for 1980-2005.
Second, I employ a more sophisticated analytic technique by utilizing multilevel linear
models designed to control for repeated measures of state-level data. Third, I include the
measures of partisan state government control and electoral vulnerability, utilizing the
Ranney index (1965; 1976) and Holbrook Van Dunk (1993) measure1 both of which are
widely accepted as valid and used in the political science literature.
My dissertation is a theory-driven secondary data analysis of state-level timeseries trends in incarceration. The question of what factors explain the use of punishment
and formal social control is central to criminological and sociological literature, and
multiple theoretical accounts exist. I test the empirical validity of major theoretical
accounts of the rates of incarceration, including the orthodox utilitarian argument, the
1

For additional details on the inter-party competition measures please see Chapter 3.
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conflict or underclass perspective, the democracy in action hypothesis, the partisan use of
incarceration argument, the electoral cycle hypotheses, and the policy artifact view. This
eclectic approach allows me to test the merits of competing explanations and therefore to
ascertain empirical salience of legal and extralegal determinants of incarceration.
From the onset of criminology as a discipline the issues pertaining to the use of
sanctions were central to theoretical debates. Although not frequently recognized, what
we know today as the classical school of criminology, exemplified by the writings of
Cesare Beccaria ([1764] 1995) and Jeremy Bentham ([1789] 1988), contained a strong
criticism of the inefficient and overly cruel punishments meted out by the courts
operating in a fashion reminiscent of the medieval period. Beccaria ([1764] 1995)
advanced the principle of proportionality of punishment and claimed that it should fit the
crime, claiming that it is not on the despotic authority but on the need to protect the social
contract and functioning of the society that the punishment should be based. Jeremy
Bentham ([1789] 1988) refined and advanced Beccaria’s ([1764] 1995) thoughts,
incorporated a Hobbesian view of human nature and social order, and developed a
utilitarian philosophy of crime and punishment based on the principle of hedonistic
calculus. Essentially, Bentham ([1789] 1988) claimed that in order to prevent selfinterested social agents from engaging in crime, the intensity and duration of punishment
have to be no less than is sufficient to tip the balance of costs and benefits by employing
physical, political, moral, and religious sanctions. Therefore, both classics shared the
view of punishment as an instrumental response to crime, that is the utilitarian orthodox
view suggesting that incarceration and crime rates are related.
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However, many contemporary scholars claim that social control and the choice of
particular forms thereof does not exist in a vacuum and is driven not exclusively by
utilitarian and juridical factors (Tonry, 2009; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011; Wacquant,
2001; Yates and Fording, 2005). Cultural, political, electoral, institutional, and
socioeconomic dynamics have been hypothesized to be associated with the rates of
incarceration, police force size, and processing of individual cases in the criminal justice
system (Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Helms, 2001; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang,
2005; Beckett and Western, 2001; Lessan, 1991; Kent and Jacobs, 2004; Wooldredge and
Thistlethwaite, 2004). I intend to test the empirical validity of non-utilitarian explanations
of incarceration, the ones which do not share the unproblematic view of punishment, or
question the view of the law and incarceration as neutral conflict resolution mechanisms,
or highlight extrajudicial determinants of incarceration rates.
The underclass hypothesis derives mostly from historical and comparative studies
of punishment and stipulates that incarceration might be contingent upon socioeconomic
factors such as inequality and unemployment, as well as upon population heterogeneity
i.e. presence of ethnoracial minorities (Rusche and Kirchheimer, [1939] 1968; Lessan ,
1991; Jackson, 2009; Keen and Jacobs, 2009; Wacquant, 2010). In ancient Greece, for
example, corporal punishment was applied only to slaves while monetary penalties were
reserved for free citizens, and in colonial America the criminal justice system was one of
many institutions enforcing the colour line (Peters, 1998; Williams and Murphy, 1999).
Sociological perspectives deriving from writings of Marx and Weber emphasize that
prison as an institution is embedded in the nexus of institutions of the class society
(Christie, 2000). Several claims can be made based on that insight, including the strong
12

claim that criminal justice is one of many tools for management of class contradictions,
or a moderate claim that economic factors might impact judicial decision making,
perceptions of dangerousness, prospects of rehabilitation, and ability to make life-course
transitions away from a life of crime. I am not making any conspiratorial or deliberate
economy-incarceration coordination claims. I merely test the insights derived from works
of Rusche and Kirchheimer ([1939] 1968), DuBois ([1903]1961), and Key (1949) to
assess whether there are empirical links between unemployment, poverty, inequality,
minority presence and incarceration rates, as suggested by previous research (Lessan,
1991; Arvanites, 1992; Arvanites and Asher, 1998; Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs
and Helms, 2001; Marvell and Moody, 1997; Michalowski and Pearson, 1990; Sorensen
and Stemen, 2002; Taggart and Winn, 1993; Yates and Fording, 2005).
The democracy in action hypothesis presumes that public opinion and public
ideology is what drives incarceration rather than a purely utilitarian need to control crime,
or political-economic rationales such as the availability of a vast pool of unemployed
workers, or threatening presence of minorities and corresponding racial anxieties, or
indifference to the plight of the underprivileged group. America is a federal republic and
as such crime control is at least partially a matter of state-level jurisdictions, hence it is
reasonable to assume that cultural and political values of voters might shape the
functioning of state penitentiaries. Conservative values and ideology emphasize
individual choice and responsibility while downplaying the structural correlates of crime
(Finckenauer, 1978). Thus it is logical to suppose that conservative values of the citizenry
might favour punishment of individual transgressors and as such be associated with
incarceration rates as an expression of collective punitiveness within a given state, and
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some supporting evidence of this claim exists in the literature (Taggart and Winn, 1993;
Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Costelloe et al., 2009).
The partisan hypothesis suggests that Republican Party control of the executive
branch or strong presence in the state legislature might be associated with use of
incarceration (Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Beckett and Western, 2001; Smith, 2004; Yates
and Fording, 2005; Brown, 2012). Conservative ideology, as was mentioned above,
emphasizes individual choice and responsibility rather than complex socioeconomic
trajectories into crime. Therefore, I expect to find a link between partisan control of state
executive and legislative branches and punitiveness. The hypothesized relationship
between partisan control of the executive and legislative branches and incarceration is
also contingent upon claims in the literature that incarceration can be used as a resource
in an attempt to broaden Republican Party appeal to voters who do not directly benefit
from its economic policies (Beckett, 1997; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Chiricos,
Welch, and Gertz, 2004). It is a conflict theory insight that coercion is a resource,
symbolic and otherwise, since even federal student loan eligibility is tied to criminal
convictions. Hence, some voters might find it advantageous for themselves to support the
Republican Party in order to gain protection from criminals or gain an edge in the social
competition by allocating punishment, which is a negative reward, to their rivals.
The electoral cycle hypothesis casts doubt on the claim that it is the Republican
Party which is solely associated with an uncompromising stance on crime and suggests
bipartisan use of anticrime rhetoric and incarceration to attract voters, especially so
during election campaigns (Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Jacobs and Helms, 2001; Smith,
2004; Stucky et at., 2005; Yates and Fording, 2005; Marion et al., 2009; Oliver, 2011).
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After all, it was a Democratic president who signed the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act in 1994 (Simon, 2007) which became the largest-scale criminal justice
bill in the nation’s history allocating over $9 billion in prison funding and stipulating the
need to add 100,000 police officers to the force. Hence, I hypothesize that gubernatorial
candidates from both parties might engage in “tough-on-crime” rhetoric during an
election year, and suggest a focus on the impact of the electoral competition between
candidates from both parties on subsequent incarceration rates.
The policy hypothesis is built on the insight that institutional internal processes
explain incarceration rates. Perhaps criminal justice policies and initiatives can account
for the dynamics or path dependence of incarceration, as some research suggests, rather
than citizen ideology, presence of underclass, or political factors (Marvel and Moody,
1996; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Schneider, 2006; Spelman, 2009). Sentencing policies are
of utmost importance in explaining the recent incarceration increase, as there is evidence
that up to 37 percent of prison population growth is attributed to increase in time served
and 51 percent is attributable to increased commitment per arrest and both are clearly
contingent upon sentencing policies (Blumstein and Beck, 1999). Therefore, I study the
impact of determinate sentencing laws, three-strike laws, and marijuana decriminalization
laws on incarceration rates. In addition, it is important to remember that incarceration is
not the only sanction available and that some states have low incarceration while
substantial probation rates (Phelps, 2011). Thus I include a measure of magnitude of the
population on probation supervision across states.
Due to substantial variability of socioeconomic, political, cultural, and
criminogenic factors across states, the introduction of some measure of standardization
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and unification is important to make comparisons meaningful. Following the replicated
study (Smith, 2004) I use four control variables: the violent crime rate, property crime
rate, state education spending, and divorce rate. Controlling for crime rates, state
education spending, and divorce rate will allow testing the orthodox utilitarian argument
that incarceration rates vary concordantly with crime rates, as an attempt to maintain
social order, protect social contract, and punish the transgressors. Strength of
socialization agents such as school and family is recognized as essential by several
theoretical perspectives in criminology, and it is presumed that normative and substantive
education and strong marriage allow for behavioural repertoire consistent with a stake in
conformity and upward mobility which justifies inclusion of these control variables
(Larzerele and Patterson, 1990; Sampson and Laub, 1993; Sampson and Laub, 2003;
Simons et al., 2005; Sampson, Laub, Wimer, 2006).
Significance of the Study
I argue that the current project is significant in five ways. First, it addresses
fundamental theoretic debates in sociology and criminology. Second, it analyzes the
salient expansion of the use of incarceration at the subnational level of analysis. Third, it
tests the validity of the orthodox utilitarian view of incarceration. Fourth, it offers a more
refined understanding of the political determinants of imprisonment by including
measures of partisan state government control and electoral vulnerability. Fifth, it
employs data and analytic technique that are superior to those that have been previously
used in research on this topic.
Theoretical relevance of the study is predicated on the centrality of incarceration
as a type of formal social control for the sociological and criminological discourses
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ranging from Hobbes ([1679]1999) to Bauman (2000) and Wacquant (2001; 2010). The
question of social order and its reproduction, maintenance, and negotiation is
fundamental to sociology, whose origins as a discipline are tied to the attempts to
investigate how humans coordinate and organize their social worlds within the shifting
boundaries of the larger social context, hence the relevance of the discussion of
incarceration and social control in general.
Practical relevance of the study is contingent upon empirically observable drastic
shifts in the use of imprisonment in the U.S. over last three decades. For five decades
levels of incarceration were fairly invariant and low across states since the average U.S.
incarceration rate for the period between 1930 and 1970 equaled 110.2 inmates per
100,000 population with a standard deviation of 8.9 inmates (Zimring, 2010). The U.S.
incarceration rate in 1972 stood at 95.5 per 100,000 population yet it increased to a rate
of 502 inmates per 100,000 in 2007 (Zimring, 2010). The magnitude of the expansion in
the overall use of incarceration since the early 1980s justifies the inquiry into the factors
associated with the phenomena which so spectacularly refuted the stability of punishment
hypothesis (Blumstein and Moitra, 1979).
The important contribution of this study is its commitment to state-level analysis
of various specific processes influencing incarceration rates. Unlike England or France
where the penal field is consolidated and might be better described by meta-narratives
(Garland, 2001;Wacquant, 2001), the field of crime control in the U.S. is not monolithic,
it is decentralized and federal inmates are the numeric minority making only 10 percent
of total incarcerated individuals (Phelps, 2011). A significant variance in the
incarceration rates across different states exists, illustrated by the fact that in 2004 Maine
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incarcerated 148 inmates per 100,000 population and Texas incarcerated 694 inmates
respectively, and any attempt to understand the incarceration trends must be sensitive to
said differences to avoid potential false homogenization (U.S. Bureau of Criminal Justice
Statistics, 2009).
A specific contribution of this study consists of testing the major theoretical
explanations of the use of imprisonment as a form of social sanction. Imprisonment is
usually understood within the orthodox utilitarian framework in which punishment
protects the social order and as such is contingent upon the frequency of the criminal acts
attempting to undermine the social contract (Bentham [1789] 1988). But a number of
plausible hypotheses exist, including the underclass, democracy in action, partisan,
electoral cycle, and endogenous criminal justice policies explanations (Garland, 2001;
Jacobs and Helms, 2001; Wacquant, 2001; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Tonry, 2009) and I
test them going beyond the simplistic model of political determinants of incarceration
employed by Smith (2004) by adding context and specificity employing the measures of
partisan state government control and electoral vulnerability. The use of the Ranney
index and Holbrook Van Dunk measure produces a more refined understanding of the
political forces at play which Smith’s (2004) mechanical conceptualization of political
and partisan processes might have overlooked.
The significance of this study is also lodged in important methodological
upgrades compared to the replicated study. I extend the temporal boundaries of the
project by a decade so that it spans from 1980 to 2005 to produce a larger number of
observations in the dataset but also to focus on the years of the incarceration boom and to
go beyond that to include a decade that followed it. In addition, ordinary least squares
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regression (OLS) used by Smith (2004) is not the optimal one for the task because it is
based on the assumption that the term for any observation is not impacted by or related to
that of other observations (i.e. absence of autocorrelation). However, the repeated
measures of variables at the state-level violate this assumption of independence and even
though OLS coefficients produced in such analysis are likely to be accurate, the standard
errors are biased downward resulting in inaccurate deductions about statistical
significance (Luke, 2004; Field and Miles, 2010). To avoid these problems, I strengthen
the study methodologically and employ hierarchical linear modeling which controls for
the repeated measure design.
Thus, this project is significant because it engages the fundamental theoretical
question of social order, investigates the shifting patterns of incarceration while being
attuned to state-level differences, contributes to the research literature by testing the
competing utilitarian and extrajudicial hypotheses of incarceration while refining our
understanding of political dynamics by adding measures of inter-party competition, and
relying on a larger number of observations and an advanced statistical analytic strategy. I
argue that these attributes of the current study make it worthwhile and innovative despite
the somewhat formulaic replicative nature.
Specific Hypotheses
Consensus and conflict are central to social life, and from the beginning of
sociology as a discipline, theoretical explanations of the functioning of society
privileging the former (Durkheim, 1972), the latter (Marx, 1994), or allowing for a
historically, culturally, and contextually contingent mixture of both (Weber, [1946]1958)
coexisted. This study is testing the empirical validity of competing consensus and conflict
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views on the function of imprisonment. Generally stated, the research question focuses on
the determinants of incarceration at the state level; I am exploring whether the
incarceration rates are driven exclusively by crime rates or if factors such as presence of
the underclass, citizen conservative ideology, partisan control of the state government,
electoral cycle, and sentencing policies impact state incarceration rates. I test six specific
hypotheses summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses
Hypotheses
H 1: Utilitarian Hypothesis
Violent crime is positively associated with incarceration
Property crime is positively associated with incarceration
H 2: Underclass Hypothesis
Unemployment is positively associated with incarceration
Income inequality is positively associated with incarceration
Poverty is positively associated with incarceration
Percent of Black state residents is positively associated with incarceration
Percent of Hispanic state residents is positively associated with incarceration
H 3: Citizen Ideology Hypothesis
Population conservatism is positively associated with incarceration
H 4: Partisan Use of Incarceration Hypothesis
Democratic control of state legislature is negatively associated with incarceration
Democratic control of state governor's office is negatively associated with incarceration
H 5: Gubernatorial Election Cycle Hypothesis
Gubernatorial election year is positively associated with incarceration
H 6: Criminal Justice Policies Hypothesis
Probation rate is positively associated with incarceration
Habitual offender law is positively associated with incarceration
Determinate sentencing law is negatively associated with incarceration
Marijuana decriminalization law is negatively associated with incarceration

Hypothesis 1: Punishment is an instrumental response to crime. States with
higher crime will have higher incarceration rates.
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Classical and neo-classical criminological theory suggests that punishment is a social
reaction to the hedonistic and self-interested acts of the individuals rationally trying to
maximize their material or symbolic gains and harming the society (Beccaria [1764]
1995, Bentham [1789] 1988). If crime is on the rise, then society responds with higher
use of punishment to preserve the social contract (McGarrell, 1993; Listokin, 2003;
Spelman, 2009). Hence, I expect that states with higher violent and property crime rates
will also have higher incarceration rates.
Hypothesis 2: Punishment is a tool for managing economic and ethnoracial
tensions. States with higher inequality, unemployment, and proportion of Black
and Hispanic residents will have higher incarceration rates.

Conflict criminological perspective suggests that punishment is not a purely instrumental
neutral response to violent and property crime but also functions to manage economic
and ethnoracial tensions in the society (Rusche and Kirchheimer [1939] 1968; Wacquant,
2001). If inequality and unemployment are rising, then potential for class conflict is
increasing, and if the minority group presence is getting stronger, then potential for racial
threat is increasing (Jackson, 2009; Johnson, Stewart, Pickett, and Gertz, 2011).
Inequality is measured by the state Gini income inequality index, unemployment is
operationalized as a percent of civilian noninstitutionalized population sixteen years of
age or older, minority presence is operationalized as a proportion of state population that
is Black or Hispanic. I expect states with higher levels of inequality and unemployment
and higher proportion of Black or Hispanic residents to have higher incarceration rates.
Hypothesis 3: Punishment is a social policy sensitive to public opinion. States
with more conservative population will have higher incarceration rates.
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The social constructivist approach operates on the W.I. Thomas (1928) maxim stating
that if people “define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” Perhaps
punishment is neither an instrumental response to rising or declining crime rates nor a
tool managing class and ethnic conflict but rather a fairly expressive social policy attuned
to the fluctuation of public opinion, cultural and religious sensibilities about crime, and
ideological explanations of crime as either an individual moral weakness or a structural
issue (Taggart and Winn, 1993; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Tonry, 2009). Finding a
reliable and temporally uninterrupted measurement of public opinion about crime is
problematic so I employ the closest available proxy – citizens’ ideology measure (Berry
et al., 1998). Citizen ideology measure is reliable, available, and appropriate as it is has
been suggested in the literature that conservative ideology is associated with punitiveness
(Greenberg and West, 2001; Costelloe et al., 2009). Hence, I expect that states with more
conservative population will have higher incarceration rates.
Hypothesis 4: Punishment is a social policy consistent with the Republican Party
agenda. States with strong Republican Party presence in the legislature and
Republican governors will have higher incarceration rates.
Sociological literature suggests that since the 1960s the Republican Party have
consistently employed “law-and-order” rhetoric (Tonry, 2009). Some scholars see this as
purely symbolic political device, some scholars conceptualize this as a backlash against
extension of formal civil and political rights to women, ethnoracial and sexual minorities,
and some scholars suggest that it is a pragmatic solution to the limited pool of voters
benefiting from economic policies of the party and an attempt to reach out to voters
supporting the tough anti-crime policies (Beckett, 1997; Yates and Fording, 2005;
Beckett and Godoy, 2008; Keen and Jacobs, 2009). I measure Republican partisan
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strength as Republican control of the state executive branch (i.e. governor’s office) and
Republican control of the state legislative branch. I expect states with Republican
governors and a high percentage of Republican legislators to have higher incarceration
rates.
Hypothesis 5: Punishment is a social policy which is appealing to voters. Both
parties use punishment as a device to widen their appeal during gubernatorial
and election cycles. Gubernatorial election year is positively associated with
incarceration.
Recent sociological scholarship on the politics of crime control suggests that rather than
being a purely Republican partisan issue, punishment might be used by both parties
during the election cycles to broaden the appeal to voters (Jacobs and Helms, 2001;
Smith, 2004; Stucky et al., 2005; Simon, 2007; Marion et al., 2009, Oliver, 2011).
Perhaps the Democratic candidates to executive branch offices seize the “tough-oncrime” agenda and use it just as much as Republicans during the electoral cycle. As a
measure of electoral cycle, I use a dummy variable coded 1 for gubernatorial election
year within a given state between 1980 and 2005. I expect election years to be associated
with increase in incarceration rates.
Hypothesis 6: Punishment is an outcome of criminal justice policies. States with
determinate sentencing laws and marijuana decriminalization will have lower
incarceration rates. States with three-strikes laws and high probation rates will
have higher incarceration rates.
Criminological research suggests that the prison population is influenced by a myriad of
criminal justice factors, including the certainty of arrest and conviction, and discretion of
decentralized decision makers, including the presence of flexibility in sentencing (Marvel
and Moody, 1996; Blumstein and Beck, 1999; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). It may be that
punishment is an outcome of criminal justice policies and available institutional
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alternatives rather than a positivist billiard-ball response to the reality of crime or crime
as a constructed political issue. Therefore, I explore the impact of determinate sentencing
laws, marijuana decriminalization laws, three-strikes laws, and probation rates on the
state-level incarceration rates. I expect that determinate sentencing constrains judicial
punitiveness (Reitz, 2006) and that marijuana decriminalization eliminates the very crime
qualifying one for a prison term. I expect that three-strikes laws and probation rates are
positively associated with incarceration, due to increased sentence length for the former
and evidence of high rates of violations and reincarceration of probationers (Jacobson,
2005).
Outline of the Study
Chapter 1 provides a historical sketch on the emergence of imprisonment in
medieval Europe and its evolution in the U.S., demonstrates contemporary empirical
trends in the American criminal justice system, includes incarceration rates for different
ethnoracial groups, describes the major features and significance of the current study,
provides an outline of sociological theorizing about incarceration, articulates the general
research question and explicitly states the specific hypotheses. Chapter 2 delivers an
exhaustive review of existing state-level studies of incarceration, giving additional
theoretical and empirical context for each of the six hypotheses of the incarceration
change, and establishing links between crime rates, socioeconomic and demographic
factors, citizen ideology, partisan strength, elections, sentencing policies, and prison
population rates. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of the study, describes the data and
major variables, and explains the basic logic of the statistical multilevel analytic
technique which I utilize.
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Chapter 4 is devoted to hypotheses testing, and I open it by presenting the
descriptive statistics for the whole sample, then I display time-trends for state
incarceration rates, discuss the basic multilevel model and proportion of variance
between states and within states across time explained by the model, and proceed by
testing one hypothesis at a time in a step-up manner, first including only the independent
variables, then adding control variables, then adding measures of political competition.
Chapter 5 translates findings of the quantitative analysis into a coherent sociological
narrative, as I discuss the key results of hypothesis testing, link findings of this project to
the existing literature, moving from the specific to the general, make conclusions about
the validity of major theoretical accounts of incarceration, and identify directions for
future research.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to situate each specific hypothesis within the
disciplinary context by reviewing the major theoretical and empirical works. Given the
scope of this project I find it necessary to focus on the literature directly relevant for the
concepts utilized in each hypothesis privileging recent state-level research on
incarceration in the U.S. First, I provide a brief review of the literature conceptualizing
imprisonment as a utilitarian, instrumental response to crime. Second, I discuss the
literature seeing incarceration as not purely neutral or instrumental but as contingent on
extrajudicial socioeconomic and demographic factors. Third, I describe research
signifying the salience of public ideology for the criminal justice outcomes. Fourth, I
review the literature on the role of partisan politics and politicization of the crime as a
social issue. Fifth, I review research linking electoral cycle and criminal justice
outcomes. I close the chapter with discussion of the links between the criminal justice
policies, such as determinate sentencing and three-strikes laws, and incarceration.
Literature on Orthodox Utilitarian Argument
From the onset of criminology as a discipline the issues pertaining to the use of
sanctions were central to theoretical debates. Cesare Beccaria ([1764] 1995) advanced the
principle of proportionality of punishment and asserted that it should fit the crime,
claiming that it is not on the despotic authority but on the need to protect the social
contract and functioning of the society that the punishment should be based. Jeremy
Bentham ([1789] 1988) refined and advanced Beccaria’s ([1764] 1995) thoughts,
incorporated a Hobbesian view of human nature and social order, and developed a
utilitarian philosophy of crime and punishment based on the principle of hedonistic
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calculus. Essentially, Bentham ([1789] 1988) claimed that in order to prevent selfinterested social agents from engaging in crime, the intensity and duration of punishment
have to be no less than is sufficient to tip the balance of costs and benefits by employing
physical, political, moral, and religious sanctions. Therefore, both classics shared the
view of punishment as an instrumental response to crime, that is the utilitarian orthodox
view suggesting that incarceration and crime rates are related.
In the contemporary criminological literature, the utilitarian view of the
relationship between the crime and punishment is endemic since, under the rule of law,
commission of crime and subsequent conviction is a necessary prerequisite of
incarceration, which is conceptualized as a forced reaction to a violation of the legal
norm and an attempt to reestablish social order. Hence it is not illogical to assume that
incarceration rates and prison admissions are a function of crime rates in a given
jurisdiction. Much research supports the validity of the utilitarian hypothesis
(Michalowski and Pearson, 1990; Taggard and Winn, 1993; McGarrell, 1993; Jacobs and
Helms, 1996; Arvanites and Asher, 1998; Raphael, 2000; Greenberg and West, 2001;
Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Listokin, 2003; Yates and Fording, 2005; Spelman, 2009;
Stemen and Rengifo, 2011). However, other researchers claim that the relationship
between crime rates and incarceration rates is either weak or nonexistent (Blumstein and
Cohen, 1973; Blumstein and Moitra, 1979; Lessan, 1991; Zimring and Hawkins, 1991;
Blumstein and Beck, 1999; Smith, 2004; Zimring, 2010).
The following is the concise summary of early studies supporting the utilitarian
hypothesis, many of which tend to be cross-sectional and use data from the eighties
onward. Michalowski and Pearson (1990) found that, controlling for effects of South,
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violent crime is by far the strongest predictor of state imprisonment rates in 1970 and
1980. McGarrell (1993) asserts that violent crime is a strong consistent predictor of state
incarceration rates in 1971, 1980, and 1988 and points out the historical contingency of
this relationship as it increased in strength over time, suggesting potential qualitative
shifts as well, as the criminal justice system might have become more responsive during
the economic and political crisis of the 1980s. Taggart and Winn (1993) used measures of
both property and violent crime in their cross-sectional study yet only violent crime was
associated with state incarceration rates in 1984 in the regression results. Arvanites
(1992) used a measure of total index crime rate as well as violent crime (murder, rape,
assault and robbery) and found both significantly related to incarceration rates in 1980
and 1988, while Arvanites and Asher (1995) found similar results for 1990, and
Arvanites and Asher (1998) found crime to be the strongest predictor of state
imprisonment rates for 1993 but non-significant in regards to county jail incarceration
rates, perhaps due to multicollinearity with the measure of nonwhite population.
Several studies with more sophisticated methodology also find that crime and
punishment are associated. In a time-series analysis spanning from 1950 to 1990, Jacobs
and Helms (1996) confirm that combined federal and state prison admission rates lagged
by one year are influenced by crime rates, however, the authors squared the crime rates,
claiming that prior research suggests that people tend to ignore the crime risks until a
certain threshold level is reached when fear of crime actually sets in and the public
requests an increase in the punitive response, and concurrently in their study the unaltered
crime rates were insignificant, yet the squared ones did increase the admissions.
Greenberg and West (2001) analyze census panel data from 1970, 1980, and 1990 and
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find that both violent crime rates and narcotic arrests influenced state imprisonment rate
while no significant effect exists for property crime rate. It is fitting to note that I do not
know of any direct measurements of drug crime independent of the criminal justice
system, and narcotic arrests are in a sense a measure of the drug law enforcement rather
than the drug crime per se. A study of both state prison admission rate and incarceration
rate found that FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Part 1 index crimes are associated with
both measures of punitiveness, being the strongest predictor of admissions and third
strongest predictor of the incarceration rate i.e., the relative size of prison population
(Sorensen and Stemen, 2002).
The simultaneous relationship between crime rates and incarceration rates has
been largely neglected. However, it is not improbable that not only do increasing crime
rates fuel the growth of the prison population via new admissions but the increasing
incarceration suppresses crime, perhaps via deterrent or incapacitating effect. Listokin
(2003) takes into account that simultaneous relationship by using 1970 abortion rates as
an instrumental variable highly correlated with 1990 crime rates but, apart from that, not
correlated with 1990 incarceration or admission rates. Listokin (2003) also employs
sophisticated measures of independent variable, as crime is operationalized as a moving
two-year average of FBI UCR Part 1 index crimes where violent crime is given a weight
of 0.65 and property crime is weighted as 0.35, claiming that admission rate is a better
dependent variable since the current incarceration rate is partially driven by past crime
rates due to the salient proportion of inmates with long sentences. Listokin (2003) finds
that, controlling for simultaneous nature of the relationship, a 1 percent increase in crime
results in 1 percent rise in prison admissions, which also should boost the incarceration
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rate. Interestingly, prison releases are not affected by the temporally concurrent crime
rate (Listokin, 2003). However, Listokin (2003) recognizes that although the utilitarian
hypothesis is supported, there may be other factors at play, since his results would predict
an 80 percent growth in incarceration between 1970 and 1990 when in reality it was
closer to 500 percent.
Ouimet and Tremblay (1996) made an interesting attempt to go beyond cross
sectional analysis towards identification and tentative theorization of the trends over time.
First, they found that at three points in time, i.e., in 1972, 1982, and 1992, the states with
higher crime rates also had higher imprisonment rates. But then they observe that the
“cross-sectional crime-incarceration link dissolves in time-series studies” (Ouimet and
Tremblay, 1996, p. 120) and claim that incarceration growth trends are not billiard-ball
deterministic but seem to have a normative dimension (or, perhaps, depend on fiscal
constraint, existing prison capacity and tendency to fight overcrowding with early convict
releases, etc.). Ouimet and Tremblay (1996) suggest that 14 out of 16 states that
increased their incarceration rate by a 100 percent by 1992 were underpunitive in 1982,
while states which were overpunitive in 1982 did not show such significant growth. They
suggest that cross-sectional correlation between crime and incarceration reflects better the
basic proportionality between these two variables, yet the time series trends better reflect
not just the mechanistic crime-incarceration link but also cultural sensibilities about the
desirable level of total punitiveness and traditions of the jurisdiction about the acceptable
scope of imprisoned population, citing Minnesota where sentencing rules explicitly tie its
incarceration rate not to the crime rate but to availability of cells in prisons. So, as the
state becomes overpunitive its actors realize that proportionality and fairness are violated,
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and suppress the growth, while the reverse is true for underpunitive states (Ouimet and
Tremblay, 1996).
Supporting evidence for the utilitarian hypothesis and specific enabling
mechanisms are also reported in a study (Spelman, 2009) which explores the impact of
crime on rate of prison population under state jurisdiction, including private, federal, and
local jails, analyzing a panel of states over a time period spanning 1977 to 2005. Spelman
(2009) claims that crime explains 32 to 42 percent of the variance in the state
incarceration rate, with violent crime having an especially strong positive effect in the
long term due to longer sentences, property crime having a statistically significant
negative immediate effect and a nonsignificant long term effect, and drug crime having
significant immediate and long term effect which is much weaker than that of violent
crime. The study also hints at the probable specific mechanism or contextual variable
linking crime and incarceration, namely spending, which is contingent upon the increase
in crime and several ideological, political, electoral, and budgetary variables (Spelman,
2009). However, no significant relationship between crime rates, prison admissions and
correctional spending is reported by Stucky, Heimer, and Lang (2007) which questions
the validity of the specific mechanism of incarceration growth identified by Spelman
(2009).
Anomalies and critiques of the instrumental argument’s empirical status can also
be found in the literature. The absence of the crime-incarceration link was a part of
American criminological orthodoxy in the 1970s when Blumstein and Cohen (1973)
developed the stability of punishment hypothesis, drawing from the Durkheimian
analysis of relativity of deviance, claiming that increasing crime will not result in higher
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incarceration because the society will simply increase the seriousness threshold,
responding only to the most serious crimes relative to the totality of offenses. The
national aggregate data exhibited a stability of imprisonment rates for the period between
1930 and 1970, with a statistical average of 110.2 inmates per 100,000 population and a
standard deviation of 8.9 inmates respectively (Blumstein and Cohen, 1973, p. 201). The
validity of stability of punishment argument was empirically reinforced by subsequent
research (Blumstein and Moitra, 1979).
Zimring and Hawkins (1991) claimed that the crime-incarceration link is weak or
nonexistent in their analysis of U.S. data spanning from 1949 to 1988 primarily due to the
fact that roughly 100 felonies result in only 1 conviction, partly because of the “funnel of
criminal justice” phenomena where each stage progressively filters out significant
number of cases. Blumstein and Beck (1999) found that 88 percent of the incarceration
growth between 1980 and 1996 is attributable to the increasing likelihood of conviction
to real prison time and the increasing length of the sentences, while only 12 percent of the
growth is explained by crime rate increase. Partitioning the crime rates shows that drug
offenses are the single most salient category, accounting for 29 percent of the growth
(proportion thereof attributable to the crime rates), while neither sexual assault, murder,
or non-sexual assault individually account for more than 11 percent of the growth and
only when all violent offenses are added together they account for 43 percent of the
growth (Blumstein and Beck, 1999, p. 24). A time-series study covering the same
temporal span between 1980 and 1995 concurs with Blumstein and Beck’s findings
(1999) showing that neither property nor violent crime had a significant impact on state
incarceration rates (Smith, 2004).
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Zimring (2010) suggests that the studies supporting the crime-incarceration have
two limitations, first is the temporality issue – many of these studies were carried out not
at midcentury when there was no imprisonment growth but in the 1980s when
incarceration rates skyrocketed, second is the qualitative shift in the scope of the
punishment between 1974 and 1987 – toward higher rates of commitment for marginally
serious high-frequency felonies such as vehicle theft, assault, burglary. Therefore studies
looking at the index crime rates from that period might overrate their impact on
incarceration. Zimring (2010) claims that abovementioned studies focused on “the role of
differential crime growth in explaining state-to-state differences in growth of
imprisonment” (p.1240) and have no bearing on the issue once it is examined at the
national level. Between 1964 and 2007, homicide rates and robbery rates at the national
level show out-of-sync fluctuations, lags, and differences in the shape of patterns with
incarceration, and while there is a homicide-incarceration relationship it is a negative one
that Zimring (2010) interprets as indicative of a suppressing effect of imprisonment on
crime but not-supportive of the argument that crime drives incarceration at the national
level.
Literature on the Underclass Hypothesis
The conflict criminological perspective suggests that punishment is not a purely
instrumental neutral response to violent and property crime but also functions to manage
economic and ethnoracial tensions in society in general, and is specifically responsive to
groups perceived as either economically non-productive or encroaching on the existing
ethnoracial order (Rusche and Kirchheimer [1939] 1968; Blalock, 1967; Wacquant,
2001). There are at least two interpretation of the underclass hypothesis, one is purely
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economic while the other recognizes the salience of race and ethnicity. The first derives
from work of Rusche and Kirchheimer ([1939] 1968) and is conventionally tied to the
supply and demand for labour force, unemployment, and the labour market in general,
though the authors’ main goal was to explore punishment outside the utilitarian or legal
or consequentialist framework, seeing it within a broader context of the social structure.
The second interpretation takes into account more complex intergroup relations, history
of immigration and slavery, and is linked to the threats associated with increase in
relative size of the minority group perceived by the dominant group and its attempts to
maintain symbolic and material privileges (Blalock, 1967).
The origins of the term “underclass” can be traced to the term “lumpenproletariat”
which Marx introduced in the “Communist Manifesto” to describe the lower rungs of the
proletariat lacking class-consciousness, the chronically unemployed, as well as
marginalized déclassé elements not unfamiliar with the illicit activities or paid
participation in reactionary political movements ([1848]1994; p.167). The term took root
in social science literature, on American soil, largely tied to the local history of
immigration, intergroup relations, and political economy, where it acquired ethnic and
racial connotations. In the “Dangerous Classes of New York” ([1872] 1967) Charles
Loring Brace focused on the predominantly American-born offspring of Irish and
German immigrants raised in a context of poverty, lack of education and the availability
of vices, who do not hesitate to use firearms and are “as ignorant as London flash-men or
costermongers…far more brutal than the peasantry from whom they descend and they are
much banded together” (p. 26-27).
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The first large-scale urban ethnography undertaken in the U.S. by W.E.B. Du
Bois (1899) produced an empirical account of black residents of Philadelphia as an
excluded caste, a strata which “does not form an integral part of the larger social group”
(p.5) and suggested that although other groups, i.e., Jews or Italians, are not entirely
included either, the social exclusion of blacks is more intense and intertwined with a
historic legacy of slavery and contemporary social wretchedness. Du Bois (1899) did not
seek to pathologize black residents, on the contrary, his theoretical argument was
analogous to the Durkheimian notions of integration and group solidarity as antithesis of
anomie and social pathologies, and Du Bois (1899) pointed out that that it is a mistake to
focus on the problems of crime, prostitutes, and deteriorating housing per se because the
slum “is not a simple fact, it is a symptom” (p.6) and that exploration of the race problem
should include social dynamics operating outside of the Philadelphia ghetto.
Du Bois’ analysis of 5,000 surveys demonstrated existence of a racialized division
of labour, where 61 percent of black men were employed in domestic or personal service
and only 7 percent of them were employed in manufacturing jobs compared to 47 percent
of the total male Philadelphia population (p.109), and Du Bois (1899) explains the
discrepancy by exclusion of blacks from labour unions. For black females, the
discrepancies were even higher, with 88 percent employed in personal and domestic
service and 8.8 percent employed in manufacturing jobs (p.109). In terms of occupations
of black males 21 years of age and older, 2 percent were “learned professionals,” 6.5
percent were “conducting business on their own account,” 7 percent were employed in
“skilled trades,” 5 percent were employed in clerical positions, with the remaining 80
percent of black males being unskilled laborers and servants (p.100, p. 109). Du Bois
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(1899) also points out that there are 60 black policemen, 17 post office workers, and 11
municipal workers (p.132). Du Bois (1899) claims that even though not all black families
strive to take advantage of educational opportunities there was a marked improvement in
this area since only 18.56 percent of blacks are entirely illiterate (unable to read or write),
which compared favourably to the Belgian population with 15.9 percent illiteracy rate or
with Italian, Russian, and Irish American immigrants residing in Philadelphia who
manifested respective illiteracy rates of 63.63 percent, 41.92 percent, and 25.79 percent
(p.92). However, regardless of the favourable literacy comparisons to incoming
immigrants and occasional examples of upward mobility, Du Bois (1899) speaks of
systematic exclusion of blacks as equal social actors from mainstream white institutions
and the existence of a racialized occupational hierarchy.
Underclass, the contemporary iteration of the term “lumpenproletariat,” was
coined by Myrdal (1963) who used it in a sense analogous to the classical theorists,
referring to a social group of “unemployed, unemployables, and underemployed” (p.38)
largely disconnected from the national social currents and affluence. Myrdal (1963), like
Marx ([1848] 1994) or Du Bois (1899) tends to use the term predominantly as a structural
rather than a behavioural or subcultural referent such as that advanced by Lewis in
“Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty” (1959). Wilson (1987) provides an
insightful dissection of the theoretical debates concerning the legitimacy and empirical
validity of the term, while refuting simplistic reductionist analyses of the issue, instead
focusing on the “interplay between ghetto-specific cultural characteristics and social and
economic opportunities” (p. 18). Wilson (1987) emphasizes in particular the effects of
corporate relocation and downsizing on post-civil rights urban ghettos characterized by
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endemic joblessness, which doubled between 1968 and 1980 (p. 17), and concentrated
poverty defined as number of Census tracts with at least 40 percent poor, which also
doubled between 1970 and 1997 (Wilson, 1996). Primarily, Wilson (1987) focuses on
urban black residents defining underclass as those “outside of mainstream American
occupational system … who lack training and skills” (p.8) and who either dropped out of
the labour force or are long-term unemployed, long-term welfare recipients, long-term
poor, and those engaged in crime and other illegal activities.
Wacquant (2010) employs contemporary descriptive data on inmates to show that
less than half were employed full-time prior to sentencing, 60 percent come from
households with income significantly below official poverty level, 60 percent were raised
in single-parent household, and that the ethnoracial composition of the U.S. prisons
reversed from 70 percent inmates being white at midcentury to almost 70 percent being
non-white today (p.79). Wacquant (2010), like Du Bois (1899), stresses the
intersectionality of class and race in explanation of contemporary U.S. incarceration
trends, saying that “they have been finely targeted, first by class, second by that disguised
brand of ethnicity called race” (p. 78) and lastly, by place of residence, which resulted in
the overrepresentation in prisons of lower-class fractions of African American dwellers
of deteriorating inner-city areas. Wacquant (2001) develops the classical critical ideas
expressed by Rusche and Kirchheimer ([1939] 1968) updating them to account for
postindustrial economic and neoliberal political realignments, and makes a historical,
institutional claim that prisons emerged as the “substitute apparatus for enforcing the
shifting colour line” and warehousing “segments of African American community devoid
of economic utility and political pull” (p. 103).
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To explain the contemporary situation, Wacquant (2001) discusses the history of
the legal and institutional arrangements extracting economic value of black labour from
slavery to Jim Crow sharecropping to the industrial ghettos of the 1950s and claims that
in the post-industrial deregulated economy the black ghetto as an institution became
obsolete, both in the sense of economic utility and in a sense of ability to nurture and
protect its residents from the outside forces within a nexus of black businesses, churches,
and schools. As the last middle-class blacks fled and jobs disappeared, the symbiotic
relationship between ghetto and prison developed, as both warehoused the same surplus
population and incentivized it to compete for the minimum wages and underemployed
status in the deregulated fluid labour market (Wacquant, 2001).
Empirical research operationalizes the underclass hypothesis by measuring the
impact of socioeconomic factors such as unemployment, income inequality, and poverty
on the incarceration rate and, in regards to the minority threat version of the argument,
the percentage of population which is black or Hispanic is used. The link between
socioeconomic variables and imprisonment is claimed to be inconsistent and even
elusive, overly sensitive to model specifications, while the link between minority
presence and incarceration seems to be strong (Pfaff, 2008). In regards to existence of
unemployment-incarceration link many studies did not find supporting evidence
(Michalowski and Pearson, 1990; Arvanites, 1992; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Smith,
2004; Yates and Fording, 2005; Spelman, 2009). Similarly, in regards to existence of the
inequality-incarceration relationship, lack of supporting evidence was reported by several
studies (Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Smith, 2004). Several
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studies also failed to find support for the poverty-incarceration link (Taggart and Winn,
1993, Listokin, 2003; Smith, 2004).
However, a meta-review of 44 studies (Chiricos and Delone, 1992) measuring the
effects of unemployment claims that regardless of the mediating effects of crime “labour
surplus is consistently and significantly related to prison population and prison
admissions when time-series and individual-level data” (p.421) are analyzed. Chiricos
and Delone (1992) also suggest that available data on unemployment underreport the
phenomena almost by 50 percent due to the removal of discouraged workers from the
statistics, lack specificity in regards to describing the underclass, and frequently exclude
jail populations which might be more homologous with the unemployed subproletariat
fractions of interest than stock prison populations. Overall, aggregate quantitative
measures of surplus labour and prison population leave many factors unaccounted for,
including “the value of labour, judicial anxiety, moral panic, or punitive ideology …
structural needs of capital … indicators of “social dynamite”” (Chiricos and Delone,
1992; p. 432) all of which are crucial for Rusche and Kirchheimer’s ([1939] 1968)
argument and its reiterations (Spitzer, 1975; Wacquant, 2001).
Findings from Chiricos and Bales’ (1991) study analyzing outcomes for 2,773
adult felons sampled from the totality of criminal cases in two Florida counties that were
initiated by police and made it to the level of the State’s Attorney show a strong positive
impact of unemployment on both pretrial and post-trial imprisonment, as well as
expected higher odds of imprisonment for unemployed black young men accused of
committing violent or public order offenses. Hochstetler and Shover (1997) analyzed data
from 269 urban counties in the U.S. over a ten-year period using the residual-change
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regression technique and found covariance in a state’s use of incarceration in relation to
both proportion of the young male (20-34 years of age) demographic group and the
reserve labour army (i.e., the surplus population measured by unemployment rate)
independent of fluctuations in street property crime (though violent crime was
significantly related), percent of non-white residents, residents in poverty, and average
income. D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2002) found that city-level unemployment is a
mediating variable between individual employment record and pretrial imprisonment, so
that, in cities characterized by high unemployment, jobless individuals charged with
armed robbery and burglary had higher odds of pretrial detention controlling for
contextual and individual variables, yet Spitzer’s (1975) “social dynamite” thesis was not
supported and jobless black defendants were not more likely to be incarcerated prior to
trial in cities with high unemployment.
Studies operating on higher levels of analysis also provide supporting evidence of
an unemployment-incarceration link. Lessan (1991) analyzed time series between 1948
and 1985 and found that inflation and unemployment rates for African American and
white men have a positive impact on incarceration rate trends (calculated as combined
federal and state prison population rate) even when violent crime, age structure of the
population, and cell capacity are held constant. The findings are interesting given that this
is one of only a few studies explicitly taking into account the possibility of simultaneous
crime-incarceration and incarceration-crime links (Lessan, 1991). Grimes and Rogers
(1999) found that in Mississippi state-level unemployment positively impacts admissions
and that a 1 percent increase in the former leads to a 2 percent “increase in the monthly
net flow of state inmates within two years” (p.754). Greenberg and West (2001) analyzed
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panel data for 1970, 1980, 1990 and found that unemployment had a significant positive
effect on state-level imprisonment rates. Sutton’s (2010) cross-national study analyzing a
time-series spanning from 1960 to 2000 for 15 developed Western democracies found
significant relationship between unemployment and imprisonment rate calculated as
combined population of convicted offenders and those awaiting trial.
Economic inequality seems to be associated with state incarceration rates as well
(Jackson, 2009). Arvanites and Asher (1995) found that economic inequality is positively
related to state-level incarceration rates and its indirect effect (through crime,
hypothesized as the outcome of diminished educational and occupational prospects) was
stronger than the direct effect (hypothesized as perceived economic underclass threat).
Arvanites and Asher (1998) also found that, controlling for crime, income inequality was
positively associated with total state incarceration rates defined as state plus local jail
population (though overall direct effect of crime was stronger than direct effect of
inequality) (p.216), and county jail incarceration rate as well. Interestingly, in the county
jail model the total effect of inequality and proportion nonwhite was stronger than that of
crime, but authors explain it away as a product of multicollinearity since opposite results
were reached for total state incarceration model and the state prison incarceration model
(Arvanites and Asher, 1998).
Jacobs and Helms (1996) compiled a time-series for 1950 – 1990 and found a
significant influence of economic inequality operationalized as variance of incomes on
combined federal and state admission rates. Going beyond the use of the Gini coefficient,
Jacobs and Helms (1996) computed the income variance as measure sensitive to the
presence of the rich individuals with the data from Current Population Survey and
41

Internal Revenue Service due to the fact that IRS data are more specific setting the
highest annual income bracket as 1 million dollars and up while early CPS established
25,000 dollars and up as the highest income bracket. Jacobs and Helms (1996) claim that
variance of income measure is associated with the proportion of individuals in the two
upper income categories while the Gini index better accounts for the proportion of
individuals in lower income categories and the gap between middle-income earners and
the poor. The Gini coefficient was not significantly associated with incarceration while
variance of incomes was, and this finding has important theoretical implications as it is
consistent with predictions about the use of incarceration to manage tensions in a society
marked by sharp economic division and hardening class lines (Jacobs and Helms, 1996).
Poverty also might be associated with incarceration, and research seems
suggestive of regional differences and historical contingency of the relationship.
Arvanites (1992) analyzed state-level data for 1980 and 1988 and found that poverty was
positively related to the state imprisonment rate in 1980 yet the relationship reversed and
became negative in 1988. A separate analysis splitting southern states and non-southern
states revealed that in the latter poverty was not associated with state incarceration rate
either for 1980 or for 1988 (Arvanites, 1992). Beckett and Western (2001) studied
welfare and prisons within the same framework of management of marginalized
populations and found a significant relationship between poverty and state incarceration
rate which also grew stronger over time from being very weak, almost non-existent in
1975 to weak positive in 1985 and strong positive in 1995. Interestingly, state welfare
generosity was negatively related to incarceration and the relationship also grew stronger
over time, which is interpreted as the emergence of a new penal-welfare regime (parallel
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with Wacquant’s (2001) argument), in which certain states shrink welfare programs while
relying more on imprisonment (Beckett and Western, 2001). Also, poverty seems to
impact both white and black incarceration rates, and a measure of poverty rate disparity
was significantly related to black and white discrepancies in state-level prison admissions
(Yates and Fording, 2005). Finally, states with higher income per capita seem to
incarcerate fewer inmates (Stemen and Rengifo, 2011).
Race is linked with a variety of criminal-justice processes and outcomes, but this
section is confined to a review of macro-level studies testing the minority presence
effects on state-level incarceration. Arvanites (1992) suggests that “percent black was not
only the strongest predictor of imprisonment rates … but its impact increased between
1980 and 1988” (p.38). McGarrell (1993) claims that controlling for violent crime and
excluding southern states from the analysis percent black is still positively related to
incarceration rate “whether of attempts to control surplus population or because of
cultural beliefs and attitudes towards punitiveness” (p.22) and interprets the findings as
supportive of the conflict perspective on crime and punishment. Arvanites and Asher
(1995) analyzed 1990 cross-sectional state-level data to test the conflict perspective
stipulating that minority presence has a direct impact on incarceration rate (hypothetically
via creating a cultural conflict or perceived threat to the racial control of economic and
political resources) or an indirect impact (through crime) and found that “percent
nonwhite has a significant and direct effect on imprisonment levels across the U.S. but
less of a direct effect in nonsouthern states” (p.27). Arvanites and Asher (1998) report
anomalous results i.e., “no clear evidence of a direct race effect” as “indirect effect was
greater than direct effect in four of the six equations” (p.214) which they interpret as
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supportive of the instrumental, functionalist perspective rather than the cultural conflict
or minority threat perspectives.
Contemporary studies using more sophisticated methodologies report results
concurring with earlier studies. Greenberg and West (2001) analyzed panel data (which is
superior to cross-sectional as it allows one to analyze actual rather than inferred change)
at three points in time, in 1970, 1980, and 1990, and found that gender-specified measure
of black population i.e., percent of black men, is significantly and positively related with
state imprisonment rates, including those serving a sentence of at least 12 months.
Contextual effect might be in place as the relationship between percent of black males
and incarceration is weaker in states with a large proportion of black residents, and the
results are consistent with both presence or absence of racial bias, as both whites and
blacks alike seem to be incarcerated at higher rates in the states with larger black
populations (Greenberg and West, 2001, p.639-640).
Jacobs and Carmichael (2001), in a pooled-time series studying 150 state-years
from 1970, 1980, and 1990, found that not only percent black but also percent Hispanic
have significant positive effects on state imprisonment rates and that the effects are
historically contingent as they get stronger in 1990. Beckett and Western (2001) find
evidence of historical contingency as well, as percent nonwhite has an overall positive
impact on incarceration but no or negative impact in 1975 and 1985. Stemen and Rengifo
(2011) also tested for dual minority threat, but unlike Jacobs and Carmichael (2001), they
found that only percent black but not percent Latino is significantly related to state-level
incarceration rates in a time-series between 1978 and 2004. Smith (2004) showed similar
results in a time-series between 1980 and 1995 as the minority threat, operationalized as a
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percent of black state residents was significant, while none of the socioeconomic threats
were significant. Nicholson-Crotty (2004) utilized a fixed-effects technique (which
controls for influence of alternative variables not directly specified in the model) to
analyze a pooled time-series for 1975-1998 and found that percent of black residents in a
state was significantly and positively associated both with prison admissions and
incarceration rates, and called for a study of incarceration rates disaggregated by race.
Some discord exists in the literature in regards to the impact of the size of the
black population on the discrepancy between disaggregated black and white
imprisonment rates and relative levels of imprisonment rates. Oliver (2011) asserts that
states with larger black population have lower black imprisonment rates, and Oliver and
Yocom (2004) claim that states with smaller black population have greater black-white
prison admission discrepancies, which is contrary to the minority threat hypothesis
(predicting that the larger the minority group the stronger the perceived threat resulting in
higher admissions and incarceration). Yates and Fording (2005) report that percent black
has positive impact on black imprisonment rate, as predicted by minority threat argument,
yet percent black has negative impact on black / white imprisonment rate disparity,
suggesting that states with smaller African American populations over-incarcerate
African Americans relative to whites, contrary to the minority threat argument. Keen and
Jacobs (2009) resolve the confusion by employing fixed-effects analysis eliminating
alternative explanations and find existence of an “inverted, U-shaped, nonlinear” (p.209)
interactive relationship between the size of black population and black/white prison
admissions. Racial arrest differences for property and violent crime do explain some
percent of variance in the dependent variable, as well as certain political contexts, but
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even controlling for that percent black is associated with admission discrepancies (Keen
and Jacobs, 2009).
Several studies failed to find any significant relationship between minority
presence and incarceration rates (Jacobs and Helms, 2001; Stucky, Heimer, Lang 2005;
Spelman, 2009). In the first study indicated above the measure of total nonwhite
population was used (Beckett and Western, 2001 also report weak results using similar
measure which they explain by low incarceration rates of Asian Americans), in the
second study the percent black was found nonsignificant, and neither percent black nor
percent Hispanic was associated with incarceration in the last study, questioning the
validity of minority threat hypothesis. Cross-national studies also report mixed results.
Ruddell (2005) studied cross-sectional data for the 100 richest nations and found that
countries with heterogeneous population did have higher incarceration rates. Sutton
(2010) analyzed a time-series for 15 rich, developed countries and did find a positive
effect of minority presence on incarceration but once the indicators of discrimination
were added to the model in order to fully test the conflict argument the relationship
actually becomes negative, suggesting that higher minority oppression results in lower
imprisonment which seems to be an artifact of contemporary time trends in the data and
the disappearance of legalized discrimination (which the measures capture) since the
World War II in the context of skyrocketing imprisonment. This prompts Sutton (2010)
to question whether percentage of minority can be used as a valid measure of group
conflict (p.10) and to doubt if the status of “subaltern” ethnoracial groups, including
indigenous people and immigrants, and the degree of conflict in different societies are
adequately captured by such a generic measure (p. 12).
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Literature on Democracy in Action Argument
It may be that incarceration is neither a utilitarian instrumental reaction to crime
nor an attempt to manage tensions between socioeconomic and ethnoracial groups in a
society but an expressive social policy sensitive to public ideological and cultural world
views. Garland (2001) offered a multidimensional grand narrative of the crime control
transformation in the U.S. and England which designated public opinion as the principal
source of the shift. The full theoretical model suggests that two sets of factors underlie
the change, namely the socioeconomic and cultural symptoms of late modernity on one
hand, and political as well as policy realignments associated with the rise of neoliberalism on the other hand. The first group of factors, among other things, radically
increased exposure of both poor and middle-class individuals to crime in the course of
their daily lives due to shifts in routine activities patterns, female workforce participation,
increased opportunities for crimes, and the decreased cohesion of informal communal and
situational control. Garland (2001) does not share the billiard-ball positivist reaction to
crime increase, though, suggesting instead that broad cultural adaptation and political
reinterpretation of crime control issues occurred within a wide context of diffuse
anxieties and uncertainties of modern life resulting in dethronement of the rehabilitative
paradigm that sought to alleviate individual or social deficiencies which lead to crime.
What emerged instead was a diverse, and somewhat contradictory, constellation of
policies aimed at control of the offender who was simultaneously redefined as a rational
agent making a criminal choice and bearing complete personal responsibility. In this
account, the middle-classes can be either seen as drifting rightward on the political
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spectrum or at least ceasing to actively support welfarist and rehabilitative strategies,
resulting in subsequent policy shifts (Garland, 2001).
American exceptionalism, allegedly embodied in the U.S. Constitution and
governmental structure, is a pertinent issue for understanding of relationship between
democracy and crime (Christie, 2001; Tonry, 2009). The U.S. constitution was written in
the context of a struggle against a tyrannical monarch and a remote, unaccountable
parliament, hence localization, decentralization, and a complex system of checks and
balances were seen as solutions, allowing for influence of the populace on a variety of
issues including those of criminal justice (Black, 1988). Contemporary America is the
only developed country which holds lay partisan elections for judges, and Switzerland is
the only other developed country allowing lay elections for prosecutors besides the U.S.
(Tonry, 2009). In addition, the contemporary American political system operates more on
adversarial, conflict principles with single-member districts, single-party governments in
a bipartisan system, rather than on proportional, cooperative principles within a multiple
party system (Tonry, 2009). These factors make American criminal justice more
responsive directly to the voting majority, as well as indirectly, via governors and other
political representatives. In Europe, criminal justice is a sphere with limited popular
input, as it is seen as the domain of pragmatic experts and independent judges, who are
assumed to be less prone to emotive retributive responses, and are remote from political
pressures to be able to demonstrate “tolerance from the above,” especially since some of
them experienced incarceration or internment (Christie, 2000, p.55).
Two distinct views on the relationship between the democracy and penal policies
exist, one problematizing the very notion of punishment in a democracy (Bosworth,
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2010) and the other stressing the opportunities for agency offered by democratic process
(Barker, 2009). Bosworth’s account (2010) tracing the evolution of scientific debates,
actual correctional practices, and juxtaposing these with lived experiences of inmates is
very critical of imprisonment, which is seen not as some peripheral phenomenon but the
very expression of sovereign power of the state, emphasizing continuities in the use of
exclusion and sensory deprivation throughout the history of American democracy, from
the early Protestant prisons aiming at religious conversion of inmates to the contemporary
diversified carceral constellation isolating illegal immigrants and suspected foreign
combatants. Bosworth (2010) is critical of a democracy de facto relying on consistent
segregation and inclusion on subordinate terms of de jure equal populations, her analysis
is Foucauldian in that it questions the power to punish and its proper role in the
realization of a substantively inclusive democratic social order, especially in the face of
globalization and its geopolitical discontents.
Barker’s (2009) account contextualizes democracy as an idea in concrete forms of
collective agency and governmental structures in a comparative analysis of three
American states, and emphasizes the potential opportunities democracy offers for
meaningful civic input which can have profound impact on the criminal justice policy
outputs. California’s political structure is decentralized which theoretically allows input
from diverse grass-roots organizations, yet the initiative process is often used as a
mechanism for translating public will into policy, and it is prone to sloganization and
dichotomization of complex social issues into binary yes/no vote so single-issue
advocacy groups thrive in such an environment which results in polarized political
participation and penal populism (Barker, 2009). On the other hand, Washington state
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political structures are more horizontal and inclusive, conducive to deliberative
democracy and in the context of high social capital and a functional civil society,
minimalist penal policies emerge, which seek to use the least amount of coercion and
reintegrate rather than stigmatize (Barker, 2009). Empirical research supports this point,
as half of the difference in incarceration rates between California and Washington is
attributed to differences in welfare generosity (Becket and Western, 2001). New York
carries out criminal justice decision-making in commissions dominated by specialists
highly insulated from public input, yet this technocratic pragmatism has resulted in a
differentiated set of penal policies, emphasizing incarceration for recidivists and violent
offenders, treatment for drug users, and intermediate, community-based penalties for
trivial offences (Barker, 2009). Thus, inclusive political participation and informed
deliberation, for Barker (2009), is a check against penal excesses.
Beckett and Godoy (2008) interpret the shift to punitiveness as a backlash against
the extension of formal legal rights to groups previously excluded from full participation
in the democratic process. In a grand narrative resembling these of Garland (2001) and
Wacquant (2001), Beckett and Godoy (2008) suggest that incarceration growth is integral
to the policies of neoliberalism and is, among other things, an attempt to deal with the
social fallout of economic crises and deregulation. In particular, the authors describe
specific developments enabling that punitiveness – namely, the popular support for
tough-on-crime rhetoric among status-anxious groups concerned about their legal,
symbolic, and economic standing as women, ethnoracial and sexual minorities are
gaining legal rights and the dynamics of globalization are dissolving boundaries, allowing
for the free movement of commodities and people (Beckett and Godoy, 2008). In this
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context, public support for punitiveness is a part of nostalgia for the pre-anomic days of
real or imaginary gemeinschaft, and an attempt to resurrect it by hollowing out the legal
and political gains of previously marginalized groups. This is accomplished by
politicizing disorder and crime and designating marginalized individuals as culprits.
Manza and Uggen (2006) developed an analogous expansion-contraction
argument in their quantitative historical study of disenfranchisement showing that it was
originally reserved for only those convicted of high crimes such as treason, yet in postCivil War America disenfranchisement was extended to regular felons to deprive exslaves of newly won liberties, based on the fact that a large black population in a state
was the strongest predictor of the enactment of disenfranchisement laws, and suggesting
that the echo of racism and classism can be recognized in recent expansion of
disenfranchisement in six states to include misdemeanor offenders. Miller (2008)
identified a subtler but crucial form of political exclusion in her study of crime control
policy formulation at the federal, state, and local levels. Her analysis of the witnesses
allowed to testify at policy hearings show that both at the U.S. Congress and the
Pennsylvania state legislature, federal law enforcement agency representatives as well as
single-issue advocacy groups vocalizing law-and-order rhetoric were prevalent, while
only at the local level in Philadelphia and Pittsburg did wider-focused citizen groups have
a strong voice, which resulted in a paradoxical situation where the individuals who were
most impacted by law enforcement, i.e. urban residents, had little or no influence on the
formulation of policy at the national and state levels (Miller, 2008).
Many of the abovementioned addressed the vague anxieties, nostalgic sentiments
and corresponding politicization of incivilities and crime within a perceived disorderly
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world of routine exposure to victimization in which sympathetic rehabilitative solidaristic
responses were lacking public support while narratives of personal responsibility, rational
choice, and retribution were ascending (Carrier, 2010). Crime became an object of
intense ideological debate, and also a metaphor for a nexus of social issues at the core of
American society, where opinions about appropriate penal responses are divided across
class, race, and cultural lines (Finckenauer, 1978; Gordon, 1994; Costelloe, Chiricos, and
Gertz, 2004). Bobo and Johnson (2004) found that black and white respondents, for
example, differ in their punitiveness as measured by support for the death penalty and
war on drugs, with blacks being less punitive than whites partly due to their belief in the
unfairness of the criminal justice system, and racial prejudice having a large effect on
white punitiveness, and to a lesser extent, on black punitiveness. Religious beliefs also
have an influence on matters of crime and punishment, with studies suggesting that
conservative protestants do not differentiate crime by seriousness, treating it all as
morally wrong, and that members of all Christian denominations are more punitive, as
measured by support for the death penalty, than non-believers (Curry, 1996; Wozniak and
Lewis, 2010), even though evidence of compassion and support for rehabilitation among
believers exists as well (Applegate et al., 2000; Unnever et al., 2005)
Citizen ideology also is associated with a variety of criminal justice attitudes,
processes and outcomes. Langworthy and Whitehead (1986) found that liberals are less
likely to support punitive measures than conservatives. Huang et al. (1996) found that
political conservatism of jurisdiction, measured by percentage supporting Republican
presidential candidates, is associated with courts issuing sentences of greater length to
violent offenders. Percival (2010) analyzed county-level data in California and found that
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increase in population conservatism corresponds with higher incarceration rates for black
and Hispanic offenders. Some research reports supportive evidence of citizens ideology’s
impact on state-level incarceration (Taggart and Winn, 1993; Greenberg and West, 2001;
Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Jackson, 2009) though other
studies do not find consistent significant association between these variables (Smith,
2004; Fording and Yates, 2005; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, 2005; Schneider, 2006;
Spelman, 2009; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011).
Taggart and Winn (1993) found that liberal ideology of state population measured
by percent of vote for liberal presidential candidate in 1972 elections was significantly
and negatively associated with state-level incarceration rate in the bivariate analysis of
cross-sectional 1984 data yet the relationship disappeared in the multiple regression.
However, the measure of state political culture, a nine-point scale indicating moralistictraditionalist cultural continuum, remained significant in multiple regression, with
traditionalist states being the ones in which the role of government was seen primarily in
terms of order maintenance (Taggart and Winn, 1993). Greenberg and West’s (2001)
panel analysis, operationalizing citizen ideology as a percentage of politically
conservative population in each state from 51 CBS News-New York Times polls, and
also using a percentage of population in each state affiliated with denominations literally
interpreting the Bible, found that both measures were independently positively associated
with state-level incarceration rates, suggesting that conservative political and
fundamentalist values of the citizenry might have effect on levels of punishment.
Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2001) time-series study utilizing fixed effects and
random effects analytic techniques found, consistent with Greenberg and West (2001),
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that both measures of citizen ideology on a liberal-conservative continuum and Christian
fundamentalism, are significantly associated with state-level incarceration (conservatives
and fundamentalists being associated with higher incarceration rates). Jacobs and
Carmichael (2001) used Berry et al.’s (1998) multidimensional measure of ideology
changeable over time, which included ratings of state congressional representatives, statelevel election data representing ideological splits, party presence in state legislature and
partisan control of governor’s office. Sorensen and Stemen (2002) also found supportive
evidence for the positive association of conservative citizen ideology with state-level
incarceration rates and admission rates using Berry et al.’s (1998) measure, while
government ideology (but not citizen ideology) was associated with drug offender
admissions. Finally, Jackson (2009) found significant negative influence of citizen liberal
ideology on incarceration rate in every model including these variables.
Literature on the Partisanship Hypothesis
Perhaps incarceration is not an instrumental response to crime, nor an attempt to
manage ethnoracial or economic tensions in a given society, nor even an expressive
response to public ideological views on crime but a social policy consistently
implemented by the Republican Party. Republican officials and politicians may favour
incarceration as it is consistent with their agenda emphasizing individual responsibility
and retributive justice for street criminals, or, as is suggested by some researchers,
increased law and order rhetoric and the use of incarceration is a pragmatic attempt to
resolve an electoral handicap due to the limited pool of voters benefitting from right-wing
economic policies and to gain support of less-affluent voters (Finckenauer, 1978;
Scheingold, 1991; Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz, 2004; Jacobs and Jackson, 2010). A
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time-series analysis of fluctuations in the salience of crime in the Gallup polls found that,
controlling for crime rate and media coverage, public concern with crime actually lagged
behind politicians’ pronouncements on the issue, which is suggestive of the important
role of law-and-order rhetoric initiated by Republican politicians in the mid-1960s as an
explanation of the subsequent skyrocketing rates of incarceration (Beckett, 1997).
Sociological literature suggests that Republican Party politicians consistently
employed tough-on-crime rhetoric in the post-World War II era (Finckenauer, 1978;
Tonry, 2009). Hofstadter (1965), a consultant for Goldwater in 1952 and 1958, wrote that
conservatives know “how much political leverage can be got out of the extreme
animosities,” even acknowledging that such divisive and paranoid style of politics is “not
always right-wing in affiliation” (p. 3). Hofstadter (1965) spoke of the entrenchment of
paranoid discourses in American politics and that many leaders do not view “social
conflict as something to be mediated and compromised” but rather as a “conflict between
good and absolute evil” (p.31) and stated that Goldwater broke with the legacy of
Republican party which historically allied itself with blacks and reoriented towards white
voters by rhetorically coupling urban unrest and racial issue with crime. Goldwater made
law-and-order a central theme in his 1964 campaign, second only to the government’s
role in creating a conducive atmosphere for free enterprise, and repeatedly made allusions
to civil unrest and crime, speaking of “violence in our streets … growing menace in our
country tonight, to personal safety, to life, to limb and property” (Schneider, 2003, p.242)
and suggesting programmatically that “moderation in pursuit of justice is no virtue” (p.
245).
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Phillips, who served as a special assistant to Nixon’s campaign manager in 1968,
wrote a controversial book in 1969 which directly spoke of electoral advantages derived
from regional, religious, ethnoracial divisions and claimed that these were instrumental in
creating a conservative majority for the years to come, suggesting that anti-black
sentiments will channel urban Catholics and white blue-collar workers into the
Republican Party. Phillips (1969) talked about racial polarization as being politically
fruitful, predicting that this strategy will lead to weakening of the Republican Party in the
Northeast but that this would be offset by the gains in the South and West. Although the
book stated that the ideas it contained by no means corresponded to official presidential
campaign strategy, some commentators suggested that a dramatic discrepancy would be
unlikely, given Phillips’ lead position in the campaign and his subsequent service in the
Justice Department, under the same Nixon campaign manager John Mitchell, who
emerged as Attorney General (Weaver, 1969). A combination of racial polarization and
tough-on-crime rhetoric turned out to be effective, as Nixon won presidency, and the
same approach, exemplified by the electoral use of black murderer and rapist Willie
Horton, helped George H.W. Bush defeat Michael Dukakis in 1988 (Jacobs and Jackson,
2010).
Republican politicians kept their promise of harsher sanctions, as research shows
supportive evidence of the link between Republican strength and incarceration or
admission rates (Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Beckett and Western, 2001; Jacobs and
Carmichael, 2001, Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Smith, 2004; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang,
2005; Yates and Fording, 2005; Keen and Jacobs, 2009; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011). In a
broader sense, Republican strength is seen as tied to a variety of criminal justice
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processes and outcomes, including the legality of the death penalty in a given state, the
number of prison sentences, higher execution odds for convicts on death row, longer
sentences for black defendants, longer sentences for juvenile offenders, and lower
likelihood of enactment of bills reducing reliance on incarceration (Jacobs and
Carmichael, 2002; Weidner and Frase, 2003; Jacobs et al., 2007; Helms and Costanza,
2010; Carmichael, 2010; Brown, 2012).
Jacobs and Helms (1996) found that, on the national level, Republican strength
was significantly positively associated with combined federal and state admission rate
lagged by one year in their analysis of annual time-series for a period between 1950 and
1990. Republican strength was operationalized as a cumulative scale taking into account
the presence of Republican politicians in the senate, congress, and the White House, as
well as the percentage of Gallup polls respondents who self-identified as Republicans,
quantifying both national and state-level dimensions of phenomena. Jacobs and Helms
(2001) ran a similar time-series analysis for 1950-1990 and found that combined federal
and state incarceration rate lagged by two years is significantly and positively associated
with presence of a Republican president and also with a measure of consecutive
Republican presidential terms supporting the partisan hypothesis and suggesting that the
longer a GOP president stayed in office the higher was the incarceration rate, even
though in the last years of the time-series the incarceration growth was fading.
On the state level, where the bulk of the incarceration takes place, Republican
strength defined by presence of a Republican governor and percentage of Republicans in
state legislatures, again positively impacts the state imprisonment rate, controlling for
violent crime, in the analysis of 150 state-years from 1970, 1980, and 1990 (Jacobs and
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Carmichael, 2001). Beckett and Western (2001) arrive at similar conclusions as the
percentage of Republicans in state legislatures was positively associated with
incarceration rates in 1975, 1985, and 1995. Smith (2004) concurs with previous results,
suggesting also that for each Democratic member of a state legislature, the incarceration
rate goes down by seven inmates per 100,000 of population though also claims that
Republican control of a state’s governor’s office is not associated with incarceration
(which is counterintuitive). Stucky, Heimer, and Lang (2005) provide analogous findings
in their analysis of annual time-series for 1978-1996, where the percentage of Republican
legislators but not Republican governors influences admissions to prison. However, the
relationship between Republican Party legislators and admissions is contingent on
electoral competition, with higher incarceration in jurisdictions with higher competition
and little effect of Republican legislators on admissions in low competitive districts,
which is consistent with the overall premise of the partisanship argument, but also adds
contextual specificity rather than portraying Republicans as indiscriminately punitive
(Stucky, Heimer, Lang, 2005).
Race is another variable which adds specificity to the partisanship hypothesis. It
seems that political variables have more impact on black rather than white incarceration
rates, since Republican legislatures, Republican governors, and judicial conservatism
positively impact black rates, as well as black-white incarceration disparity, while only
the presence of Republican governor was positively associated with the white rate where
the effect was seven times smaller (Yates and Fording, 2005). Interestingly, the effect of
Republican legislature, Republican governor, and judicial conservatism faded as the
relative size of the state population that is black increased, which is contrary to the
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minority threat hypothesis, but the authors suggest that once blacks become a substantial
voting block, the effects of partisanship and conservative elite on incarceration rate are
diminished (Yates and Fording, 2005). Keen and Jacobs (2009) criticize the notion of a
linear negative relationship between the black population size and prison admissions,
suggesting instead that a “inverted, U-shaped, nonlinear relationship” (p.209) exists, but
they also point out the significance of Republican strength in predicting racial disparity in
prison admissions, even while controlling for conservative ideology. Keen and Jacobs
(2009) use a different approach in defining Republican strength, employing a percentage
of vote for Republican presidential candidate which was significant, while Republican
governor presence was nonsignificant, which they explain by the “heavy emphasis
Republican presidential candidates placed on racial code words in their law-and-order
campaigns” (p.230).
Spending on corrections seems to be the specific mechanism linking Republican
strength with incarceration. Caldeira and Cowart (1980) found that GOP presidential
administrations expended more funds on corrections and criminal justice compared to
their Democratic counterparts. Stucky, Heimer and Lang (2007) validate that claim on the
state level as they found that percentage of Republicans in a state legislature is positively
associated with spending on corrections, while governors had no such impact. Spelman
(2009) further solidified the findings of previous research, suggesting that spending
explains 30 percent of the variance in total prison population under state jurisdiction,
including private, federal and local jail populations, and suggesting that political
variables such as Republican control of legislature increase spending, which goes into the
creation of additional prison capacities. Brown (2012) adds also that the odds of enacting
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incarceration-reducing bills’ are lower in states with a strong GOP presence in their
legislatures and that exhibit a greater dependence on federal money to operate state
corrections. Recent research focuses on alternative mechanisms, namely on influence of
Republican-dominated political contexts on prosecutorial plea bargaining behaviour and
on judicial sentencing behaviour, suggesting that the proximity of elections is associated
with increased conviction odds and less dismissals by prosecutors, and that the proportion
of county votes for Republican state attorney and temporal closeness of judge’s election
have a positive nonlinear impact on harshness of sentence (Dyke, 2007; Huber and
Gordon, 2004).
Literature on Electoral Cycle Argument
Perhaps incarceration is not an instrumental response to crime, but a social policy
which is implemented by both parties during the election cycle to broaden their appeal to
voters. If Durkheim ([1893] 1972) was right that crime has a potential to increase group
solidarity as definitions of and responses to crime are based on strongly defined
sentiments shared by the members of a given society, then such a consensus can be an
attractive electioneering device for either party. Caplow and Simon (1999) assert that any
candidate for political office in the U.S. has to portray her/himself as committed to harsh
penalties for street criminals in order to be electable. Chevigny (2003) suggests that fear
of crime is a potent fuel for political campaigns especially in unequal societies
characterized by an incapacity or reluctance of government to use ameliorative social
policies. Enns (2010) claims that the American public is punitive, and that this factor
explains the growth in federal, i.e., nationwide incarceration rates between 1953 and
2003, even controlling for crime rate, economic inequality, drug use, and party in power,
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suggesting that Republicans and Democrats were both receptive to retributive collective
sentiments.
However appealing linear narratives of universal public punitiveness may be, a
detour is in order as the research shows more complexity and ambiguity on the issue.
Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate (2000) argue that the public does support or even favour
harsh sanctions but that there is a lot of ambiguity and willingness to downgrade
penalties, as well as wide support for intermediate sanctions if no violence was involved
and the offender is young and shows potential for normalization. Tyler and Boeckmann
(1997) found that support for the “three strikes and you are out” habitual felon law in
California had less to do with fear of crime and perceptions of dangerousness and more
with classical Durkheimian concerns about the moral cohesion of society, traditional
family roles, and growing diversity (this factor was equally salient among whites and
minorities, suggesting perhaps that ethnocentrism is a better explanation rather than
racism per se). Roberts (1992) concedes that the public does support punitive sanctions
yet that it is no more punitive than the judges and that politicians overestimate public
punitiveness.
Wacquant (2010) points out that contemporary situation with incarceration is a
“bipartisan achievement” as the growth was “uninterrupted by changes in political
majorities in statehouses, Congress, and the White House” (p.77). In reexamining the
legal and political roots of the growth, other literature recognizes the salience of the Safe
Streets Act of 1968, which “from its inception … was controlled by an emerging
coalition of southern Democrats and western Republicans who shared a social
conservatism and growing anxiety about crime” (Simon, 2007, p.92). The Act passed
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almost unanimously, allocating generous financial streams in the form of block grants to
the states modernizing their police and corrections in line with 1967 President’s
Commission on Crime vision emphasizing law enforcement use of technology and
offender rehabilitation (Simon, 2007). The next paradigmatic piece of legislation is the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which allocated over $9
billion in prison funding and called for an additional 100,000 police officers to strengthen
the force (U.S. Department of Justice, 1994). Both the 1968 and 1994 laws were passed
in a Democratic-dominated Congress and with Democratic president, in the context of
extreme electoral competition and a Republican revanche, as in 1968, six months after
the law passed, Republicans won the presidency, and in 1994, just a few days after that
law’s enactment, Republicans gained majority in the House of Representatives for the
first time in 40 years, and also captured the Senate (Simon, 2007). The fact that both bills
were passed in the midst of presidential or congressional campaigns lends tentative face
validity to the electoral cycle hypothesis.
Empirical research suggests that, on the national level, there is support for the
impact of electoral cycle on incarceration. Jacobs and Helms (1996) found a significant
positive impact of a dummy variable designating presidential election year on cumulative
federal and state prison admission rate in their time-series for 1950-1990 which was
nonpartisan in nature i.e. not-contingent on the partisan orientation of the presidential
election actual winner. This was explained by adoption of law-and-order stance by
Democratic Party presidential candidates due to its popularity with voters. The finding of
significant positive nonpartisan effect of presidential election year was replicated with a
less volatile dependent variable than prison admissions, namely with cumulative federal
62

and state imprisonment rate, and research suggested that during national campaigns
candidates can not risk appearing soft on crime (Jacobs and Helms, 2001).
Research suggests that mechanisms of presidential impact on imprisonment
include allocation of money for criminal justice issues, presidential agenda setting power
residing in rhetorical salience and frequency of crime issues in speeches, and also
presidential influence on congress (Caldeira and Cowart, 1980; Marion, 1992; Oliver,
2003). Interestingly, Marion (1992) found that though “Reagan and Bush have each made
more speeches than any other presidents, neither party stands out as being more
concerned with crime than the other” (p.169) and that there was no conclusive evidence
that there are more crime-related speeches during election years compared to nonelection years. Oliver (2003) found that a presidents’ activity on crime has a significant
temporally lagged impact on Congressional committees’ crime-related hearings. Also,
Oliver and Marion (2006) replicated Caldeira and Cowart (1980) study and showed that
presidential allocation of finances to criminal justice is becoming less substantive than in
the past, i.e., less contingent on crime rates, and “more symbolic and is often a gesture
used by presidents to gain political and popular support” (p. 451). Spelman (2009) further
strengthened that argument by demonstrating a strong positive impact of presidential
election cycle on correctional spending.
Since presidential debates are symbolic and significant part of crime politics is
local (Zimring and Hawkins, 1991) additional validation of the electoral cycle hypothesis
is given by supportive state-level results (Smith, 2004; Yates and Fording, 2005).
Gubernatorial election cycle significantly and positively impacts incarceration in Smith’s
(2004) study, while presidential election cycle has no effect on state-level incarceration,
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and the author claims that previous research has misinterpreted state-level effect for
national-level effect, as only the 1980 presidential election year was significant and
negative in the analysis. Further support for state-level election effect and important
theoretical refinement comes from Yates and Fording (2005), who found that
gubernatorial elections have positive significant effects on black incarceration rates but
no such effect on white incarceration rates. Spelman (2009) reported anomalous results as
neither presidential nor gubernatorial electoral cycle was associated with state-level
incarceration rates.
Oliver (2010) found that both parties adopt tough-on-crime stances and that
ideology does not matter, but partisan control of government and electoral competition
do, with higher competition associated with higher incarceration for black state residents.
Marion, Smith and Oliver (2009) concur stating that “Republican governors did not
devote more of their speeches to crime issues” (p. 469), that governors from both parties
were equally likely to use symbolic rather than concrete language and “Democratic
governors did not support more liberal anticrime policies than Republicans” (p. 471).
Interestingly, state-level gubernatorial electoral cycle did not impact correctional
spending nor did presence of a Republican governor, yet “district level competition is
marginally related to spending” (Stucky, Heimer, Lang, 2007, p.114). Spelman (2009)
also found no evidence of gubernatorial election cycle effect on correctional spending.
Unah and Coggins (2010) suggest that gubernatorial rhetoric strongly impacts
imprisonment rates controlling for crime rates, unemployment, police capacity, and state
ideological climate, but in a manner contextualized by governors’ institutional power
since strong governors have multiple channels of influence on incarceration policy such
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as funding requests, rejection of bills, and liaisons with various administrators and
governmental bodies. Punitive gubernatorial rhetoric, as research suggests, sets the
agenda for the operation of the entire state criminal justice system which responds,
judging by incarceration rate, regardless of the crime rate (Unah and Coggins, 2010).
Literature on Criminal Justice Policy Hypothesis
Criminological research suggests that the prison population is influenced by a
myriad of internal criminal justice factors, including the certainty of arrest and odds of
conviction, as the criminal justice system operates in a manner of a funnel whereby only
1 out of 100 felonies result in a conviction and prison time (Zimring and Hawkins, 1991;
Blumstein and Beck, 1999). It may be that punishment is an artifact of criminal justice
policies and available institutional alternatives rather than an instrumental response to the
reality of crime or crime as a constructed social issue. Literature shows that in late 1970s
state legislatures as well as the U.S. Congress began enacting laws constraining the
discretion of judges in regards to sentencing and the discretion of other actors in the
criminal justice system (Tonry, 1999) so that indeterminate sentencing policies were
increasingly replaced by various structured sentencing policies. By 1996, 14 states
adopted determinate sentencing versus 36 states with indeterminate sentencing, and by
2002 17 states had adopted determinate sentencing, while 18 states adopted presumptive
sentencing, and 8 states operated via voluntary guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice,
1996; Stemen, Rengifo, Wilson, 2005).
In general, determinate sentencing is characterized by a “fixed term … and a set
release date with no review by an administrative agency (parole board)” (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1996, p.1) and presumptive sentencing can be either determinate
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or indeterminate but constrains judges’ decision-making via either offense-centered
systems or “grid-based guidelines” (Engen, 2009, p.323) which demand the judge to
substantiate any deviation from the range of pre-established sentences in writing and
establish appellate examination of the deviation (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996).
Criminologists suspected that the shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing
might have consequences for the size of prison population, perhaps via increased
admissions or increased time served for the average offender, and the removal of releases
contingent on parole boards (Blumstein, 1988; Zimring and Hawkins, 1991; Cristie,
2000).
In general, sentencing is an important determinant of incarceration. Blumstein and
Beck (1999) found that 88 percent of the incarceration growth between 1980 and 1996 is
attributable to the increasing likelihood of conviction to real prison time and the
increasing length of the sentences while only 12 percent of the growth is explained by
crime rate increase. Empirical research demonstrates that determinate sentencing is
associated with changes in state-level incarceration (Marvel, 1995; Marvel and Moody,
1996; Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001, Smith, 2004; NicholsonCrotty, 2004; Yates and Fording, 2005; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011). Some research found
determinate sentencing to be nonsignificant in regards to state-level incarceration
(Taggart and Winn, 1993; Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, 2005;
Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn, 2009).
Marvel (1995) found that sentencing guidelines “are associated with declines in
prison population growth in the six states where legislators decreed that guideline framers
consider prison capacity” (p.696) in setting the length of prison sentences. Marvel and
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Moody (1996) found divergent effects of determinate sentencing, as in Indiana the
relationship with incarceration was positive while in Washington and Minnesota the
relationship was negative, and no significant relationship was observed in seven other
states in a time-series for 1976-1984, plus determinate sentencing positively influenced
commitments in California and Indiana but not in other states. Several studies show that
determinate sentencing has a significant negative impact on state-level incarceration
(Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Smith, 2004). NicholsonCrotty (2004) criticized the findings of cross-sectional studies and claimed that the timeseries methodology is more appropriate, showing that determinate sentencingincarceration relationship is mediated by prison capacity and correctional spending, so
“when mandatory guidelines are linked to capacity and expenditures, these policies have
had either a negative or nonsignificant” (p.395) effect on prison commitment rates, while
mandatory guidelines non-contingent on resources had a positive effect on commitment
and incarceration.
Contemporary research provides more specificity concerning sentencing effects
on the prison population. Yates and Fording (2005) show that determinate sentencing has
a significant negative impact on white incarceration rates but nonsignificant for black
incarceration. However, in a model testing interactive effects of black incarceration rate
and black / white incarceration disparity, determinate sentencing has a significant positive
impact on racial incarceration disparity (Yates and Fording, 2005). Spelman (2009) tested
the effects of several types of sentencing laws and found that presumptive sentencing has
both an immediate and a long-term negative impact on incarceration which gets stronger
over time, truth-in-sentencing laws requiring inmates to serve a determinate significant
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proportion of their sentence have small initial but substantial positive effect over time,
and habitual offender laws such as two-strike or three-strike laws have little effect,
perhaps because they are applicable only to a small specialized contingent of offenders.
Stemen and Rengifo (2011) provide a refined account of sentencing effects, claiming that
determinate sentencing regardless of other policies negatively impacts incarceration rates,
that policies constraining release decisions i.e., parole, have more implications for prison
population than policies restricting sentencing, that presumptive sentencing only reduces
the prison population when done in tandem with determinate sentencing, and that
voluntary sentencing guidelines have no effect on incarceration even with determinate
sentencing, because judges can ignore the advised sentence and increase it.
Some researchers claim that sentencing had only limited effects on incarceration
growth. Sorensen and Stemen (2002) assert that determinate sentencing, mandatory
sentencing, and truth-in-sentencing impact neither commitments nor incarceration rates,
that only presumptive sentencing is negatively associated with admission and
incarceration rates, and that three strike laws appear to increase prison admission for
those arrested on drug violations charges, but overall sentencing policies did not have a
strong effect on prison population. Stucky, Heimer, and Lang (2005) make the even
stronger claim that, contrary to previous research, presumptive sentencing has no effect
on state-level incarceration rates. Zhang, Maxwell and Vaughn (2009) used hierarchical
multivariate linear models and found that “on the aggregate, sentencing reforms are not
directly related to change in state prison populations” (p.190) and that only the abolition
of parole is negatively associated with incarceration, that three-strikes laws decrease new
commitments and voluntary guidelines increase commitments, that no element of
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sentencing reform was associated with time served, so that overall sentencing had a small
impact and then only insofar it increased admissions. Pfaff (2011) makes similar claim,
saying that increases in incarceration are due to increased admissions, as there is no
evidence of increased length of stay in prison, contrary to Blumstein and Beck (1999). An
important critique of the nonsignificance of the sentencing argument is that research
ignores prosecutorial discretion and charging decisions, and there is some evidence of a
reluctance on the part of prosecutors to use harshest laws while charge downgrading
influences sentencing (Engen, 2009)
The effect of alternative sanctions, such as probation, on incarceration is
completely ignored by the research literature, a significant deficiency given that some
states with small incarceration rates have a substantial proportion of their population on
probation supervision (Phelps, 2011). Only Smith (2004) included probation rates in his
study and found no significant association with state-level incarceration rates. The effects
of marijuana decriminalization are neglected as well, yet knowing that drug convictions
account for 29 percent of incarceration growth between 1980 and 1996 (Blumstein and
Beck, 1999) it is not illogical to suggest that states where the penalty for possession is
removed may have lower incarceration rates. Smith (2004) did not find support for this
claim, but Spelman (2009) did find that marijuana decriminalization had an immediate
negative impact on incarceration rates which grew even stronger in the long run, and was
exceeded only by the effects of violent crime, presumptive sentencing, and spending; he
also showed that decriminalization was associated with decreased spending on
corrections.
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of the current project and
its methodology. I will begin by discussing the general issues such as the type of research
method I use, the project’s spatial and temporal scope, as well as the unit of analysis.
Then I will discuss the data and data collection in general, and my dependent and
independent variables specifically. Finally, I will describe the analytic technique and
display a generic equation for the multilevel model utilized in this research.
This project is a theory-driven secondary data analysis of state-level time-series
trends in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005. I use aggregate state-level data to explore the
association between a variety of socioeconomic, demographic, and political factors and
incarceration because this approach allows linking multiple theoretical accounts about the
functioning of society and outcomes in the penitentiary system. Specifically, I intend to
test the empirical validity of major theoretical accounts of the change in incarceration
rates over time, including the orthodox utilitarian argument, the conflict or underclass
perspective, the democracy in action hypothesis, the partisan use of incarceration
argument, the electoral cycle hypotheses, and the policy artifact view. The eclectic
approach allows me to test the merits of competing explanations.
The population of interest includes all 50 U.S. states. Temporal dimension of the
study extends beyond a cross-sectional analysis into a time-series covering the period
from 1980 to 2005. The time span is appropriate to address the research question since it
focuses on the years of the imprisonment boom and extends into the period marked by
the leveling-off of the incarceration rates. The state-year is the proposed unit of analysis
for this study. I choose state-year units of analysis because they are appropriately aligned
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with my research question focusing on the explanation of incarceration rates which vary
widely at the state-level and over time, and I will employ analytic techniques which can
adequately deal with hierarchical data in which repeated measures, in my case –
individual years, are clustered in groups – in my case, in states.
In regard to temporality, sampling for the proposed project is theoretically-driven
in that it focuses on the years marked by the extreme growth of incarceration rates and
the following decade of stabilization, and also driven by reasons of convenience or data
availability since creating long exhaustive time series is problematic and the data from
the 1970s have significant gaps in regard to explanatory variables. Geographically
speaking we include the whole population of interest which is all 50 American states.
However, two states have been dropped from the analysis, Nebraska – because it has a
unicameral legislature which makes it impossible to calculate average percent of
Democratic seats in lower and upper chamber of state legislature, and Louisiana –
because there were major issues with missing data. All but four variables had a complete
number of observations for the required 1248 state-years, yet due to missing data in the
political competition measures a listwise deletion was performed which reduced the
number of state-years to 1131, which is an adequate quantity of observations to obtain
robust regression models.
Data and Data Collection
In order to evaluate the relationships between incarceration rates and
socioeconomic, demographic, and political factors I have performed a secondary data
analysis using a nation-wide state-level dataset entitled “State Politics Data with
Judiciary Politics Data” compiled under primary investigator Stephanie Lindquist (2007)
71

from the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt University which includes timeseries data from 1975 to 2004. The dataset is publically available at the State Politics and
Policy Quarterly website in a variety of file formats, and it is organized as a multiple
records dataset in which every state has multiple annual records, one per state per year
per variable which is crucial for the SAS Mixed Procedure which I use for analysis
(Singer, 1998). The dataset is appropriate as it is aligned with the logic of my research,
specific hypotheses, and includes a substantial number of key explanatory and control
variables at the state-level.
In addition, I used “Measurement of Partisan Balance of State Government” MS
Excel format dataset publically available at the State Politics and Policy Quarterly
website compiled by Carl Klarner (with 2007 updates) to extract data on partisan control
of the state-level executive branch (i.e. governors’ party) and on partisan control of state
legislatures. The dataset is appropriate as it is aligned with my partisan control of state
government hypothesis and units of analysis, includes all fifty states and the explanatory
variables pertaining to the partisan strength at the state governments. Finally, I used
Shufeldt and Flavin’s (2011) MS Excel dataset to extract values for political competition
estimates, the Ranney Index and Holbrook Van Dunk Measure, from 1970 to 2003. That
dataset was generously shared with me by Mr. Shufeldt and Mr. Flavin.
I had to perform some primary data collection, or at least data location and entry,
as the bulk of “State Politics Data with Judiciary Politics Data” (2007) variable values did
not go beyond 1994 or 1997, and many variables of interest were not included. To find
values for 1997-2005 period, and also for some missing years in the 1980s, I consulted
multiple annual editions of reference literature such as the Sourcebook of Criminal
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Justice Statistics, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, the Book of the States, Probation and Parole in the United
States, and the Digest of Education Statistics (see Table 1 in the next section for details).
After I found the values for the variables of interest, I entered them into the Excel
spreadsheets which I later combined with time-series from “State Politics Data with
Judiciary Politics Data” (2007) and finally merged into SAS for statistical analysis. I was
very cautious during data entry and always double-checked the values I entered followed
by frequencies checks in SPSS or SAS. Only one typo was found and fixed during preanalysis data cleaning stage.
I compiled an exhaustive time-series for sixteen major variables so each state had
perfect amount of observations per every year per variable. Yet citizen ideology measure
was missing for every state for 2005, 29 observations for divorce rate were missing due
to California, Indiana and Hawaii non-reporting of divorces and dissolutions for some
years, and both measures of political competition, the Ranney partisan state government
control index and Holbrook Van Dunk electoral competition index were missing for 2004
and 2005 because these indexes are calculated by political scientists for eight-year cycles
and in 2012 not all of the data necessary for calculation was available. We decided to
balance group sizes (Garson, 2013), and even though the statistical technique employed
for analysis is capable of handling missing data, listwise deletion was performed i.e. all
cases that had missing values for any of the variables were omitted from final analysis, so
the maximum number of observations dropped from 1248 to 1131, a 9 percent reduction.
I performed multilevel analysis of select models on both 1248 and 1131 maximum
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observations, and unemployment and marijuana decriminalization were significantly
negatively associated with incarceration in the former but not in the latter case.
Description of Dependent and Independent Variables
To test several competing theoretical accounts of incarceration, I use state-level
incarceration rate per 100,000 as a dependent variable. The “State Politics Data with
Judiciary Politics Data” (2007) dataset included incarceration rates for 1980 – 1994
period for every state, and I have obtained missing data from the various annual editions
of The Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, an authoritative source of various data
on criminal justice processes and characteristics funded by Bureau of Justice Statistics of
U.S. Department of Justice and operated by University of Albany, School of Criminal
Justice, Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center and offered for public access online.
To be specific, The Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics defines incarceration rate as
a number of inmates serving a sentence of one year or longer per 100,000 state resident
population. Although some researchers proposed to analyze annual prison admission
rates or aggregate institutionalization rates including both inmates and patients in the
mental hospitals (Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Harcourt, 2007), I side with the researchers
considering the state-level incarceration rate a more relevant and comprehensive measure
of punitiveness taking into account likelihood of imprisonment, length of sentences, and
early releases (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Jackson, 2009). Univariate analysis of my
dependent variable indicates that it is normally distributed.
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Table 2: Variables: Sources and Measures
Variables
Dependent Variable
Incarceration Rate per 100,000

Measure

Source

Inmates serving sentences of at least 1 year per
100,000 population

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Geographic
Profile of Employment and Unemployment
Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the
United States
Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program
Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program
Galbraith and Hale (2006)
State Politics and Policy Quarterly. 2005. State
Politics Data with Judiciary Politics Data .
Klarner (2003), Klarner (2007)

Probation Rate per 100,000

Homicide, rape, robbery, assault per 100,000 population
Burglary, larceny, vehicle theft per 100,000 population
Unemployed individuals as a percent of civilian
noninstitutional population 16 and older.
Individuals below poverty as a percent of state
population.
Estimated percent of population which is African
Estimated percent of population which is Hispanic
Income inequality index, 1 = absolute inequality
Berry et al. (1998) ideology scale, higher score =
more liberal
Average number of Democratic seats in both
chambers of state legislatures
Dummy measure of partisan control of executive
power in the state, 1 = Democratic governor
Dummy measure of electoral cycle, 1 = gubernatorial
election year
Dummy measure, 1 = presence of laws establishing
fixed sentence length and abolishing discretionary
Dummy measure, 1 = presence of three-strikes laws
establishing super-penalties for repeat offenders
Dummy measure, 1 = presence of law decriminalizing
possession of 1 ounce of marijuana
Individuals under probation supervision per 100,000

Control Variables
Divorce Rate per 1,000

Divorces per 1,000 population

Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
National Vital Statistics System
National Center for Education Statistics, Digest
of Education Statistics

Independent Variables
Violent Crime Rate per 100,000
Property Crime Rate per 100,000
Percent Unemployed
Percent in Poverty
Percent African American
Percent Hispanic
Gini Coefficient
Citizen Ideology
Percent Democratic Legislators
1 if Democratic Governor
1 if Gubernatorial Election Year
1 if Determinate Sentencing Law
1 if Habitual Offender Law
1 if Marijuana Decriminalization Law

State spending on primary and secondary education as
a percent of gross state product
Index measuring partisan control of state government
calculated for 8-year periods, 1 = complete
Democratic control
Holbrook Van Dunk Index 8 year period Index measuring district-level electoral competition
calculated for 8-year periods, 100 = perfect
competition
Spending on Primary and Secondary
Education as Percent GSP
Ranney Index 8 year period

Klarner (2003). The Council of State
Governments, The Book of the States
The Council of State Governments, The Book
of the States
Stemen and Rengifo (2011)
Chen (2008)
MacCoun et al. (2009)
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and
Parole in the United States

Shufeldt and Flavin (2011)
Shufeldt and Flavin (2011)

Table 2 above provides a detailed description of the 15 independent variables and
4 dependent variables which I use to test six competing accounts of incarceration change
in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005. Key explanatory variables for the utilitarian
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hypothesis are the violent crime rates combining instances of homicide, rape, robbery,
and assault per 100,000 state residents, and the property crime rates combining instances
of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft per 100,000 respectively. Underclass
hypothesis is operationalized by five variables, including three socioeconomic variables
such as percent of state residents that are unemployed, percent of individuals in poverty,
and Gini coefficient measuring the income inequality where one represents complete
inequality and zero represents perfect equality, and two demographic variables such as
percent of state residents that are African American and percent of Hispanic residents
respectively. Key explanatory variable for the democracy in action hypothesis is a
dynamic annual citizen ideology scale ranging from zero to a hundred where high values
represent liberalism and lower values represent conservatism computed by Berry et al.
(1998) and available in the “State Politics Data with Judiciary Politics Data” (2007)
dataset. The partisan use of incarceration hypothesis is operationalized by two variables,
the partisan control of the executive branch of state government i.e. the party of the
governor, and the partisan control of the legislative branch of state government i.e. the
average percent of Democratic seats in both chambers of state legislatures. The predictor
variable for the electoral cycle hypothesis is a dummy variable where one represents
gubernatorial election year in a given state. Finally, four variables operationalize the
criminal justice policies hypothesis, one continuous variable – the probation rate per
100,000 of state residents, and three dummy variables, where one represents presence of
the three-strikes law, determinate sentencing law, and marijuana decriminalization law in
a given state for particular year between 1980 and 2005. Additional information on my
explanatory variables is contained in the chapter four of my dissertation.
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Following Smith’s study (2004) I use four control variables in my multilevel
analysis, including the violent and property crime rates per 100,000 state residents, state
divorce rates per 1,000, and the state spending on primary and secondary education as a
percentage of state gross product. In order to contribute to the literature and expand our
understanding of the relationship between incarceration and the socioeconomic,
demographic, and political variables I also include two measures of partisan competition
used in political science literature, the Ranney index and Hoolbrook Van Dunk measure,
as additional control variables.
Ranney index (1976) is a measure of partisan composition of legislatures and
governors’ offices, i.e. a measure of partisan control of the state government, coded so
that 1 represents complete Democratic control and .5 represents complete Republican
control. Index takes into account proportion of seats in both chambers of state legislature,
Democratic percentage in governor’s elections, and proportion of time legislative and
executive state branches were controlled by Democratic Party. Holbrook Van Dunk
(1993) is a measure of the degree of competitiveness of state legislature elections, i.e. a
measure of electoral vulnerability, coded so that a hundred represents complete
competitiveness (this value is actually impossible as long as somebody wins) and zero
represents low competitiveness. Measure takes into account percentage of votes cast for
the winning candidate, margin of victory, whether the seat is seat is “safe” (55 percent
and up votes cast for winner), and if the seat was contested or not. Political scientists
suggest that Ranney index better fits models implying partisan competition and Holbrook
Van Dunk better fits models implying public pressure and policy outcomes (Shufeldt and
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Flavin, 2011), so I will use each measure in a separate model to tap into different
dimensions of the state-level political context.
Analytic Technique
I start my analysis with presenting the descriptive statistics for the sample as a
whole to familiarize readers with the data, variable measures, means, and standard
deviations. Then I present visual representations such as time-trend graphs to depict
change in my major variables over time and scatterplots to demonstrate presence or
absence of bivariate relationships between incarceration and variables of interest. I
finalize the preliminary stage in data analysis with presenting the correlations between
incarceration and my independent variables in order to demonstrate statistical
significance, direction, and strength of the said relationships.
The data which I analyze for this project are hierarchical in structure (Field and
Miles, 2010) which means that there are naturally occurring groups, i.e. 48 states, and
repeated annual observations for each variable for every individual year between 1980
and 2005 nested within each state. Traditional approaches, such as Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression employed by Smith (2004) whose study I am replicating, can
only deal with one level of analysis, either operating on the individual level ignoring the
group context or on the group level ignoring the individual, and each approach has its
issues. Ignoring the group context is problematic as values of observations for any given
variable, for example – incarceration, drawn from the same state may be more similar
than if drawn randomly, and these observations will have correlated errors which is a
direct violation of the independence assumption of the multiple regression (Luke, 2004).
Correlated residuals, as a result of not accounting for clustering of measures within states,
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will lead to downward misestimation of standard errors which might lead to incorrect
conclusions about statistical significance and false positives or false negatives. In
addition, OLS regression, by ignoring the context, ignores the fact that every state can
have different average incarceration rate and different effect of time on incarceration, i.e.
assumes homogeneity of regression slopes (Field and Miles, 2010).
To avoid issues with hierarchical data analysis associated with traditional OLS
regression such as autocorrelation, I am utilizing hierarchical linear models with random
intercepts using the Mixed Procedure of the SAS statistical program. Hierarchical linear
modeling is better aligned with the logic and design of this dissertation as it is can be
used to analyze data with two or more levels simultaneously, analyze variability between
and within groups, has no independence or slope homogeneity assumptions, and includes
both fixed and random effects (Singer, 1998; Luke, 2004; Field and Miles, 2010; Garson,
2013). Literature suggests that a multilevel approach is more efficient with time-series
cross-sectional data compared to OLS as it produces a narrower estimated coefficients’
range, higher quality of standard error, and allows for more flexibility as “fully or
partially time-invariant predictors can be estimated simultaneously with varying grouplevel indicators” (Shor et al., 2007). Multilevel models with random intercepts will not
pool the variability into the single error term but divide it into the state-level, betweengroup variability, and the individual-level, variability across years within the state.
Therefore, use of hierarchical linear models with random intercepts is appropriate due to
technique’s efficiency, conservative estimates, compatibility with the state-level repeated
annual measure design of the study, size and multiple-record organization of the dataset
(Singer, 1998; Shor et at., 2007; Garson, 2013).
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The analytical strategy utilizing hierarchical approach involves two steps. First, I
will build an unconditional means model in order to assess the need for multilevel
approach. The null model is specified as
dependent variable,

where

is the sample mean, a fixed effect,

representing variability between states and

is the

is the random effect

is the random effect representing

variability within states. i.e. essentially a one-way random effects ANOVA (Singer,
1998; Luke, 2004). Utilizing the unconditional means model I will calculate the intraclass
correlation and determine wether clustering within states is present, and what is the
proportion of the variance in the dependent variable which is explained by the difference
between states and difference across years within individual states (Singer, 1998).
Second, once the need for multilevel approach is determined, I will test each of
the six hypothesis, one at a time, using specific models, first including only the
independent variables operationalizing each hypothesis, then including both predictors
and the control variables utilized in Smith’s study (2004), then adding the measures of
political competition, one at a time, to the model containing predictor and control
variables. A generic random intercepts and slopes model can be specified as:
Level 1:
Level 2:
where

and

is the dependent variable,

term for the individual year,

is the intercept,

is the slope,

is the error

is the sample mean of intercepts (a fixed effect),

is

the source of level-2 variance, i.e. represents variability of intercepts between states,
is the mean value of level-1 slope (a fixed effect), and

is the second source of level-2

variance, i.e. represents variability of level-2 slopes (Luke, 2004). This model will allow
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for the level-1 intercepts and slopes to vary between level-2 groups, i.e. we will be able to
partition incarceration fluctuation into variability across individual years within states and
variability between states and see which independent variables are associated with the
incarceration fluctuation.
In conclusion, I summarize the content of this chapter. This dissertation is a
theory-driven secondary data analysis of nationwide state-level time-series between 1980
and 2005. I analyze publically available nation-wide state-level dataset entitled “State
Politics Data with Judiciary Politics Data” (2007). To account for the spatial and
temporal correlation of data, where individual years are nested in the states, I am using
hierarchical linear models with random intercepts utilizing the Mixed Procedure in SAS
statistical software. The following chapter is devoted to data analysis, and it contains
specifics about the analysis steps which I made, describes intraclass correlations, and
estimates of the random and fixed effects for the variables of interest.
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CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS
I will start this chapter of my dissertation with presenting descriptive statistics for
the sample at large to familiarize the reader with the mean, standard deviation, and range
of variables considered in the analysis of incarceration change. Then I will display the
figure representing the dynamics of change in my dependent variable, state incarceration
rate, between 1980 and 2005. Third, I will present the results of the unconditional means
model for the sample at large computed by using the SAS Mixed Procedure, to represent
the variance in incarceration rates within and between states. Then I will proceed with
discussing the results for each of my six hypotheses, presenting the time trend graphs,
scatterplots, results of Pearson’s correlations and independent samples t tests for all my
independent variables. I will conclude this section with presentation of random
coefficients model results for each of my hypotheses, first discussing the models with
predictors only and then discussing the models including both the predictors and control
variables.
Table 3 below provides a wealth of information about the major variables in my
dataset. The first column represents the number of observation per each variable, and as I
am doing a multilevel analysis comparing 48 states over a period of 26 years, the
maximum number of observations is 1248 and all but four variables have the maximum
possible number of observations, suggesting that this is a complete time-series with low
number of missing cases. Two out of 50 states were dropped, Nebraska – due to the
unicameral nature of its legislature, making it impossible to calculate the average percent
of Democratic seats in both chambers of state assembly, Louisiana – due to consistent
large number of missing values for key variables. Citizen ideology measure was not
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available for any state for 2005, and political competition measures, the Ranney Index
(Ranney, 1976) of partisan control of state-level government and the Holbrook Van Dunk
Index (Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993) of state-level elections competitiveness are
missing for all states for 2004 and 2005 because these variables are computed for an
eight-year cycle and the data for 2012 were not available.

Table 3: Description of Variables: State-Level, 1980-2005
Variable
N
Incarceration Rate per 100,000
Violent Crime Rate per 100,000
Property Crime Rate per 100,000
Percent Unemployed
Percent in Poverty
Percent African American
Percent Hispanic
Gini Coefficient
Citizen Ideology
Percent Democratic Legislators
1 if Democratic Governor
1 if Gubernatorial Election Year
1 if Determinate Sentencing Law
1 if Habitual Offender Law
1 if Marijuana Decriminalization Law
Probation Rate per 100,000
Ranney Index 8 year period
Holbrook Van Dunk Index 8 year period
Divorce Rate per 1,000
Spending on Primary and Secondary
Education as Percent of Gross State
Product

1248
1248
1248
1248
1248
1248
1248
1248
1200
1248
1248
1248
1248
1248
1248
1248
1131
1131
1219
1248

Standard Deviation
Minimum Maximum Mean
28
768
272.59
143.141
47
1244
462.20
237.777
1776
7941
4226.85
1156.735
2
18
5.94
2.059
2
27
13.00
3.844
0.2
37
9.48
9.008
0.4
43.7
6.25
8.150
0.333
0.5109
0.40
0.028
8
96
48.53
14.825
11
98
55.22
17.211
0
1
0.51
0.500
0
1
0.26
0.436
0
1
0.27
0.445
0
1
0.21
0.410
0
1
0.20
0.399
147
6519
1245.28
826.519
0.63385
0.99904
0.86
0.084
17
71
44.23
11.501
2
17.6
4.84
1.620
2.13
6.32
3.63
0.580

Table 3 above provides a wealth of information about the major variables in my
dataset. The first column represents the number of observation per each variable, and as I
am doing a multilevel analysis comparing 48 states over a period of 26 years, the
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maximum number of observations is 1248 and all but four variables have the maximum
possible number of observations, suggesting that this is a complete time-series with low
number of missing cases. Two out of 50 states were dropped, Nebraska – due to the
unicameral nature of its legislature, making it impossible to calculate the average percent
of Democratic seats in both chambers of state assembly, Louisiana – due to consistent
large number of missing values for key variables. Citizen ideology measure was not
available for any state for 2005, and political competition measures, the Ranney Index
(Ranney, 1976) of partisan control of state-level government and the Holbrook Van Dunk
Index (Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993) of state-level elections competitiveness are
missing for all states for 2004 and 2005 because these variables are computed for an
eight-year cycle and the data for 2012 were not available.
Even a cursory look at Table 3 suggests that there is a substantial variability in
incarceration, crime, economic, demographic, and political indicators between 48 states
over the observed period from 1980 to 2005. Incarceration rate, for example, has a
minimum value of 28 inmates serving a sentence of one year or longer per 100,000 state
residents and a maximum value of 768 per 100,000 respectively, with a sample mean of
272.59 and a standard deviation of 143.14. Violent crime rate combining instances of
homicide, rape, robbery, and assault has a minimum value of 47 per 100,000 state
residents, a maximum value of 1244, a mean of 462, and standard deviation of 237.77
respectively. Property crime including episodes of larceny, burglary, and motor vehicle
theft has a minimum value of 1776 per 100,000 state residents, a maximum value of
7941, a sample mean of 4226.85, and a standard deviation of 1156.73.
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Economic and demographic indicators exhibit sufficient variability. Percent of
state residents that are unemployed has a sample mean of 5.9, and a standard deviation of
2.05. Percent of state residents that are below the poverty line has a grand mean of 13,
and a standard deviation of 3.84. Gini coefficient representing state income inequality on
a scale from zero representing absolute equality to one representing absolute inequality
has a mean of 0.4, lowest value of 0.33 and the highest value of 0.51, and standard
deviation of .028. Demographic composition of states in regard to ethnoracial categories
is highly variable, so that the estimated percent of state Black residents has a sample
average of 9.48 and a standard deviation of 9, a minimum value of 0.2 percent and
maximum value of 37 percent, and the estimated percent of state residents that are
Hispanic has a sample average of 6.25 with a standard deviation of 8,1, a minimum value
of 0.4 percent and a maximum value of 43.7 percent.
Political context measures are not invariant either. Dynamic citizen ideology
measure (Berry, Lingquist, Fording and Hanson, 1998) combining the annual state
electorate and legislators’ ideological orientations into a scale variable ranging from zero
to a hundred with higher values representing increasing liberalism has a grand mean of
48.53 and a standard deviation of 14.82. Percent of Democratic seats in both chambers of
state legislatures has a sample mean of 55.22 and a standard deviation of 17.21. The two
political competition measures, Ranney Index of partisan state-level government control
and Holbrook Van Dunk index of electoral competition, kindly given to me as an Excel
file by Shufeldt and Flavin (2011) who computed these measures for eight-year cycles,
show variance as well. Ranney index, calculated so that .5 represents complete
Republican control and 1 represents complete Democratic control of the state government
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(Ranney, 1976), has a sample mean of 0.86 and a standard deviation of .08. Holbrook
Van Dunk index coded as a scale from zero to a hundred so that higher values represent
more competition in state elections (Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993) has a sample mean
of 44.23 and a standard deviation of 11.5. Governors’ party, a dummy variable coded so
that one stands for Democratic party, has a mean of 0.51 and there are 633 state-years
with Democratic governors and 590 state-years with Republican Governors in my
sample. Governors’ election year is a dummy variable with a mean of 0.26, and there
were 319 state-years with gubernatorial elections and 929 state-years with no
gubernatorial elections in my sample.
Criminal justice policy variables are also included in Table 1. The only scale
variable in this group, the state probation rate, has a sample mean of 1245.28 individuals
under state probation supervision per 100,000, and a standard deviation of 826.51.
Determinate sentencing law, a dummy variable symbolizing the state laws establishing
fixed sentences and abolishing discretionary parole, has a sample mean of 0.27, and there
are 910 state-years in the no determinate sentencing law category and 338 state-years in
the determinate sentencing law category in my sample. Habitual offender law, a dummy
variable symbolizing the three-strikes state laws establishing super-penalties for repeat
offenders, has a sample mean of 0.21 and 982 state-years fall into the no-habitual
offender law category and 266 state-years fall into the habitual offender law category in
my sample. Finally, marijuana decriminalization, a dummy variable symbolizing the state
laws making it not a crime to possess an ounce of marijuana, has a sample mean of 0.20
and 1000 state-years fall into the no-marijuana decriminalization law category and 248
state-years fall into the marijuana decriminalization law category in my sample.
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Figure 6. Average State Incarceration Rate per 100,000, U.S., 1980 to
2005.
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Figure 6 above provides a visual representation of the change in my dependent
variable, state incarceration rate per 100,000, between 1980 and 2005. A clear linear
growth pattern appears in Figure 1, and the state incarceration rate increased noticeably
from an average of 118 inmates per 100,000 serving a sentence of one year or longer in
1980 to roughly 400 inmates per 100,000 in 2005 respectively, almost quadrupling over
the observed period. Not to make any false equivalences but to give extra context and to
make these numbers more intelligible, in 1980 the average U.S. state incarceration rate
was analogous to these of European states such as France, Spain and United Kingdom
with respective incarceration rates of 90, 110 and 125 per 100,000 yet by 2005 average
U.S. state incarceration rate was closer to Chile, South Africa, or Ukraine with respective
rates of 375, 402, and 415 per 100,000 (Christie, 2000; Lacey, 2008).
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Table 4: Correlations between State Incarceration Rates
and Independent Variables, 1980 - 2005.
Variable
Gini Coefficient
Percent African American
Probation Rate
Violent Crime Rate
Citizen ideology
Percent Unemployed
Percent Hispanic
Percent in Poverty
Percent Democratic Legislators
Property Crime Rate
n = 1248

r
.649***
.479***
.410***
.402***
-.269***
-.260***
.260***
.091***
-0.085***
.031

Notes: 1248 observations were used for every variable except
citizen ideology which only had 1200 observations, missing
observations for 2005 for every state.

Table 4 above summarizes the results of Pearson’s bivariate analysis of the
correlations between my dependent variable and my continuous independent variables
operationalizing the six hypotheses I am testing. Providing support for the underclass
hypothesis I found that there is a strong significant positive relationship (r = .649, p <
.001) between the Gini coefficient and the state incarceration rate. Providing further
support for the underclass hypothesis, I found that there is a significant moderate positive
relationship (r = .479, p < .001) between percent of state population that is Black and the
incarceration rate. In addition, I found a significant but weak positive relationship (r =
.260, p < .001) between percent of state population that is Hispanic and the incarceration
rate. Contrary to the underclass hypothesis, I found that there is a significant but weak
negative relationship (r = -.260, p < .001) between percent of state population that is
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unemployed and incarceration rate. This counterintuitive finding may be explained by
lagged effects as the unemployment was falling while incarceration rate was growing
between 1980 and 2005. Finally, in line with underclass hypothesis I found a significant
but very weak positive relationship (r = .091, p < .001) between percentage of state
population in poverty and incarceration rate.
Providing support for the criminal justice policies hypothesis, I found a significant
positive relationship between the probation rate and the incarceration rate (r = .410, p <
.001) which is moderate in strength. Providing support for the utilitarian hypothesis I
found a significant positive relationship between the violent crime rate and the
incarceration rate (r = .402, p < .001) which is moderate in strength, but I found no
significant relationship between property crime and incarceration rate which is contrary
to the utilitarian hypothesis. Providing support for the democracy in action hypothesis I
found a significant negative relationship between citizen ideology and incarceration rate (
r = -.269, p < .001) which is weak in strength, but the direction of relationship is as
expected since higher values represent increasing liberalism and lower values –
increasing conservatism respectively. Providing support for the partisan use of the
incarceration I found significant negative relationship (r = -.085, p < .001) between the
average percent of Democratic seats in both chambers of state legislatures and the
incarceration rate, but the strength of the relationship is extremely weak albeit in the
hypothesized direction.
The initial results of the Pearson’s bivariate analysis suggest stronger support for
the underclass hypothesis, moderate support for the utilitarian use of incarceration
hypothesis, moderate support for the criminal justice policies hypothesis, and weaker
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support of the ideological and political hypotheses. To further scrutinize the six
competing hypotheses, I employ Hierarchical Linear Modeling - an advanced analytical
technique which is better aligned with the repeated-measure design of the study and timeseries cross-sectional data where variance occurs on more than one level, with individual
years clustered within states (Luke, 2004).

Table 5. The Mixed Procedure Estimation of Null Model Covariance Parameters
Null Model: Model 1
Add Year: Model 2
Intercept
Year
Intercept Variance
Intraclass Correlation
Correlation Between
Random Intercept and
Random Slope
N

259.49 (14.02)***
8996.46 (1943.37)***
.46

113.41 (9.76)***
12.97 (.80)***
4442.07 (943.91)***
.84

1131

.1207
1131

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 1131 observations were used to
estimate parameters on exhaustive data without any missing values.
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 5 above represents the results of the unconditional means model produced
by using the SAS Mixed Procedure. This is a model without predictor variables which is
used as a baseline to estimate variation in state incarceration rate (Singer, 1998). I use
Restricted Maximum Likelihood method of variance estimation, I specify “between –
within” denominator degrees of freedom estimation of the fixed effect, and I specify the
covariance structure of my data as unstructured i.e. nonsystematic, non-patterned (Field
and Miles, 2010; Neupert, 2013). This unconditional means model has two random
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components, the intercept (
residual (

) symbolizing level – 2 variation between states and the

) symbolizing level – 1 variation within states. For this model I use 48

subjects i.e. states and there is a maximum of 24 annual observations per state. I use the
two random components of the model to calculate the intraclass correlation,

/(

+

) = 8996.46 / (8996.46 + 10443) = .46 (Singer, 1998).

I interpret the results of the null modell (Model 1) represented in Table 3 as
indicating that there is a significant between-state variance (
.0001) as well as significant within-state variance (

= 8996.46, z = 4.63, p <

= 10443, z = 23.27, p < .0001) in

incarceration. Intraclass correlation in incarceration rates value is .46 suggesting that 46
percent of the variance in incarceration rates is explained by differences between states
and that 54 percent of the variance in incarceration is explained by differences within
states across time, i.e. that states fluctuated around their own means slightly more than
they differed from other states. Results suggest that there is substantial clustering of
incarceration within states and that Ordinary Least Squares technique would likely
produce inaccurate results ( Singer , 1998; Neupert, 2013).
To follow up on the results of the null model, I continue analysis by explicitly
including time as a variable in my model as a level – 1 within-state fixed effect and also
as a random slope. As Model 2 in Table 3 shows, once time is taken into account, the
value of intercept at time zero i.e. at 1980 becomes 113.41 inmates per 100,000, and with
each subsequent time point the state incarceration rate increases by 12.97 (t = 16.08, p <
.0001). The estimated G correlation matrix portion of SAS output suggests that
correlation between the random intercept (state incarceration rate which is allowed to
vary between states) and the random slope (time measured in annual increments which
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effects are allowed to vary between states) is 0.1207 i.e. positive. That allows us to
speculate that states which started off with higher incarceration rates tend to increase
their incarceration rates more steeply over time.
Covariance parameter estimates section of SAS output not presented here
indicates that now we have four random parameters, two from the null model, plus a
random slope (
significant (

) and a covariance of intercept and slope (

). Intercept variance is

= 4442.07, z = 4.71, p < .0001), and so is slope variance (

= 30.42, z =

6.44 , p < . 0001), but there is no significant covariance between the two (

= 44.37, z =

.80, p = .42). I interpret that as evidence of significant variance between states as well as
significant variance within states across time. Note that the intercept variance,
symbolizing between-state difference in incarceration rates, has decreased from 8996.46
from the null model to 4442.07 after accounting for time. I use the values of random
parameters from this section to calculate intraclass correlation,

/(

+

) = 4442.07

/ 4442.07 + 851.15 = .84. I interpret the intraclass correlation as suggesting that after
accounting for time, 84 percent variation in incarceration rates is between states and 16
percent variation is within states across years.
I use Raudenbush and Bryk’s formula (2002, p. 79 cited in Neupert, 2013, p. 214)
to compute the portion of variance accounted for at level-1: {
year model)} /

(null model) -

(add

(null model) = {10443 – 851.15 } / 10443 = .92. To compute the

portion of variance accounted for at level-2 I use Raudenbush and Bryk’s formula (2002,
p. 74 cited in Neupert, 2013, p. 214): {

null model -

add year model} /

null

model = {8996.46– 4442.07 } / 8996.46= .51. I interpret these results as indicating that
adding time allows to account for 92 percent of level-1 variation i.e. within states across
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time as well as to account for 51 percent of level-2 variation i.e. variation in incarceration
between states. The fit of the model after accounting for time has improved based on SAS
estimations of Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the – 2 Log Likelihood ( - 2LL).
Null model has AIC of 13818.1 and -2LL of 13814.1 and the model adding year has AIC
of 11247 and -2LL of 11239 and smaller values indicate better fit (Field and Miles,
2010).
Since I have presented the descriptive statistics on my major variables in Table 3,
the time-trend graph for my dependent variable in Figure 6, the results of Pearson’s
bivariate analysis of correlation betweem my dependent and independent variables in
Table 4, and the results of baseline null model describing variation between and within
states as well as results of a model accounting for time in Table 5 I shall proceed with
discussion of my major independent variables logically grouped within six hypothesis
representing six major accounts of incarceration change which I intend to test.
Utilitarian Hypothesis: Punishment is an instrumental response to crime. State-level
violent and property crime rates will be positively associated with incarceration rates.
In this section I will present time-trend graphs which show dynamics of change
between 1980 and 2005 in my independent variables pertinent to the utilitarian
hypothesis. My independent variables are the annual state-level violent crime rates
combining instances of homicide, rape, robbery and assault per 100,000 state residents
and the annual state-level property crime rates combining instances of burglary, larceny,
and motor vehicle theft per 100,000 state residents. I use the official measures of violent
and property crime rates compiled by Federal Bureau of Investigation as Uniform Crime
Report and published in various annual editions of Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
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Statistics. Following the time-trend graphs are the scatterplots and Pearson’s r coefficient
results for bivariate relationships between my dependent and independent variables. I will
conclude this section with presenting the results of hypothesis testing using multilevel
models with random intercepts – the Mixed Procedure in SAS, first displaying the model
with predictors only, and closing with models including both predictors and control
variables.

Figure 7. Average State Violent Crime Rate Juxtaposed on Average State Incarceration
Rate, U.S., 1980 to 2005.
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Figure 8. Average State Property Crime Rate Juxtaposed on Average State Incarceration
Rate, U.S., 1980 to 2005.

The time-trend graphs above supply a visual representation of change in my
dependent and independent variables between 1980 and 2005. I chose to juxtapose the
dependent and independent variables since they are similarly standardized as a rate per
100,000 state residents hence a visual comparison is possible. Figure 7 shows that the
average state incarceration rate has increased substantially, from 118 inmates per 100,000
state population in 1980 to 395 inmates per 100,000 state population in 2005. Figure 7
also demonstrates that the average state violent crime rate combining the instances of
homicide, rape, robbery, and assault has decreased overall if the start and finish dates of
the time-series are compared, from 449 per 100,000 state residents in 1980 to 399 per
100,000 residents in 2005, yet there was a period of steep growth which started in 1983
and lasted until the maximum violent crime rate of 561 per 100,000 was reached in 1993
followed by an uninterrupted decline till 2004. A similar trend appears on the Figure 8,
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with property crime decreasing overall from a high of 5065 per 100,000 in 1980 to 3341
in 2005, with a period of growth which started in 1984 and lasted until a peak rate of
4703 in 1991 followed by an uninterrupted decline till 2005.

Figure 9. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between State Incarceration Rate and the
State Violent Crime Rate, U.S.,1980 to 2005.

Figure 10. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between State Incarceration Rate and the
State Property Crime Rate, U.S., 1980 to 2005.
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The scatterplots above take us to the next step in data analysis by allowing us to
visualize presence or absence of the relationship between the dependent and the
independent variables. Figure 9 shows a linear positive relationship between
incarceration rate and violent crime rate. Figure 10 shows no linear relationship between
incarceration rate and property crime rate.

Table 6. Correlations between State Incarceration Rates and
Utilitarian Hypothesis Variables.
Variable

r

Violent Crime Rate
Property Crime Rate
N = 1248

.402***
.031

p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Providing support for the utilitarian hypothesis, I found that there is a significant
positive relationship of moderate strength (r = .402, p < .001) between violent crime rate
and the incarceration rate (see Table 6 above). Contrary to the utilitarian hypothesis, I
found that there is no significant relationship (r = .031, p = .272) between violent crime
rate and the incarceration rate. My bivariate analysis suggests partial support for the
utilitarian hypothesis since total violent crime rate combining the homicide, rape, robbery
and aggravated assault is associated with state incarceration rate at high level of
significance in the hypothesized direction, yet property crime rate is not associated with
state incarceration rate.
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Table 7 below represents the results of the random coefficients model produced
by using the SAS Mixed Procedure which allows for the intercept and the time slope to
vary while holding the predictors’ effects fixed. Model 1 includes all the predictor
variables from the utilitarian hypothesis as fixed effects, and Model 2 includes both the
predictor variables and the control variables used by Smith (2004) such as divorce rate
per 1,000 state residents, and state spending on primary and secondary education as a
percent of state gross product as fixed effects as well. Model 3 is similar to Model 2
except I add the measure of partisan state government control, and Model 4 is similar to
Model 2 except I add the measure of electoral competition. I use Restricted Maximum
Likelihood method of variance estimation, I specify “between – within” denominator
degrees of freedom estimation of the fixed effect, and I specify the covariance structure
of my data as unstructured i.e. nonsystematic, non-patterned (Field and Miles, 2010;
Neupert, 2013). For all models I use 48 subjects i.e. states and maximum of 24 annual
observations per subject adding to 1131 observations total; a number of observations with
missing values were dropped listwise to ensure completely exhaustive time-series data
and meaningful comparison of the models
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Table 7. The Mixed Procedure Estimation of Fixed Effects and Parameters for the Utilitarian Hypothesis Models,
1980 - 2005.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Variable
Intercept
163.56 (14.44)*** 173.06 (20.55)***
206.08 (25.93)*** 186.84 (22.36)***
Year
11.81 (.83)***
12.12 (.84)***
12.16 (.85)***
12.16 (.85)***
Violent Crime Rate
.10 (.001)***
.09 (.01)***
.10 (.01)***
.09 (.01)***
Property Crime Rate
-0.1 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
Divorce Rate
2.52 (2.04)
2.41 (2.04)
2.57 (2.05)
Education Spending
-7.56 (3.46)*
-6.94 (3.47)*
-7.12 (3.48)*
Ranney Index
-44.62 (21.75)*
Holbrook Van Dunk Index
-.40 (.26)
Intercept Variance
4102.82 (898.54)*** 3551.18 (837.51)*** 3578.28 (846.38)*** 3538.1 (833.91)***
Intraclass Correlation
.84
.81
.81
.81
Proportion of Level-2
.54
.61
.60
.61
Variance Explained
Proportion of Level-1
.92
.92
.92
.92
Variance Explained
N
1131
1131
1131
1131
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 1131 observations were used to estimate parameters on
exhaustive data without any missing values;
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 7 above represents the results of the random coefficients model produced
by using the SAS Mixed Procedure which allows for the intercept and the time slope to
vary while holding the predictors’ effects fixed. Model 1 includes all the predictor
variables from the utilitarian hypothesis as fixed effects, and Model 2 includes both the
predictor variables and the control variables used by Smith (2004) such as divorce rate
per 1,000 state residents, and state spending on primary and secondary education as a
percent of state gross product as fixed effects as well. Model 3 is similar to Model 2
except I add the measure of partisan state government control, and Model 4 is similar to
Model 2 except I add the measure of electoral competition. I use Restricted Maximum
Likelihood method of variance estimation, I specify “between – within” denominator
degrees of freedom estimation of the fixed effect, and I specify the covariance structure
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of my data as unstructured i.e. nonsystematic, non-patterned (Field and Miles, 2010;
Neupert, 2013). For all models I use 48 subjects i.e. states and maximum of 24 annual
observations per subject adding to 1131 observations total; a number of observations with
missing values were dropped listwise to ensure completely exhaustive time-series data
and meaningful comparison of the models.
Table 7 above indicates that there is a statistically significant positive association
between state violent crime rates and state incarceration rates, yet a statistically
significant negative association between state property crime rates and incarceration rates
in the utilitarian hypothesis Model 1. Model 2 in Table 7 includes the same predictor
variables as utiliatarian hypothesis Model 1 as well as control variables used by Smith
(2004). There is a statistically significant positive association between violent crime
rates and state incarceration rates, and a statistically significant negative association
between property crime rates, educational spending and incarceration rates net of control
variables in Model 2.
Model 3 which includes Ranney index, the measure of partisan control of the state
government, demonstrates a significant negative relationship between the index and the
incarceration rates. Nothing changes radically in the utilitarian hypothesis Model 4 which
includes Holbrook Van Dunk index, the measure of district electoral competition (see
Table 7 above for details). I interpret these results as supportive of the independent effect
of partisan control over the state government on my dependent variable net of control
variables with stronger Democratic control negatively associated with incarceration rates,
but results are non-supportive of the electoral competition effect net of control variables.
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Findings of multilevel analysis with SAS Mixed Procedure are partially
supportive of the utilitarian hypothesis as violent crime rate is positively associated with
incarceration net of control variables and political competition measures. Contrary to the
expectations of the utilitarian hypothesis, state property crime is associated with
incarceration at a high level of significance net of control variables and political
competition measures but the direction of relationship is negative which contradicts the
logic of utilitarian use of incarceration as a response to increasing crime rate.
Underclass Hypothesis: Punishment is a tool for managing economic and ethnoracial
tensions. State-level income inequality, unemployment, poverty, and percentage of
Hispanic and Black residents will be positively associated with state-level incarceration
rates.
In this section I will present time-trend graphs which show dynamics of change
between 1980 and 2005 in my independent variables pertinent to the underclass
hypothesis. My independent variables are the Gini coefficient operationalizing state
income inequality, percent of state residents who are unemployed, percent below poverty
line, percent Black, and percent Hispanic. I use the Census Bureau’s Population
Estimates Program data on state-level ethnoracial composition. Following the time-trend
graphs are the scatterplots and Pearson’s r coefficient results for bivariate relationships
between my dependent and independent variables. I will conclude this section with
presenting the results of hypothesis testing using multilevel models with random
intercepts – the Mixed Procedure in SAS.
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Figure 11. Average State Gini Coefficient, U.S., 1980 to
2005.
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Figure 12. Average State Percent Unemployed, U.S., 1980
to 2005.
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Figure 13. Average State Percent Poverty, U.S., 1980 to
2005.
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Figure 14. Average Estimated Percent of Black State
Residents, U.S., 1980 to 2005.
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Figure 15. Average Estimated Percent of Hispanic State
Residents, U.S., 1980 to 2005.
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The time-trend graphs above supply a visual representation of change in my
dependent and independent variables between 1980 and 2005. The average state Gini
coefficient increased steadily, with a noticeable bump around 2001 and further growth
around 2003, which suggests that over time the income inequality has increased. The
unemployment rate declined consistently since the peak in early 1980s but not linearly –
there were two increases, one in early 1990s and the other in early 2000s. The poverty
rate time-trend resembles the unemployment trend but with an important difference –
during the early 2000s, the poverty grew while unemployment declined, which might
suggest realignment in the labour market towards proliferation of minimum wage parttime jobs. The percentage of state residents that are Black has increased somewhat over
time, the slight dip in the line around 2000 is due to the fact that Census data were used
for that year which might have slightly different methodology than Current Population
Estimate Series. The percentage of state residents that are Hispanic has increased
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substantially over time, more than doubling from roughly 4 percent in 1980 to over 9
percent by 2005.

Figure 16: Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between Average State Incarceration
Rate and the Average State-level Gini Coefficient, U.S., 1980 to 2005.

Figure 17. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between Average State Incarceration
Rate and the Average Percent of State Population That Is Unemployed, U.S., 1980 to
2005.
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Figure 18. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between Average State Incarceration
Rate and the Average Percent of State Population in Poverty, U.S., 1980 to 2005.

Figure 19. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between Average State Incarceration
Rate and the Average Percent of State Population That Is Black, U.S., 1980 to 2005.
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Figure 20. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between Average State Incarceration
Rate and the Average Percent of State Population That is Hispanic, U.S., 1980 to 2005.

The five scatterplots above take us to the next step in data analysis beyond
visualizing change over time in merely one variable by providing visual representations
of bivariate relationship between my dependent variable, the state incarceration, and each
of the independent variables pertinent to the underlcass hypothesis. The scatterplot on
Figure 16 shows a positive linear relationship between incarceration rate and the Gini
coefficient, which allows us to speculate that states with higher income inequality might
also have higher incarceration rates. The scatterplot on Figure 17 exhibits a weak
negative linear relationship between incarceration rate and percent of population that is
unemployed, suggesting that states with lower unemployment might have higher
incarceration rates. Figure 18 shows not a clear linear pattern but rather a blob suggesting
that there is no linear relationship between percent of state population in poverty and the
state incarceration rate. The scatterplot on Figure 19 shows no linear relationship between
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incarceration rate and percent of population that is Black but appears to show vertical
lines suggestive of state-level effects, with each of verticals line perhaps representing a
state and its demographic situation. A similar yet less pronounced pattern appears on
Figure 20, which does not exhibit a linear relationship between percent of state
population which is Hispanic and incarceration rate, hence I suspect that the vertical lines
are representing a state and its demographic situation. Thus, out of five scatterplots, only
two display a clear linear pattern, the scatterplot on Figure 16 showing a positive linear
relationship between incarceration rate and the Gini coefficient and the scatterplot on
Figure 17 showing a negative linear relationship between incarceration rate and percent
of state residents that are unemployed, while Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20 do not
display any clear linear bivariate relationship.

Table 8. Correlations between State Incarceration
Rates and Underclass Hypothesis Variables

Variable

Pearson's r

Gini Coefficient
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Percent Unemployed
Percent in Poverty
N = 1248

.649***
.479***
.260***
-.260***
.091***

p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (twotailed)

After performing the Pearson’s bivariate correlation I found that there is a strong
significant positive relationship (r = .649, p < .001) between the Gini coefficient and the
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state incarceration rate. Providing further support for the underclass hypothesis, I found
that there is a significant moderate positive relationship (r = .479, p < .001) between
percent of state population that is Black and the incarceration rate. In addition, I found a
significant but weak positive relationship (r = .260, p < .001) between percent of state
population that is Hispanic and the incarceration rate. Contrary to the underclass
hypothesis, I found that there is a significant but weak negative relationship (r = -.260, p
< .001) between percent of state population that is unemployed and incarceration rate.
This counterintuitive finding may be explained by lagged effects as the unemployment
was falling while incarceration rate was growing between 1980 and 2005. Finally, in line
with underclass hypothesis I found a significant but very weak positive relationship (r =
.091, p < .001) between percentage of state population in poverty and incarceration rate.
My bivariate analysis findings suggest partial support for the underclass
hypothesis: while the Gini coefficient is strongly and positively associated with statelevel incarceration rate, the percent of state residents that are Black is moderately and
positively associated with incarceration rate, the percent of state residents that are
Hispanic is weakly and positively associated with state-level incarceration rates, and
percent of state residents in poverty is also associated with incarceration rate at high level
of significance yet the relationship is extremely weak. Contrary to the underclass
hypothesis, the percentage of state population that is unemployed is negatively and
weakly correlated with state-level incarceration rate. Hence, four out of five variables
operationalizing the underclass are associated with incarceration in the predicted
direction. Table 8 above summarizes the findings of bivariate analysis.
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Table 9. The Mixed Procedure Estimation of Fixed Effects and Parameters for the Underclass Hypothesis Models,
1980 - 2005.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Variable
Intercept
30.93 (51.95)
110.50 (58.75)
140.09 (61.13)*
123.50 (60.42)*
Year
12.55 (.87)***
12.04 (.91)***
12.06 (.92)***
12.09 (.92)***
Percent Black
5.46 (.94)***
4.41 (.91)***
4.36 (.93)***
4.27 (.92)***
Percent Hispanic
-.85 (1.05)
-.48 (1.01)
-.46 (1.02)
-.55 (1.02)
Gini Coefficient
88.29 (137.36)
30.16 (142.03)
32.18 (141.87)
25.28 (142.19)
Percent Poverty
1.14 (.58)*
.82 (.57)
.89 (.57)
.87 (.57)
Percent Unemployed
-1.55 (0.76)*
-83 (.75)
-.84 (.75)
-.85 (.75)
Violent Crime Rate
.08 (.01)***
.08 (.01)***
.08 (.01)***
Property Crime Rate
-.01 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
Divorce Rate
3.26 (2.07)
2.95 (2.08)
3.12 (2.08)
Education Spending
-7.23 (3.52)*
-6.7 (3.5)
-6.96 (3.53)*
Ranney Index
-39.67 (21.92)
Holbrook Van Dunk Index
-.26 (.27)
Intercept Variance
3792.15 (897.13)*** 3449.79 (947.66)*** 3640.91 (1005.90)***3576.53 (984.48)***
Intraclass Correlation
.82
.81
.82
.82
Proportion of Level-2
.58
.62
.60
.60
Variance Explained
Proportion of Level-1
.92
.92
.92
.92
Variance Explained
N
1131
1131
1131
1131
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 1131 observations were used to estimate parameters on exhaustive data
without any missing values;

p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 9 above represents the results of the random coefficients model produced
by using the SAS Mixed Procedure which allows for intercepts and slopes to vary while
holding the predictors’ effects fixed. Model 1 includes all the predictor variables from the
underclass hypothesis as fixed effects, and Model 2 includes both the predictor variables
and the control variables used by Smith (2004) such as violent and property crime rates
per 100,000 state residents, divorce rate per 1,000 state residents, and state spending on
primary and secondary education as a percent of state gross product per capita as fixed
effects as well. Model 3 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of partisan state
government control, and Model 4 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of
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electoral competition. I use Restricted Maximum Likelihood method of variance
estimation, I specify “between – within” denominator degrees of freedom estimation of
the fixed effect, and I specify the covariance structure of my data as unstructured i.e.
nonsystematic, non-patterned (Field and Miles, 2010; Neupert, 2013). For all models I
use 48 subjects i.e. states and maximum of 24 annual observations per subject adding to
1131 observations total; a number of observations with missing values were dropped
listwise to ensure completely balanced design, exhaustive time-series data, and
meaningful comparison of the models.
Table 9 above indicates that there are statistically significant positive associations
between percent Black, percent in poverty and state incarceration rates in the underclass
hypothesis Model 1. Also, there is a statistically significant negative association between
percent unemployed and state incarceration rates. Model 2 includes the same predictor
variables as Model 1 as well as three control variables used by Smith (2004). There are
statistically significant positive associations between percent Black, violent crime and
state incarceration rates in Model 2. Also, there are statistically significant negative
associations between property crime, spending on primary and secondary education, and
state incarceration rates in Model 2. Percent Hispanic ceased to be significantly
associated with incarceration in Model 2, and so did two socioeconomic variables which
were significant in Model 1 i.e. the percent of state residents in poverty and percent of
unemployed are no longer associated with incarceration controlling for violent crime,
educational spending, and divorce rates.
Nothing changes radically in Model 3 which includes the measure of partisan
control of the state government except that education spending ceases being significant.
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Nothing changes radically in Model 4 which includes the measure of district electoral
competition except that education spending becomes significant again (see Table 9 above
for details), I interpret these results as non-supportive of explanatory value of the political
context measures used in political science in the current test of the underclass hypothesis.
Findings of the multilevel analysis with SAS Mixed Procedure are partially
supportive of the underclass hypothesis as percent Black is positively associated with
incarceration even controlling for violent crime and socioeconomic variables. Contrary to
the expectations of the underclass hypothesis, neither income inequality, nor poverty, nor
unemployment, nor percent of Hispanic state residents are associated with incarceration
net of control variables. See Table 9 above for significance levels and fixed effects
estimates for all four models testing the underclass hypothesis.
Public Opinion / Democracy in Action Hypothesis: Punishment is a social policy
sensitive to public opinion. State-level population conservatism will be positively
associated with state-level incarceration rates.
In this section I will present a time-trend graph which shows dynamics of change
in my independent variable operationalizing the democracy in action hypothesis between
1980 and 2005. My independent variable is the annual state-level citizen ideology
measure (Berry et al., 1998) representing citizens’ position between the poles of
conservatism and liberalism. Citizen ideology measure is dynamic as it is calculated
annually in a way that includes the electorate ideology in each district in the state by
assessing the incumbent’s and challenger’s ideology as well as the actual electoral
outcome, and the Congress representatives’ ideological orientation based on ratings of
political interest groups (Berry et al., 1998). Citizen ideology is measured as a scale from
zero to a hundred, with higher values signifying more liberal ideology, and is available
112

for the period from 1980 to 2004. Following the time-trend graph is the scatterplot and
Pearson’s r coefficient results for bivariate relationship between my dependent and
independent variable. I will conclude this section with presenting the results of
hypothesis testing using multilevel models with random intercepts – the Mixed Procedure
in SAS, first introducing the model with the predictor only, and closing with models
including both the predictor and control variables.

Figure 21. Average Citizen Ideology, U.S., 1980 - 2004
(higher value = more liberal)
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Figure 21 above suggests that average citizen ideology score has increased
somewhat from a value of 43 in 1980 to a value of 49 in 2004, yet it did not grow linearly
but fluctuated repeatedly reaching an absolute peak value of 57 in 1988 and a lesser peak
of 52 in 1992, and plummeted to 44 in 2000. Oveall, the citizen ideology moved in the
liberal direction.
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Figure 22. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between Average State Incarceration
Rate and the Average State Citizen Ideology, U.S., 1980 to 2005.

The scatterplot in Figure 22 displays a negative linear relationship between the
state incarceration rate and citizen ideology between 1980 and 2005.

Table 10. Correlations between State Incarceration Rates and
Democracy in Action Hypothesis Variable.
Variable

r

Citizen Ideology
N = 1200

-.269***

p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Providing support for the democracy in action hypothesis, I found that there is a
significant negative relationship (r = -.269, p < .001) between the citizen ideology and the
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state incarceration rate. The direction of the relationship is in line with hypothesis, since
the variable is coded so that lower values represent increasing conservatism, therefore we
can interpret the results as conforming to the expectation that states with more
ideologically conservative population are likely to have higher incarceration rate. Even
though the relationship is statistically significant and in the predicted direction its
strength is rather weak.

Table 11. The Mixed Procedure Estimation of Fixed Effects and Parameters for the Citizen Ideology Hypothesis
Models, 1980 - 2005.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Variable
Intercept
129.44 (11.94)***
187.71 (21.51)***
218.00 (26.46)***
199.15 (23.02)***
Year
13.00 (.80)***
12.12 (.84)***
12.16 (.85)***
12.16 (.85)***
Citizen Ideology
-.33 (.15)*
-.33 (.14)*
-.32 (.14)*
-.32 (.14)*
Violent Crime Rate
.10 (.01)***
.10 (.01)***
.10 (.01)***
Property Crime Rate
-.01 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
Divorce Rate
2.33 (2.04)
2.24 (2.04)
2.38 (2.04)
Education Spending
-7.00 (3.47)*
-6.44 (3.48)
-6.63 (3.48)
Ranney Index
-41.91 (21.76)
Holbrook Van Dunk Index
-.35 (.26)
Intercept Variance
4215.56 (902.03)*** 3381.83 (800.90)*** 3420.15 (812.16)*** 3391.40 (801.92)***
Intraclass Correlation
.83
.81
.81
.81
Proportion of Level-2
Variance Explained
.53
.62
.62
.62
Proportion of Level-1
Variance Explained
.92
.92
.92
.92
N
1131
1131
1131
1131
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 1131 observations were used to estimate parameters on
exhaustive data without any missing values;
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 11 above represents the results of the random coefficients model produced
by using the SAS Mixed Procedure which allows for the intercept and the time slope to
vary while holding the predictors’ effects fixed. Model 1 includes all the predictor
variables from the utilitarian hypothesis as fixed effects, and Model 2 includes both the
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predictor variables and the control variables used by Smith (2004) such as violent and
property crime rates, divorce rate per 1,000 state residents, and state spending on primary
and secondary education as a percent of state gross product as fixed effects as well.
Model 3 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of partisan state government
control, and Model 4 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of electoral
competition. I use Restricted Maximum Likelihood method of variance estimation, I
specify “between – within” denominator degrees of freedom estimation of the fixed
effect, and I specify the covariance structure of my data as unstructured i.e.
nonsystematic, non-patterned (Field and Miles, 2010; Neupert, 2013). For all models I
use 48 subjects i.e. states and maximum of 24 annual observations per subject adding to
1131 observations total; a number of observations with missing values were dropped
listwise to ensure completely exhaustive time-series data and meaningful comparison of
the models.
Table 11 above indicates that there is a statistically significant negative
association between state citizen ideology and incarceration rates in Model 1. Model 2 in
Table 11 includes the same predictor variables as Model 1 as well as control variables
used by Smith (2004). There is a statistically significant negative association between
citizen ideology, property crime rates, educational spending and incarceration rates net of
control variables, and a significant positive association between violent crime rates and
incarceration net of control variables in Model 2.
Nothing changes drastically in Model 3 which includes Ranney index, the
measure of partisan control of the state government, and the citizen ideology is still
negatively associated with incarceration rates. The Ranney index has no independent
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effect on dependent variable net of control variables. Model 4 which includes Holbrook
Van Dunk index, the measure of district electoral competition (see Table 11 above for
details), and the said index has no independent effect net of control variables. I interpret
these results as not supportive of the independent effect of partisan control over the state
government or electoral competition on my dependent variable net of control variables,
but as supportive of the independent explanatory value of citizen ideology net of political
competition measures.
Findings of multilevel analysis with SAS Mixed Procedure are supportive of the
democracy in action hypothesis as citizen ideology, coded so that lower values represent
conservatism, is negatively associated with incarceration net of control variables and
political competition measures. Interestingly, measures of political competition have no
independent effect on the incarceration in this model, while citizen ideology does even
controlling for political context.
Partisan Republican Use of Incarceration Hypothesis: Punishment is a social policy
consistent with Republican Party agenda. States with strong Republican Party presence
in the legislature and Republican governors will have higher incarceration rates.
I will open this section with presenting a time-trend graph which shows dynamics
of change between 1980 and 2005 in my first independent variable operationalizing the
partisan Republican use of incarceration hypothesis. My first independent variable is the
annual percent of Democratic seats (and, by implication, of Republican seats) in both
chambers of state legislatures measuring the partisan control of the state-level legislative
branch of government compiled by Klarner (2003) and updated by Lindquist (2007)
based on various annual editions of the Book of the States. Nebraska was excluded from
the sample since it has a unicameral legislature making it impossible to calculate the
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average percent of Democratic seats in both chambers. Following the time-trend graph is
the scatterplot and Pearson’s r coefficient results for bivariate relationship between the
state incarceration and percent of Democratic seats in both houses of state legislatures.
Then I will present a bar chart and results of an independent samples t test for my second
independent variable which is the partisan control of state-level executive branch of
government operationalized as a dummy variable indicating presence or absence of
Republican governor in each state annually from 1980 to 2006. I will conclude this
section with presenting the results of hypothesis testing using multilevel models with
random intercepts – the Mixed Procedure in SAS, first displaying the model with the
predictors, and then introducing models including both the predictors and control
variables.

Figure 23. Average Percent of Democratic Seats in Both
Chambers of State Legislatures, U.S., 1980 - 2005.
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The time-trend graph above helps in visualizing the change in the partisan control
of state-level legislative branch of government. Overall, Figure 23 shows a steady decline
in the number of Democratic legislators from a high of 62.5 percent in 1980 to 48.7
percent in 2005, suggesting that Democratic party equaled with Republican party in
regard to quantitative representation by 1995, lost its majority status in 2002, and did not
have the number of seats necessary to control the legislative process through the end of
the analyzed time-series.

Figure 24. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between Average State Incarceration
Rate and the Average Percent of Democratic Seats in Both Chambers of State
Legislature, U.S., 1980 to 2005.

Figure 24 above shows no linear relationship between the percent of Democratic
seats in both chambers of state legislatures and the incarceration rates.
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Table 12. Correlation between State Incarceration
Rate and Partisan Use of Incarceration Hypothesis
Variable.
Variable

Pearson's r

Mean Percent of Democratic Seats
in Both Chambers of Legislature

-.085**

N = 1248
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Providing support for the partisan use of incarceration hypothesis, I found that
there is a significant negative relationship (r = -.085, p < .01) between percent of
Democratic seats in state legislatures and the incarceration rate, but the relationship is
extremely week. The direction of correlation fits with the hypothesis – the lower
percentage of Democratic legislators correlates with higher incarceration rate. I am not
measuring directly the number of Republican legislators but by default the lower
percentage of Democratic legislators presumes higher percentage of Republican
legislators. The results fit the hypothesis that percentage of Republicans in state
legislatures is positively correlated with incarceration rate.
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Figure 25 above indicates that states with Republican governors have mean
incarceration rate of 289 per 100,000 between 1980 and 2005, while states with
democratic governors have mean incarceration rate of 259 per 100,000 respectively. I
carry out an independent samples t test to ascertain if there is a significant difference in
mean state incarceration rates between states headed by Democratic and Republican
governors. Independent samples t test provides support for the partisan Republican use of
incarceration. I found that there is a significant difference in incarceration rate observed
between the states with Republican governors and states with non-Republican governors
(t = 3.633, p < .001), see Table 13 below for details. States with Republican governors
have a higher mean incarceration rate (289 per 100,000) than states with Democratic
governors (259 per 100,000). The data fit the hypothesis that incarceration rates vary by
governors’ party.
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Table 13. Independent Samples Test for Mean State Incarceration Rate by Party of Governor, 1980 - 2005.
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Variable
Mean State
Incarceration
Rate

Equal
Variances
Assumed

t-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

t

df

Sig.(2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

13.425

.000

3.633

1221

.000

29.692

8.173

3.619

1182.7

.000

29.692

8.205

Equal
Variances Not
Assumed

N = 1223
Notes: 25 state-years were excluded because only mainstream parties were coded
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 14 below represents the results of the random coefficients model produced
by using the SAS Mixed Procedure which allows for the intercept and the time slope to
vary while holding the predictors’ effects fixed. Model 1 includes all the predictor
variables from the partisan use of incarceration hypothesis as fixed effects, and Model 2
includes both the predictor variables and the control variables used by Smith (2004) such
as violent and property crime rates, divorce rate per 1,000 state residents, and state
spending on primary and secondary education as a percent of state gross product as fixed
effects as well. Model 3 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of partisan state
government control, and Model 4 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of
electoral competition. I use Restricted Maximum Likelihood method of variance
estimation, I specify “between – within” denominator degrees of freedom estimation of
the fixed effect, and I specify the covariance structure of my data as unstructured i.e.
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nonsystematic, non-patterned (Field and Miles, 2010; Neupert, 2013). For all models I
use 48 subjects i.e. states and maximum of 24 annual observations per subject adding to
1106 observations total; a number of observations with missing values as well as 25 stateyears with non-mainstream party governors were dropped to ensure completely
exhaustive time-series data and meaningful comparison of the models.

Table 14. The Mixed Procedure Estimation of Fixed Effects and Parameters for the Partisan Use of Incarceration
Hypothesis Models, 1980 - 2005.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Variable
Intercept
171.02 (15.53)*** 223.07 (22.37)***
258.48 (27.47)*** 236.84 (236.84)***
Year
12.43 (.76)***
11.49 (.80)***
11.53 (.81)***
11.53 (.81)***
Percent Democratic
Legislators
-.90 (.17)***
-.93 (17)***
-.93 (.17)***
-.93 (.17)***
1 If Democratic Governor -2.43 (2.35)
-3.47 (2.29)
-3.91 (2.29)
-3.09 (2.30)
Violent Crime Rate
.10 (.01)***
.10 (.01)***
.10 (.01)***
Property Crime Rate
-.02 (.002)***
-.02 (.002)***
-.02 (.002)***
Divorce Rate
3.55 (2.09)
3.50 (2.08)
3.72 (2.09)
Education Spending
-4.60 (3.52)
-3.85 (3.53)
-4.33 (3.53)
Ranney Index
-48.11 (21.72)*
Holbrook Van Dunk Index
-.44 (.27)
Intercept Variance
5573.47 (1212.34)***4373.52 (1019.97)*** 4320.89***
4219.24 (987.20)***
Intraclass Correlation
.87
.85
.85
.84
Proportion of Level-2
Variance Explained
.38
.51
.51
.53
Proportion of Level-1
Variance Explained
.92
.92
.93
.93
N
1106
1106
1106
1106
Notes: 25 observations of Governors' party were dropped as only two mainstream parties were considered
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 14 above represents the results of the random coefficients model produced
by using the SAS Mixed Procedure which allows for the intercept and the time slope to
vary while holding the predictors’ effects fixed. Model 1 includes all the predictor
variables from the partisan use of incarceration hypothesis as fixed effects, and Model 2
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includes both the predictor variables and the control variables used by Smith (2004) such
as violent and property crime rates, divorce rate per 1,000 state residents, and state
spending on primary and secondary education as a percent of state gross product as fixed
effects as well. Model 3 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of partisan state
government control, and Model 4 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of
electoral competition. I use Restricted Maximum Likelihood method of variance
estimation, I specify “between – within” denominator degrees of freedom estimation of
the fixed effect, and I specify the covariance structure of my data as unstructured i.e.
nonsystematic, non-patterned (Field and Miles, 2010; Neupert, 2013). For all models I
use 48 subjects i.e. states and maximum of 24 annual observations per subject adding to
1106 observations total; a number of observations with missing values as well as 25 stateyears with non-mainstream party governors were dropped to ensure completely
exhaustive time-series data and meaningful comparison of the models.
Table 14 above indicates that there is a statistically significant negative
association between average percent of Democratic seats in both chambers of state
legislatures and incarceration rates, but party of governor is not significant in Model 1.
Model 2 in Table 14 includes the same predictor variables as Model 1 as well as control
variables used by Smith (2004). There is a statistically significant negative association
between percent of Democratic legislators, property crime rates, and incarceration rates
net of control variables, and a significant positive association between violent crime rates
and incarceration net of control variables in Model 2.
Nothing changes drastically in Model 3 which includes Ranney index, the
measure of partisan control of the state government, and the percent of Democratic
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legislators is still negatively associated with incarceration rates. However, the Ranney
index has an independent negative effect on dependent variable net of control variables.
Nothing changes radically in Model 4 which includes Holbrook Van Dunk index, the
measure of district electoral competition (see Table 14 above for details). I interpret these
results as not supportive of association between electoral competition and incarceration,
but as supportive of the independent effect of partisan control over the state government
on my dependent variable net of control variables.
Findings of multilevel analysis with SAS Mixed Procedure are partially
supportive of the partisan use of incarceration hypothesis as partisan control of state
legislature, coded so that lower values represent increasing Republican control, is
negatively associated with incarceration net of control variables and political competition
measures. Contrary to the partisan use of incarceration hypothesis, governor’s party is not
associated with imprisonment. One measure of political context, the Ranney index
representing partisan control of state government, is negatively associated with
incarceration rates.
Electoral Cycle Hypothesis: Incaceration is a social policy which is appealing to voters.
Both parties use incarceration to widen their appeal during gubernatorial election cycle.
Governors’ election years will be positively associated with incarceration.
In this section I will present a bar chart and results of an independent samples t
test for my independent variable operationalizing the electoral cycle hypothesis. My
independent variable is a dummy coded so that one represents gubernatorial election year
for this particular state and zero represents non-gubernatorial election year for this
particular state for the period from 1980 to 2005. I used various editions of the Book of
States as a source to create this variable. I will conclude this section with presenting the
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results of hypothesis testing using multilevel models – the Mixed Procedure in SAS, first
displaying the model with predictor only and closing with models including both the
predictor and control variables.

Figure 26 above indicates that states during gubernatorial election year have a
mean incarceration rate of 276 per 100,000 between 1980 and 2005, while states during
non-gubernatorial election years have a mean incarceration rate of 262 per 100,000
respectively. I carry out an independent samples t test to see if there is a significant
difference in mean state incarceration rates between these two groups of states.
Independent samples t test does not provide support for the electoral cycle explanation of
incarceration growth. There is no significant difference in incarceration rate between the
states during gubernatorial elections and states during non-gubernatorial election years (t
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= 1.524, p = .128), see Table 15 below for details. The data do not fit the hypothesis that
incarceration rates vary by election year.

Table 15. Independent Samples Test for Mean State Incarceration Rate by Gubernatorial Election Year,
1980 - 2005.
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Variable
Mean State
Incarceration
Rate

Equal Variances
Assumed

t-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

t

df

Sig.(2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

.131

.718

1.524

1246

.128

14.153

9.284

1.529

554.46

.127

14.153

9.257

Equal Variances
Not Assumed

N = 1248
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

The results of multilevel analysis summarized in Table 16 below fail to support
electoral cycle hypothesis. Gubernatorial election year is not associated with
incarceration rates in either of the four models. Given that intraclass correlation is 84 to
81 percent i.e. a strong clustering of data is present, I suspect that Ordinary Least Squares
regression used by Smith (2004) produced a false positive unable to deal with
autocorrelation in the data. Multilevel analysis, being a more optimal technique for
dealing with spatially and temporally correlated data in repeat-measure designs, does not
produce results supportive of gubernatorial election cycle association with incarceration.
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Table 16. The Mixed Procedure Estimation of Fixed Effects and Parameters for the Gubernatorial Election Cycle
Hypothesis Models, 1980 - 2005.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Variable
Intercept
113.00 (9.78)***
172.81 (20.55)***
205.61 (25.94)*** 186.52 (22.37)***
Year
12.97 (.80)***
12.12 (.84)***
12.16 (.85)***
12.16 (.85)***
1 If Gubernatorial Election
Year
1.54 (1.99)
1.68 (1.94)
1.61 (1.93)
1.65 (1.93)
Violent Crime Rate
.09 (.01)***
.1 (.01)***
.09 (.01)***
Property Crime Rate
-.01 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
-.01 (.002)***
Divorce Rate
2.54 (2.04)
2.45 (2.05)
2.62 (2.05)
Education Spending
-7.64 (3.47)*
-7.02 (3.47)*
-7.20 (3.48)*
Ranney Index
-44.31 (21.75)*
Holbrook Van Dunk Index
-.40 (.02)
Intercept Variance
4446.34 (944.82)*** 3550.50 (837.17)*** 3577.38 (845.97)*** 3537.52 (833.60)***
Intraclass Correlation
.84
.81
.81
.81
Proportion of Level-2
Variance Explained
.51
.61
.60
.61
Proportion of Level-1
Variance Explained
.92
.92
.92
.92
N
1131
1131
1131
1131
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 1131 observations were used to estimate parameters on
exhaustive data without any missing values;
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Criminal Justice Policies Hypothesis: Incarceration is an artifact of criminal justice
policies. States with habitual offender laws and high probation rates will have higher
incarceration rates, while states with determinate sentencing laws and marijuana
decriminalization will have lower incarceration rates.
First, I will open this section by displaying a time-trend graph, a scatterplot, and
Pearson’s r results for probation rate per 100,000 state residents which is the first
independent variable operationalizing this hypothesis stipulating that incarceration rate is
an outcome of criminal justice policies. I used various annual editions of the Probation
and Parole bulletin published by U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics to compute this
variable. Second, I will present bar charts and results of independent samples t tests for
my three remaining independent variable operationalizing this hypothesis. I used U.S.
Department of Justice (1997) research brief and Chen’s (2009) article as sources to create
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a dummy variable representing presence of a three-strikes law establishing superpenalties for repeat offenders in a given state. I used National Survey of State Sentencing
Structures published by the U.S. Department of Justice (1996) as well as articles by
Marvell and Moody (1996), and Stemen and Rengifo (2011) as sources to create a
dummy variable representing presence of determinate sentencing law abolishing
discreationary parole and introducing fixed sentences determined by a judge in a given
state. For information on marijuana decriminalization I used various editions of
Sourcebook of Justice Statistics as well as a table from MacCoun et al. (2009) listing
states that have no criminal penalties for possession of an ounce of marijuana. Third, I
will conclude this section with presenting the results of hypothesis testing using
multilevel models with random intercepts – the Mixed Procedure in SAS, first displaying
the model with predictors only and closing with models including both the predictors and
control variables.

Figure 27. Average State Probation Rate Juxtaposed on Average State Incarceration Rate,
U.S., 1980 to 2005.
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Figure 27 above supplies a visual representation of time-trends in probation rate
and incarceration rate between 1980 and 2005. I chose to juxtapose the dependent and
independent variables since they are similarly standardized as a rate per 100,000 state
residents hence a visual comparison is possible. Figure 27 shows that the average state
probation rate has increased substantially, from roughly 580 inmates per 100,000 state
residents in 1980 to roughly 1700 inmates per 100,000 state residents in 2005, roughly a
three-fold increase. In 1980 there were 4.9 times more individuals under probation
supervision than inmates but by 2005 there were 4.28 times more individuals under
probation supervision than inmates.

Figure 28. Scatterplot of Bivariate Relationship between Average State Incarceration
Rate and the Average State Probation Rate, U.S., 1980 to 2005.

Figure 28 above shows a linear positive relationship between incarceration rate
and probation rate, suggesting that higher incarceration rates are correlated with higher
probation rates. Results of bivariate analysis are consistent with the positive linear
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relationship suggested by Figure 28 as I found that there is a significant positive
relationship (r = .410, p < .001) between incarceration rate and probation rate which is
moderate in strength (see Table 17 below). Results are supportive of the hypothesis as I
expected that states will not use probation as an alternative sanction depressing
incarceration rate but as a complementary punitive mechanism.

Table 17. Correlation between State Incarceration
Rates and Probation Rates
Variable

Pearson's r

Probation Rate Per 100,000
N = 1248

.410***

p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)
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Figure 29 above indicates that states with habitual offender laws also known as
three-strikes laws have a mean incarceration rate of 358 per 100,000 between 1980 and
2005, while states without such laws have a mean incarceration rate of 249 per 100,000
respectively. I carry out an independent samples t test to determine if there is a significant
difference in mean state incarceration rates between these two groups of states. Providing
support for criminal justice policies hypothesis I found that there is a significant
difference in incarceration rate between the states with three-strikes laws and the states
without such laws (t = - 11.606 , p < .001), see Table 18 below for details. States with
three-strikes laws have a higher mean incarceration rate (358 per 100,000) than states
with no three-strikes laws (249 per 100,000). The data fit the hypothesis that
incarceration rates vary by presence of three-strikes laws.

Table 18. Independent Samples Test for Mean State Incarceration Rate by Three-Strikes Law, 1980 - 2005.

Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Variable
Mean State
Incarceration
Rate

Equal
Variances
Assumed

t-test for Equality of Means
Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

F

Sig.

t

df

22.849

.000

-11.606

1246

.000

-109.125

9.403

-13.807

560.059

.000

-109.125

7.904

Equal
Variances
Not
Assumed
N = 1248
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)
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Figure 30 above indicates that states with determinate sentencing laws which
abolish discretionary parole have a mean incarceration rate of 281 per 100,000 between
1980 and 2005, while states without such laws have a mean incarceration rate of 269 per
100,000 respectively. I carry out an independent samples t test to determine if there is a
significant difference in mean state incarceration rates between these two groups of
states. Contrary to the hypothesis, there is no significant difference in incarceration rate
between the states with determinate sentencing laws and the states without such laws (t =
- 1.331 , p = .184), see Table 19 below for details. The data do not fit the hypothesis that
incarceration rates vary by presence of determinate sentencing laws.
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Table 19. Independent Samples Test for Mean State Incarceration Rate by Determinate Sentencing Law,
1980 - 2005.
Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances
t-test for Equality of Means
Sig. (2- Mean
Std. Error
tailed)
Difference Difference
Variable
F
Sig. t
df
Mean State
Incarceration
Rate

Equal
Variances
Assumed

.448

.503

Equal
Variances
Not
Assumed

-1.331

1246

.184

-12.128

9.115

-1.326

599.348

.185

-12.128

9.144

N = 1248
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Figure 31 below indicates that states with marijuana decriminalization laws which
abolish criminal penalties for possession of an ounce of marijuana have a mean
incarceration rate of 265 per 100,000 between 1980 and 2005, while states without such
laws have a mean incarceration rate of 274 per 100,000 respectively.
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Table 20. Independent Samples Test for Mean State Incarceration Rate by Marijuana Decriminalization
Law, 1980 - 2005.
Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances
t-test for Equality of Means
Sig. (2Mean
Std. Error
tailed)
Difference Difference
Variable
F
Sig. t
df
Mean State
Incarceration
Rate

Equal
Variances
Assumed

.001

.980

Equal
Variances Not
Assumed

.939

1246

.348

9.536

10.155

.938

378.45

.349

9.536

10.165

N = 1248
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

I carry out an independent samples t test to determine if there is a significant
difference in mean state incarceration rates between these two groups of states. Contrary
to the hypothesis, there is no significant difference in incarceration rate between the states
with marijuana decriminalization laws and the states without such laws (t = .939, p =
.348), see Table 20 above for details. The data do not fit the hypothesis that incarceration
rates vary by presence of marijuana decriminalization laws.
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Table 21. The Mixed Procedure Estimation of Fixed Effects and Parameters for the Criminal Justice Policies
Hypothesis Models, 1980 - 2005.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Variable
Intercept
114.08 (10.49)*** 164.23 (21.02)***
194.96 (26.16)*** 176.43 (22.90)***
Year
11.91 (.85)***
11.17 (.89)***
11.21 (.89)***
11.22 (.89)***
Probation Rate per 100,000
1 If Three-Strikes Law
1 If Determinate
Sentencing Law
1 If Marijuana
Decriminalization Law
Violent Crime Rate
Property Crime Rate
Divorce Rate
Education Spending
Ranney Index
Holbrook Van Dunk Index
Intercept Variance
Intraclass Correlation
Proportion of Level-2
Variance Explained
Proportion of Level-1
Variance Explained
N

.01 (.003)**
16.14 (4.72)**

.01 (.003)**
17.63 (4.71)**

.01 (.003)**
17.47 (4.71)**

.01 (.003)**
17.35 (4.72)**

-4.65 (5.80)

-5.29 (5.66)

-5.36 (5.65)

-5.34 (5.66)

-28.41 (13.49)*

-24.33 (12.79)
.10 (.01)***
-.01 (.002)***
2.99 (2.04)
-5.96 (3.48)

-22.68 (12.84)
.10 (.01)***
-.01 (.002)***
2.89 (2.04)
-5.38 (3.49)
-42.01 (21.65)

-24.63 (12.80)
.09 (.01)***
-.01 (.002)***
3.02 (2.05)
-5.61 (3.49)

-.34 (.26)
4510.99 (976.06)*** 3524.36 (847.12)*** 3560.98 (859.22)*** 3544.59 (852.38)***
.84
.82
.82
.82
.50

.61

.60

.61

.92
1131

.92
1131

.92
1131

.92
1131

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 1131 observations were used to estimate parameters on
exhaustive data without any missing values;
p* < .05 p** < .01 p***<.001 (two-tailed)

Table 21 above represents the results of the random coefficients model produced
by using the SAS Mixed Procedure which allows for the intercept and the time slope to
vary while holding the predictors’ effects fixed. Model 1 includes all the predictor
variables from the criminal justice policies hypothesis as fixed effects, and Model 2
includes both the predictor variables and the control variables used by Smith (2004) such
as violent and property crime rates, divorce rate per 1,000 state residents, and state
spending on primary and secondary education as a percent of state gross product as fixed
effects as well. Model 3 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of partisan state
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government control, and Model 4 is similar to Model 2 except I add the measure of
electoral competition. I use Restricted Maximum Likelihood method of variance
estimation, I specify “between – within” denominator degrees of freedom estimation of
the fixed effect, and I specify the covariance structure of my data as unstructured i.e.
nonsystematic, non-patterned (Field and Miles, 2010; Neupert, 2013). For all models I
use 48 subjects i.e. states and maximum of 24 annual observations per subject adding to
1131 observations total; a number of observations with missing values were dropped
listwise to ensure completely exhaustive time-series data and meaningful comparison of
the models.
Table 21 indicates that there is a statistically significant positive association
between three-strikes laws, probation rates, and incarceration rates in Model 1. Also,
there is a significant negative association between marijuana decriminalization laws and
incarceration rates in Model 1. Model 2 in Table 21 includes the same predictor variables
as Model 1 as well as control variables used by Smith (2004).There is a statistically
significant positive association between three-strikes laws, probation rates and
incarceration rates net of control variables in Model 2, while marijuana decriminalization
becomes nonsignificant.
Nothing changes drastically in Model 3 which includes Ranney index, the
measure of partisan control of the state government, and the three-strikes laws and
probation rates are still positively associated with incarceration rates. Ranney index is not
associated with dependent variable net of control variables. Nothing changes radically in
Model 4 which includes Holbrook Van Dunk index, the measure of district electoral
competition (see Table 21 above for details), and the said index is not associated with
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incarceration net of control variables. I interpret these results as not supportive of
association between either measure of partisan control of the state government or
measure of electoral competition and incarceration net of control variables.
Findings of multilevel analysis with SAS Mixed Procedure are partially
supportive of the criminal justice policies hypothesis as three-strikes laws establishing
super-penalties for repeat offenders and probation rates are positively associated with
incarceration net of control variables and political competition measures. Contrary to the
criminal justice policies hypothesis, determinate sentencing laws establishing fixed
sentences and abolishing discretionary parole and laws decriminalizing possession of
marijuana are not associated with imprisonment net of control variables and political
context measures.
To conclude this chapter, a brief summary of findings of multilevel analysis is in
order. Findings are partially supportive of the utilitarian hypothesis, underclass
hypothesis, citizen ideology hypothesis, partisan use of incarceration hypothesis, and
criminal justice policies hypothesis. Findings fail to support hypothesis suggesting
association between gubernatorial election cycle and incarceration. Chapter five will
provide further discussion and analysis of the key findings and associations between
specific independent variables and incarceration. Chapter five will alo establish links
between my findings and previous research on incarceration, and synthesize fragmented
findings into a more unified narrative.
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION
The purpose of this chapter is to translate my findings into a sociological
narrative. In this chapter, I will draw conclusions in regard to empirical validity of the six
major theoretical accounts of incarceration change in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005,
and I also will go beyond interpretation of statistical significance of my findings to
establish links between my results and the existing body of literature covering the
relationships between the social processes and the criminal justice outcomes. I will also
discuss limitations of the current project and potential directions for future research,
especially in regard to the need for sensitivity to potential intersectionality of race, class,
and political processes, and the need to bring more specific measures of context into the
research on incarceration.
As Table 22 below indicates, multiple factors are associated with state-level
fluctuation in incarceration in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005, and any monocausal
explanation would be insufficient. Out of six tested hypothesis all receive a degree of
support for at least one variable, and findings fail to support gubernatorial electoral cycle
hypothesis only as no significant association between governors’ elections and
incarceration was found. Violent and property crime, percent of state residents that are
African American, population conservative ideology, percent of Democratic seats in both
chambers of state legislature, probation rates, and presence of three-strikes laws
establishing increased penalties for repeat offenders are associated with incarceration
rates net of control variables. Unemployment, poverty, income inequality, percent of state
residents that are Hispanic, governor’s party, gubernatorial elections, determinate
sentencing, and marijuana decriminalization are not associated with incarceration.
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Table 22. Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results
Hypotheses

Support

H 1: Utilitarian Hypothesis
Violent crime is positively associated with incarceration
Property crime is positively associated with incarceration

X

H 2: Underclass Hypothesis
Unemployment is positively associated with incarceration
Income inequality is positively associated with incarceration
Poverty is positively associated with incarceration
Percent of Black state residents is positively associated
with incarceration
Percent of Hispanic state residents is positively associated
with incarceration
H 3: Citizen Ideology Hypothesis
Population conservatism is positively associated
with incarceration

Fail to Support

X

X
X
X
X
X

X

H 4: Partisan Use of Incarceration Hypothesis
Democratic control of state legislature is negatively associated
with incarceration
Democratic control of state governor's office is negatively
associated with incarceration

X
X

H 5: Gubernatorial Election Cycle Hypothesis
Gubernatorial election year is positively associated
with incarceration

X

H 6: Criminal Justice Policies Hypothesis
Probation rate is positively associated with incarceration
Habitual offender law is positively associated
with incarceration
Determinate sentencing law is negatively associated
with incarceration
Marijuana decriminalization law is negatively associated
with incarceration

X
X
X
X

Discussion of the Utilitarian Hypothesis Results
Absence of crime and incarceration link was once a part of American
criminological orthodoxy, as Blumstein and Cohen (1973) argued that a stability of
punishment exists in the U.S. using national aggregate data for a period between 1930
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and 1970 to support their claim. Since then, much attention has been paid to establishing
the link between crime and incarceration, and many researchers assert that the
abovementioned relationship exists (Michalowski and Pearson, 1990; Taggard and Winn,
1993; McGarrell, 1993; Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Arvanites and Asher, 1998; Raphael,
2000; Greenberg and West, 2001; Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Listokin, 2003; Yates and
Fording, 2005; Spelman, 2009; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011) while some researchers deny
existence of crime – incarceration link (Blumstein and Moitra, 1979; Lessan, 1991;
Zimring and Hawkins, 1991; Blumstein and Beck, 1999; Smith, 2004; Zimring, 2010).
My findings are partially supportive of the utilitarian hypothesis, as I have found
consistent and robust positive association between state-level violent crime rates and
incarceration rates net of control variables, which fits the logic of the hypothesis whereby
incarceration is conceptualized as an instrumental response to violent crime, an attempt to
protect the social contract and prevent the Hobbesian war of all against all scenario. My
findings are in line with literature establishing the link between violent crime and
incarceration rates (Michalowski and Pearson, 1990; McGarrell, 1993; Greenberg and
West, 2001; Spelman, 2009; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011) or prison admissions racial
disparity (Keen and Jacobs, 2009) and contradict the literature denying violent crime and
incarceration link (Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, 2005; Schneider, 2006). I can speculate
that perhaps a consensus about unacceptability of violent crime exists and the criminal
justice system treats violent crime as serious enough to merit incarceration.
Contrary to the utilitarian hypothesis, I found a consistent and robust negative
association between state-level property crime rates and incarceration rates net of control
variables, which does not fit the logic of incarceration as a response to property crime.
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That contradicts much of the previous literature which found property crime rates to be
nonsignificant (Taggart and Winn, 1993; Greenberg and West, 2001; Stemen and
Rengifo, 2011) or positively related to incarceration (Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, 2005),
but concurs with projects which found similar negative relationship (Raphael, 2000;
Spelman, 2009).
I have three speculative explanations of the anomalous negative relationship
between property crime and incarceration rates. First, maybe there is some validity to
classic Durkheimian stability of punishment argument restated by Blumstein and Cohen
(1973), and once the crime rate increases so does the seriousness threshold established by
society in order to designate an offense as worthy of incarceration. Therefore, in the
context of the increasing violent crime rate between the early 1980s and early 1990s, the
property crimes might have been designated as not serious enough to merit incarceration.
Second, perhaps mass-incarceration had a deterrent effect on property offenders leading
them to reassess the benefits derived from property crime against increasing odds of
incarceration. Third, given that some scholars argue that offenders are non-specialized
and versatile (Gottfredson, 2006), committing various offenses, it may be that massincarceration scooped up the versatile offenders due to their involvement in violent crime
which resulted in incapacitation and prevented them from committing property crimes.
But is the crime-incarceration link an example of a billiard-ball positivist
relationship? Listokin (2003) who found a strong crime-incarceration link whereby 1
percent increase in index violent and property crime led to 1 percent increase in
incarceration himself admitted that if crime was the only factor of incarceration, the latter
would have grown by 80 percent while in reality it was a growth in excess of 400 percent.
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Ouimet and Tremblay (1996) made an interesting attempt to introduce qualitative
context, claiming that 14 out of 16 states that increased their incarceration by a 100
percent by 1992 were underpunitive in 1982, i.e. had relatively low incarceration rates.
My analysis contradicts Ouimet and Tremblay’s (1996) account as hierarchical linear
models show that correlation between random intercept and random slope is positive
suggesting that states with higher incarceration rates had steeper growth trajectory over
time compared to states which were low-incarcerating at the beginning of the time-series
(see Table 5). Importantly, the Ranney index, a measure of partisan control of the state
government, suggests that Democratic partisan strength is negatively associated with
incarceration net of control variables, thereby highlighting a potential political
mechanism mediating the link between violent crime and incarceration (see Table 7). My
finding of negative association of Democratic partisan control of the state government fits
the findings suggesting that increased spending on corrections was the mechanism
enabling the incarceration growth and linking Republican partisan control of state
legislatures with increased correctional spending (Spelman, 2009, p.53).
I conclude that the utilitarian hypothesis conceptualizing incarceration as a
response to crime is partially supported in my analysis. Violent crime is positively
associated with incarceration at high level of significance net of control variables
suggesting that the criminal justice system does consider violent crime a serious issue,
perhaps reflecting the social consensus, and incarcerates violent offenders to protect the
social order. Property crime is negatively associated with incarceration at a high level of
significance, contrary to the utilitarian hypothesis, and I speculate that either property
crime was not seen as dangerous in the context of violent crime growth, or mass143

incarceration had a deterrent effect on property offenders or an incapacitating effect on
versatile offenders. Importantly, context matters, and these were the high-incarcerating
states which experienced steeper growth in imprisonment, and the Democratic partisan
control of the state government is the political context negatively associated with
incarceration.
Discussion of the Underclass Hypothesis Results
The link between socioeconomic variables suggested by Rusche and Kirchheimer
([1939] 1968) and incarceration has been considered “elusive” and contingent upon
model specification, while the link between minority presence and incarceration is seen
as much stronger (Pfaff, 2007). Yet some research supports the existence of the link
between unemployment and incarceration (Chiricos and Bales, 1991; Lessan, 1991;
Chiricos and Delone, 1992; Hochstetler and Shover, 1997; Grimes and Rogers, 1999;
Greenberg and West, 2001; D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2002; Zhang, Maxwell, Vaughn,
2009), income inequality and incarceration (Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Arvanites and
Asher, 1998), and poverty and incarceration (Beckett and Western, 2001; Yates and
Fording, 2005). Similarly, no concordance exists in regard to the positive link between
minority presence and incarceration, with some studies providing support (McGarrel,
1993; Arvanites and Asher, 1995; Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael,
2001; Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Smith, 2004; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011) and some
studies discovering no positive link between minority presence and incarceration
(Raphael, 2000; Jacobs and Helms, 2001; Stucky, Heimer, Lang, 2005; Spelman, 2009).
My findings are partially supportive of the underclass hypothesis, but none of the
socioeconomic variables were found significantly associated with incarceration rates, and
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only percent African American but not percent Hispanic was positively associated with
incarceration rates net of control variables (see Table 9). My findings on nonsignificance
of an unemployment-incarceration relationship are concordant with several studies
(Smith, 2004; Yates and Fording, 2005; Spelman, 2009). My findings on nonsignificance
of income inequality are concordant with several studies (Greenberg and West, 2001;
Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Smith, 2004), and my findings on the lack of a positive
relationship between poverty and incarceration are also analogous to other projects’
findings (Taggard and Winn, 1993; Listokin, 2003; Smith, 2004). I have found a
significant positive association between percent of African American state residents and
incarceration, which fits the literature (Greenberg and West, 2001; Sorensen and Stemen,
2002; Smith, 2004) even though evidence to the contrary exists as well (Stucky, Heimer,
Lang, 2005; Spelman, 2009). I found no positive association between percent of state
residents that are Hispanic and incarceration, which fits the literature (Greenberg and
West, 2001; Spelman, 2009; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011) but contradicts Jacobs and
Carmichael’s (2001) findings.
Contrary to the underclass hypothesis, I found no association between
unemployment, income inequality, poverty and incarceration rates net of control
variables. Percent of state residents that are in poverty and percent of unemployed are
associated with incarceration in Model 1 but once control variables are introduced, the
socioeconomic variables lose significance (see Table 9). Even though there is debate in
criminological literature about the unemployment-crime link, and some authors dismiss it
(Wilson and Herrstein, 1985), a metaanalysis of 63 studies (Chiricos, 1987) suggests that
“unemployment-crime relationship is three times more likely to be positive than negative
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(75/25 percent) and more than 15 times as likely to be significant/positive as
significant/negative (31/2 percent)” (p. 192). Harcourt (2006) claims that unemployment
and poverty are two of the three most robust structural covariates of homicide, and a
seminal review of 21 studies by Land, McCall and Cohen (1990) claims that poverty is
the most consistent and strongest structural covariate of homicide. Therefore, I can
interpret my findings as indicative that unemployment and poverty impact incarceration
indirectly via violent crime rates, but have no independent effect otherwise. The strong
conflict or underclass claim that the criminal justice system is responding to the labour
surplus or class tensions related to relative or absolute economic deprivation per se is not
supported.
However, it is worth noting that there are limitations to the official data as
discouraged workers who have been searching for jobs over 27 weeks and those not
searching for jobs are excluded from unemployment data, hence some claim that the
official measures underreport unemployment by up to 50 percent (Chiricos and Delone,
1992). In addition, incarceration distorts unemployment statistics as inmates are not
counted as unemployed (Pfaff, 2007; Pettit, 2012). There may be not only quantitative,
but also qualitative problems with unemployment data as some authors are speculating
about a qualitative realignment of labour market towards proliferation of low-skill,
temporary, micro-employment opportunities offering minimum wage and no prospects of
advancement or job security (Wacquant, 2001; Campbell, 2010; Piven, 2010, Mayer,
2010). The poverty measure I use also lacks qualitative dimension as concentrated
poverty was not taken into account. A similar critique can be applied to the Gini
coefficient as some researchers found that variance of incomes computed on actual IRS
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data is a better measure of income distribution sensitive to the presence of the very
affluent individuals, and is positively related to state-level incarceration rates even when
the Gini coefficient is not (Jacobs and Helms, 1996).
Providing support for the racialized version of the underclass hypothesis, I found
that percent of African American state residents is positively associated with
incarceration net of socioeconomic variables, control variables, and crime rates. Minority
or racial threat theories suggest that structural, group-level processes rather than
individual-level attitudes result in disparate criminal justice outcomes, so that members of
the predominate ethnoracial group consider themselves entitled to symbolic and material
resources while seeing members of numeric minority groups as potential challengers of
the racialized status quo and using punishment against such threats (Blumer, 1958;
Blalock, 1967; Bobo and Hutchens, 1996; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001). Research finds
racial typification of violent crime, (i.e. it is associated with dishonorable Black
underclass in the perceptions of White respondents)Quillian, and that support for punitive
policies is associated with perceptions of crime increase and the latter is associated with
contexts with high percentage of Black residents (Quillian and Pager, 2001; Chiricos,
Welch, Gertz, 2004). African American presence is associated with hostility to African
Americans (Quillan, 1996), fear of crime (Quillian and Pager, 2001), larger police force
(Kent and Jacobs, 2005), and higher incarceration (Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Smith,
2004).
It has been suggested in the literature that African Americans account for higher
proportion of homicide, rape, and robbery arrests than Hispanics or Whites, that the
relative share of violent crime committed by African Americans has not declined
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significantly, and that arrest-incarceration comparison does not support that
overincarceration of African Americans has increased recently (Steffensmeier,
Feldmeyer, Harris, and Ulmer, 2011). My findings suggest that, true as it may be, percent
of African Americans has a positive effect on incarceration independent of crime rates.
My findings are in line with a more sophisticated project (Keen and Jacobs, 2009) that
found that even controlling for Black and White disparities in property and violent
arrests, and murder rates, percent of Black residents is still positively associated with
racial disparities in prison admissions in politically conservative areas, particularly in the
deep South. Unfortunately I use aggregate, non-race specific incarceration rates so I
cannot directly contribute to the literature on incarceration disparities and weigh in on the
debate on whether states with small Black population overincarcerate Blacks (Yates and
Fording, 2005) or whether states with large Black population incarcerate both Blacks and
Whites at higher levels compared to states with small Black population (an interpretation
offered by Greenberg and West, 2001). My findings are in line with a generic racial
threat argument suggesting that increasing size of the ethnoracial minority group will
result in perception of threat by the majority group (net of actual crime) and use of
punishment to contain the minority.
My findings of an independent race effect seem to contradict both Wilson’s
(1980) “declining significance of race” thesis and Wacquant’s (2001) assertions about the
primacy of class-based targeting of the most dispossessed segments of the urban
subproletariat and his statements of fine-tuned targeting of “first and foremost poor
people” (2010, p.78) and suggestions that “class disproportionality inside each ethnic
category is greater than the racial disproportionality between them” (2010, p.80) in regard
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to the fact that Black men odds of going to prison are eight times higher compared to
White men, while odds of prison time for Black men without a college degree are twelve
times higher than for Black men with a college degree, and for Whites the odds are
sixteen times higher respectively. However, Wacquant’s (2010) statements fit with my
findings of strong negative association of spending on primary and secondary education
and incarceration rates (see Table 9), especially given that lifetime odds of imprisonment
for Black male high school dropouts have increased by 300 percent between 1979 and
1999 to 59 percent while odds for Black male college graduates have dropped from 6 to 5
percent (p. 79). Perhaps, state-level education spending serves as a protective mechanism
increasing life-course opportunities for potential clients of prisons, or, an alternative
explanation may be that given the theoretically limited fiscal resources higher spending
on education leads to lower spending on corrections, serving as a natural inhibitor of
incarceration growth.
Contrary to underclass hypothesis, percent of Hispanic residents is not
significantly associated with incarceration. No consensus on the validity of Hispanic
ethnic threat exists in the literature, as some researchers claim nonsignificance of percent
Hispanic (Greenberg and West, 2001; Spelman, 2009), some claim it is negatively
associated with incarceration (Stemen and Rengifo, 2011), and some claim a positive
relationship (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001). I interpret my findings of the lack of
Hispanic ethnic threat in the context of literature stipulating that Hispanics are more
integrated into mainstream society given that 30 percent of Hispanic marriages are
interracial compared to 10 percent of Black marriages (Cherlin, 2005), that Hispanics
seem to grow proportionately in employment sectors with previous strong Black presence
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(Griffith, 2005), and that there is a realignment of ethnoracial relations “from the
traditional White/non-White divide to a new Black/non-Black divide” (Steffensmeier et
at., 2011, p. 206).
Given that my data show growth of percent Hispanic over time for the sample as a
whole but especially in some states, considering Oliver’s (2011) claim that Hispanics
surpassed Whites as a proportion of prison admissions due to parole revocation since
1998, and Steffensmeier et al. (2011) suggestion that Hispanic levels of violent crime
exceed these of Whites but not of Blacks, and that proportion of Hispanic involvement in
homicide and robbery grew between 1980 and 2008 in California and New York, as
anticipated due to proportion of Hispanic residents’ growth (neither UCR nor NCVS have
“ethnicity” category so nationwide Hispanics are classified as Whites) I think that
Hispanic threat could be found in the time-series focusing on the 1990s and 2000s and at
either specific states or at a lower level of aggregation than my data. Some evidence in
the literature is supportive of the previous statement as when period-specific measures of
Hispanic population are used, percent of Hispanic in 1980 is nonsignificant but positive
and significant in 1990 (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001) and there is some evidence that
Hispanic perceived threat is conditioned by context and is contingent on the actual
growth of Hispanic population between 1990 and 2000 in a given area (Johnson, Stewart,
Pickett, and Gertz, 2011).
I conclude that the underclass hypothesis is partially supported in my analysis.
Neither unemployment, nor income inequality, nor poverty are associated with
incarceration rates once control variables are taken into account. I interpret these findings
in the context of previous research (Chricos, 1987; Land et al., 1990, Harcourt, 2006) and
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speculate that socioeconomic variables do not impact incarceration directly, but their
influence is mediated by violent crime rates. I found that percent of state residents that
are African American is positively associated with incarceration rates. I interpret that in
context of the racial threat literature, as evidence of lingering independent effect of race
net of socioeconomic variables or actual crime rates, and supportive of the conflict view
of incarceration as contingent not only on utilitarian but also on extrajudicial factors.
Discussion of the Democracy in Action Hypothesis Results
The democracy in action hypothesis suggests that incarceration is not a purely
instrumental response to crime rates, but a relatively expressive policy sensitive to
population ideological views on crime and crime control. Some studies support the
citizen ideology – imprisonment link, whereby population conservatism is positively and
liberalism is negatively associated with state-level incarceration (Taggart and Winn,
1993; Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Sorensen and Stemen,
2002; Jackson, 2009) while other studies fail to support that link (Smith, 2004; Fording
and Yates, 2005; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, 2005; Schneider, 2006; Spelman, 2009;
Stemen and Rengifo, 2011).
My findings are supportive of the democracy in action hypothesis as increasing
liberalism among state residents is negatively associated with incarceration (and
conservatism is positively associated with incarceration given that it is a scale measure
where lower values represent conservatism and high values – liberalism respectively).
My findings fit perfectly with Garland’s (2001) account whereby he links emergence of a
culture of control with both increased exposure of the middle class to crime and
ideological and political rightward drift of the population, i.e. he suggests not a billiard151

ball positivist relationship between crime rates and incarceration but an ideological and
cultural reinterpretation of the crime control issues which occurred in the context of
exposure to violent crime and ontological anxieties of the late-modern society. As seen in
Table 11, both violent crime and ideology matter in explaining incarceration rates.
My findings are consistent with the literature suggesting that since the mid-1960s
crime became a subject of heated ideological arguments, and also a metaphor for a
variety of social issues, with sharp conflict between narratives of rehabilitation or
retribution and personal responsibility and polarization of the social strata across the
class, race, and cultural lines (Finckenauer, 1978; Gordon, 1994; Costelloe, Chiricos,
Gertz, 2009; Carrier, 2010). Literature suggests that conservative Protestants see all crime
as morally wrong without differentiating by seriousness (Curry, 1996), that Blacks are
less punitive than Whites (Bobo and Johnson, 2004), and that liberals are less likely to
support punitive measures than conservatives (Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986).
Conservatism in males is reported to be a stronger predictor of punitiveness than fear of
crime, and economic insecurity is associated with punitiveness as well (Costelloe,
Chiricos, Gertz, 2009).
Interestingly, neither of my measures of political competition is associated with
incarceration in Table 11, suggesting that neither partisan control of the state government
nor electoral competition influence incarceration net of citizen ideology and control
variables. It may be that it is the direct influence of citizen ideology on decision-makers
in the criminal justice system that explains incarceration rather than partisan “top-down”
accounts. The American Constitution allows various channels of popular input whereby
citizens’ ideological views on crime could have entered the justice system, including the
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lay partisan elections for judges, prosecutors, and other criminal justice actors (Black,
1988; Tonry, 2009). Literature suggests that population conservatism is positively
associated with sentence length in a given jurisdiction (Huang et al., 1996) as well as
with higher incarceration rates for African American and Hispanic offenders (Percival,
2010), and also with higher incarceration for White offenders (Oliver, 2011).
The interplay between concrete forms of collective political agency and
governmental structure is another mechanism worthy of attention, as suggested by Barker
(2009) in a comparative analysis of civic participation in California, New York, and
Washington, and its influence on criminal justice policies. Differential access to decisionmaking could be another issue pertinent to citizens’ ideology role. In a study of policy
hearings, Miller (2009) found that both at U.S. Congress and Pennsylvania state
legislature, law enforcement agency representatives and single-issue advocacy groups
channeling law-and-order rhetoric were dominant, and wider-focused citizen groups only
had a stronger voice at the local, city-level hearings. This suggests that urban residents,
being the recipients of crime control policies, had limited impact on federal and statelevel policy formulation compared to not infrequently retributive advocacy groups.
I conclude that the democracy in action hypothesis is supported in the current
study providing further evidence of the salience of extrajudicial factors for the criminal
justice outcomes. Citizen ideology is associated with incarceration rates in the predicted
direction, since increasing state residents’ liberalism is associated with lower levels of
imprisonment. I interpret my findings as concurring with Garland’s (2001) account of the
rightward drift and broad ideological reinterpretation of the crime control field. Lack of
fine measures of state-level political context is a limitation of the current study, and in the
153

future I might quantify some of the factors explored by Barker (2009) and Miller (2009)
to further specify the mechanisms whereby citizens’ ideology influences the criminal
justice system. Since it has been claimed that population conservatism can both increase
Black or Hispanic incarceration (Percival, 2010) or White incarceration (Oliver, 2011), I
might use incarceration rates disaggregated by ethnoracial categories to arrive at finer
conclusions about the role of citizen ideology.
Discussion of the Partisan Use of Incarceration Hypothesis Results
The partisan use of incarceration hypothesis sees imprisonment not as a purely
instrumental response to crime, but as a policy favoured by the Republican Party, either
due to the partisan agenda of individual responsibility and retributive just deserts
whereby street crime is seen as a product of individual moral failure amenable by
individual-focused punitive response, or due to the fact that crime may be an effective
campaigning device and a consensus-producing strategy to solidify electoral support
(Finckenauer, 1978; Scheingold, 1991; Costelloe, Chiricos, Gertz, 2004; Jacobs and
Jackson, 2010).
My findings of a negative association between percent of Democratic legislators
and incarceration (and, by definition, of a positive association between Republican
legislators and incarceration) and lack of association between governors’ party and
incarceration rates fit the general findings of the literature on politics of incarceration
(Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs and Helms, 2001;
Beckett and Western, 2001; Smith, 2004). To be more specific, Republican strength in
the state legislature is associated with increased imprisonment (Beckett and Western,
2001; Smith, 2004; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Stucky, Heimer, Lang, 2005), while
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governor’s party is not associated with imprisonment (Greenberg and West, 2001; Smith,
2004; Stucky, Heimer, Lang, 2005; Spelman, 2009), even though some researchers do
link governor’s party and imprisonment (Stemen and Rengifo, 2011).
I interpret my findings as concurring with the literature suggesting that the
Republican Party has consistently politicized the issues of crime and crime control and
employed a law-and-order rhetoric since the mid-1960s (Finckenauer, 1978; Tonry,
2009). Hofstadter (1965), political consultant for Goldwater’s presidential campaign,
discussed the salience of absolutist rhetoric of pure evil vs. pure good for gaining
political leverage, and acknowledged the Republican abandonment of the Black
electorate and reliance on coupling of race, urban unrest, and crime to gain sympathy of
the White conservative voters which culminated in Goldwater’s programmatic statement
that “moderation in pursuit of justice is no virtue” (p. 245). The racialization of crimecontrol issues seemed to be characteristic of Republican presidential campaigns which
led Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush to success (Phillips, 1968; Jacobs and
Jackson, 2010).
National-level Republican strength in the White House, senate and congress, as
well as consecutive years of a Republican presidency is associated with increased
imprisonment (Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Jacobs and Helms, 2001), and given that a
presidential candidate has to secure the nomination of the party, I think that presidential
candidates are representative of the larger pool of Republican legislators and a significant
difference on crime-control issue seems highly unlikely. Research is supportive of that
assumption, and state-level Republican strength is positively associated with
imprisonment as well (Beckett and Western, 2001; Smith, 2004; Jacobs and Carmichael,
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2004; Stucky, Heimer, Lang, 2005), which concurs with my findings of association
between Republican strength in both chambers of state legislature and increased
incarceration.
My findings of nonsignificance of governors’ partisan affiliation are not atypical.
Stucky, Heimer, and Lang (2005) point out a historically inconsistent effect of
Republican governors on incarceration, a positive impact in 1978-1982, and a negative
impact in 1989-1996, perhaps, as they suggest, due to the gubernatorial campaigns
emphasis on incumbency and personality or due to southern Democratic governors’
convergence with Republicans on the issue of imprisonment. Greenberg and West (2001)
interpreted nonsignificance of governors’ party as suggestive of the Democratic
governors’ preparedness to use imprisonment so that “states governed by Democrats
responded to the crime issue no differently from states governed by Republicans” (p.
638). Marion, Smith, and Oliver’s (2009) gubernatorial rhetoric analysis found that
“Republican governors did not devote more of their speeches to crime issues” (p. 469)
and that Democratic governors did not propose more liberal crime control measures,
which fits my findings of a nonsignificant effect of governors’ partisan affiliation on
incarceration.
Has incarceration been driven by partisan use of the issue rather than by the
public concern about crime? In my analysis (see Table 14), the Holbrook Van Dunk
measure of electoral competition, which is used by political scientists in a hypothesis
linking public pressure and policy outcomes, is nonsignificant (as in any of my models)
so I have no evidence to support the citizens’ pressure for more incarceration argument.
Partisan control of the state government measure is significant and negative, though,
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suggesting that Democratic control of the state government is negatively associated with
incarceration net of control variables and net of Democratic strength in both chambers of
state legislature. My findings fail to support Stucky, Heimer, and Lang’s (2005) claims
that electoral competition is the factor which mediates the effect of Republican legislators
on incarceration, so that Republican legislators are punitive not universally but only in
highly-competitive districts, as a comprehensive measure of electoral competition was
nonsignificant in my analysis. My findings are better aligned with a top-down partisan
use of incarceration interpretation and claims that politicians’ crime rhetoric drove
citizens’ concern about crime, with the latter lagging temporarily behind the former in
Gallup poll data (Beckett, 1997).
Lack of measures of specific mechanisms whereby partisan strength is linked with
criminal justice outcomes is a limitation of the current study. Several mechanisms have
been suggested in the literature, such as the positive association between Republican
legislators and correctional spending (Stucky, Heimer, Lang, 2007) which explained 30
percent of variance in incarceration (Spelman, 2009), as well as an effect of Republicandominated political contexts on prosecutorial plea-bargaining behaviour and judicial
sentencing behaviour, with odds of conviction and dismissal, and sentencing harshness
related to election proximity and proportion of votes for Republican state attorneys
(Huber and Gordon, 2004; Dyke, 2007) and sentence length for regular and juvenile
offenders related to vote for Republican presidential candidate or to percentage of
Republicans in state legislature (Huang et at., 1996; Carmichael, 2010).
Another limitation of this study is a lack of race-disaggregated incarceration rates
as there might be an interaction effect between political variables and race. Republican
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strength in a given jurisdiction measured by presidential vote is linked with racial
disparities in prison admissions controlling for a variety of factors including racial
disparities in arrests, actual crime rates, and population ideological conservatism (Keen
and Jacobs, 2009). The additional effect of political variables on Black incarceration rates
was reported by Yates and Fording (2005) as presence of Republican governor, percent
of Republican seats in state legislature, and judicial conservatism are related with
incarceration of Blacks while only Republican governor is associated with White
incarceration and the effect is 7 times weaker than for Blacks. Contrary to Yates and
Fording (2005), Oliver (2011) argued that Democratic control predicts higher White and
lower Black incarceration rates. Thus, in the future, I will employ race-disaggregated
measures to arrive at finer conclusions about the relationship between state politics and
incarceration.
I conclude that the partisan use of incarceration hypothesis is partially supported
in the current study providing further evidence of the salience of extrajudicial factors for
the criminal justice outcomes. Percent of Democratic seats in both chambers of state
legislature is negatively associated with incarceration as predicted. I interpret my findings
as concurring with the body of literature on politicization of issues of crime and crime
control championed by the Republican Party since mid-1960s (Finckenauer, 1978;
Scheingold, 1991; Jacobs and Jackson, 2010). Contrary to the partisan use of
incarceration hypothesis, governors’ party was not associated with incarceration. I found
no evidence of an association between electoral competition and incarceration, so I fail to
support an argument of the citizens’ pressure and criminal justice outcomes, while the
measure of partisan state government control was significant in the predicted direction,
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with higher Democratic control associated with lower incarceration, so my findings are
better aligned with the partisan top-down implementation of pro-incarceration policies.
Lack of measures of specific mechanisms whereby partisan control of state government is
associated with incarceration and use of racially aggregated incarceration rates are
limitations of the current study, and in the future I might quantify some of the factors
explored by Spelman (2009) to specify the mechanisms whereby partisan strength
influences the criminal justice system and employ incarceration rates disaggregated by
ethnoracial categories to identify potential interaction effects between race and political
variables.
Discussion of the Gubernatorial Electoral Cycle Hypothesis Results
I have found no association between gubernatorial elections and incarceration,
therefore I fail to support the hypothesized relationship between a bipartisan effect of
electoral cycle and criminal justice outcomes. It has been suggested in the literature that
presidential elections, on the national level, have a non-partisan positive effect on
incarceration rates (Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Jacobs and Helms, 2001) and that, on the
state level, gubernatorial elections have a positive effect on incarceration (Smith, 2004)
especially in states where African Americans’ electoral standing is weak (Yates and
Fording, 2005), and that close elections and higher competition matter rather than
ideology (Oliver, 2011), with highly competitive elections conditioning Republican
strength and increasing incarceration (Stucky, Heimer, Lang, 2005). Yet I have found no
evidence of the association between gubernatorial election year and incarceration, nor
any evidence of the effect of electoral competition, as the Holbrook Van Dunk measure
was not associated with incarceration (see Table 16). My findings are consistent with
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Spelman (2009), who found neither presidential nor gubernatorial elections to be
associated with incarceration, and with Stucky, Heimer, and Lang (2007) who found no
effect of state gubernatorial election cycle on correctional spending. I conclude that there
is no association between state-level executive branch election cycle and incarceration.
Discussion of the Criminal Justice Policies Hypothesis Results
Providing partial support for the hypothesized relationship between certain
policies, institutional parameters, and criminal justice outcomes, I found the expected
positive relationship between population under probationary supervision rates, threestrikes laws establishing additional penalties for repeat offenders, and state-level
incarceration. Contrary to my expectations, criminal justice policies such as determinate
sentencing, introducing fixed sentence length and abolishing parole at the discretion of
the review board, and decriminalization of possession of an ounce of marijuana, are not
associated with state-level incarceration.
The relationship between probation rates and incarceration has not been closely
examined in the reviewed literature. The only study which included both variables found
no significant relationship between probation and incarceration (Smith, 2004) which
contradicts my findings linking increased population under probation supervision with
increased imprisonment in a given state. I expected the positive relationship due to
reports that up to 30 percent of new prison admissions are not for new crimes but for
probation and parole violation, and up to 30 percent of these are for technical violations
such as drug test failure or failure to meet with a probation officer (Vera Institute of
Justice, 2010). In addition, the population under probation supervision has grown over
time and now is double of the incarcerated population, fluctuating above 4,000,000 and,
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based on 1997 estimates (Wacquant, 2010, p. 76), two in five probationers released in
1997 were back in prison within three years. I interpret the positive relationship between
probation and incarceration rates as indicative of an additional, less visible but more
decentralized strategy of population control which is consistent with Foucault’s (1979)
account of the diffusion of power in the contemporary society and move beyond
retributive spectacles focusing on the body of the offender towards forms of control
based on surveillance, and reject Phelps (2011) suggestion that states chose either high
probation or high incarceration alternatives since in my analysis high incarcerating states
were more likely to have higher probation rates as well.
The relationship between three-strikes laws and incarceration rates has been a
subject of much research, but no consensus exists in the field. Sorensen and Stemen
(2002) found a positive association between three-strikes laws and new admissions for
drug offenders, and Spelman (2009) also found a positive albeit small effect which he
explained by the fact that habitual offender laws are applicable, or were applied, to a
narrow contingent of offenders. Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn (2009) actually suggested
that three-strikes laws were associated with a decrease in new commitments, something
that has been hypothesized in the literature as out of 26 states with three-strike laws only
California, Georgia, and Florida have applied them to any extent (Dickey and
Hollerhorst, 1999; Shiraldi, Colburn, Lotke, 2004; Pfaff, 2007). I found a positive link
between habitual offender laws and incarceration, concurring with Sorensen and Stemen
(2002) and Spelman (2009).
Three-strike laws establishing additional penalties, including increased sentence
length for recidivists, are a policy symbolic of the many issues covered in the current
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study, and links the themes of the ontological anxiety and anomie experienced by the
middle-class discussed by Garland (2001) with the political mechanisms converting the
anxiety into policy outcomes (Barker, 2009). Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) found that
support for a three-strike law among Californians was not primarily driven by punitive
sentiment towards offenders or concerns about crime per se but by classical Durkheimian
themes about the moral cohesion of society, traditional family roles, growing diversity
(later factor was equally salient across ethnoracial categories, suggesting perhaps that
ethnocentrism is a better explanation rather than racism per se) and a feeling of the
weakening of the traditional social order. Barker (2009) studied California’s forms of
collective political action and governmental structure and found low civic participation,
highly polarizing non-dialogical initiative process whereby complex social issues are
reduced to dichotomous yes/no propositions which had resulted in an emergence of the
retributive regime, consistent use of the three-strikes law, and one of the largest prison
populations in the country and in the so-called free world in general.
Contrary to the expectation, neither determinate sentencing nor marijuana
decriminalization are associated with incarceration in my analysis. Determinate
sentencing has been mostly negatively associated with incarceration in the previous
research (Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Smith, 2004; Stemen
and Rengifo, 2011), even though it has been found that it can be negatively related with
White incarceration rate, nonsignificant for Black incarceration rate, and positively
related with Black and White disparity in incarceration (Yates and Fording, 2005). My
findings of nonsignificance of determinate sentencing concur with Sorensen and Stemen
(2004) and Marvel and Moody (1996) who suggested that different states passed
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determinate sentencing with different goals, and that the relationship will be contingent
on whether prison system capacity is tied to the sentencing structure. My finding of
nonsignificance of marijuana decriminalization matches Smith’s findings (2004) but
contradicts Spelman (2009) who found an immediate negative effect of decriminalization
which grew stronger over time.
I conclude that the criminal justice policies hypothesis is partially supported in the
current study suggesting that the crime-incarceration link is not purely mechanic but is
contingent on institutional parameters and processes. The probation rate is positively
associated with incarceration as predicted. I interpret this finding as evidence that highincarcerating states were also more likely to have a large population under probation
supervision, which is contrary to conceptualization of states as committing to one or the
other alternative sanction mechanism, and is more aligned with Foucault (1979) thesis of
the constant diffusion of power and its evolution beyond carceral institutions towards
decentralized surveillance. Three-strikes laws allowing for longer sentences for habitual
offenders are also positively associated with incarceration. I interpret this finding within
the context of literature suggesting that crime issues became intertwined with themes of
Durkheimian anomie and ontological insecurity brought by real or perceived weakening
of traditional social arrangements, roles, family statuses, and increasing diversity, and,
given the highly polarizing non-dialogical political initiative process in some
jurisdictions, led to increased incarceration (Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997; Garland, 2001;
Barker, 2009). I found no evidence that policies such as determinate sentencing and
marijuana decriminalization are associated with incarceration. Lack of finer
measurements of sentencing structure is a limitation of the current project, and addition
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of several sentencing policies’ specification (i.e. presumptive or voluntary) and prison
releases data, as well as racially disaggregated incarceration rates might produce finer
conclusions about the role of criminal justice policies.
Conclusions
I have replicated and advanced Smith’s (2004) study of the association between
socioeconomic, demographic, political, criminal justice factors and incarceration rates.
My project went beyond the replicated study and much of the previous research in this
area in three important ways. First, I extended the scrutinized historical period by a
decade, compared to Smith’s (2004) study, by compiling nation-wide state-level timeseries for the period between 1980 and 2005. Second, I employed multilevel models with
random intercepts, a more sophisticated analytic technique, which allowed me to avoid
methodological problems endemic in traditional statistical methods utilized in previous
research. Third, I explicitly included measures of political context, the Ranney index and
Holbrook Van Dunk measure, which were ignored in the previous research on the topic
and which allowed me to move towards a more refined understanding of association
between political processes, such as partisan control of the state government and district
electoral competition, and criminal justice outcomes.
Violent crime, race, population conservatism, Republican strength in state
legislatures, probation rates, and habitual offender laws matter. Socioeconomic variables,
partisan affiliation of state governors, and gubernatorial elections are not associated with
incarceration in the current analysis. My findings provide support for both consensus and
extrajudicial accounts of the incarceration change in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005
suggesting that any monocausal explanation would be insufficient, and calling for further
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research sensitive to, and specifying mechanisms of, potential interaction effects between
utilitarian and extrajudicial variables. I have tested six hypotheses, and five of them
received a degree of support. An attempt at a theoretic or narrative synthesis is in order.
Violent crime was rising between mid-1980s and mid-1990s, and all my
regression models show a robust positive association between violent crime and
incarceration. Consistently with a utilitarian, consensus view (Bentham ([1789] 1988;
Spelman, 2009), serious violent crimes result in increased incarceration, as society
attempts to prevent the Hobbesian war of all against all and protect the social contract.
Yet, contrary to the utilitarian view, property crime is negatively associated with
incarceration, suggesting validity of Durkheim’s (1972) stability of punishment thesis.
Some groups, though, were not completely accepted as equals under the terms of social
contract, or were seen as threatening the social order, so percent of African Americans is
positively associated with incarceration even controlling for actual level of crime and
socioeconomic disadvantage, which is consistent with conflict, extrajudicial accounts and
suggests not a decline but a lingering independent effect of race (Blalock, 1967; Wilson,
1980; Keen and Jacobs, 2009).
Not just the reality of crime but its ideological perception by citizens mattered as I
found that population conservatism is associated with incarceration, and Garland’s (2001)
account of the salience of both exposure to crime and broad ideological reinterpretation
of the crime control issues and rightward drift of the population is consistent with my
findings. Partisan politics matter too (Phillips, 1969; Tonry, 2009) but I have not found
any evidence of the district-level electoral competition effect while partisan control of the
state government is salient, as Republican strength in state legislatures is positively
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associated with incarceration, through spending on corrections (Spelman, 2009) or
through habitual offender laws, as my analysis indicates.
Three-strikes laws, retributive populist measures, passed via polarized nondialogical political process (Barker, 2009), were largely driven not by crime concern per
se but by anxieties associated with real or perceived vanishing of the post-World War II
social arrangements, family roles, and community cohesion into the thin air (Tyler and
Boeckmann, 1997) and, in my interpretation, represented an attempt at Durkheimian
mechanic solidarity but also led to increasing incarceration, as my findings indicate. But
just as the number of prisoners grew, so did the number of individuals under probation
supervision, and, as Foucault (1979) suggested, the power to punish spilled beyond the
walls of the carceral institutions into the general population and took a form of a diffuse
surveillance engulfing in excess of 4,000,000 individuals.
I conclude that incarceration is influenced by both legal and extrajudicial factors,
and both consensus and conflict theoretical accounts receive support. Rusche and
Kirchheimer’s ([1939] 1968) argument, in its economistic form, was not supported. My
major finding is the lingering significance of race which is independent of the violent
crime rates and socioeconomic disadvantage, suggesting that after a period of increasing
integration and socioeconomic convergence of racial groups’ standing in the 1960s the
colour line is still not entirely erased, and, perhaps, African Americans are still seen as a
group not entirely included into the social contract, and, perhaps, as a group threatening
the social order. My research invites further studies to focus on the interplay of utilitarian
and extrajudicial factors, especially on the interaction between race, socioeconomic
inequality, and political processes. Utilization of racially and, perhaps, gender
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disaggregated incarceration rates, use of more volatile dependent variables such as jail or
prison admissions, inclusion of specific mechanisms whereby citizen ideology and
partisan strength translate into specific criminal justice outcomes, and finer measures of
context including additional measures of electoral competition and vulnerability, as well
as specification of electoral standing of Black and White voters and measures of urban
and rural location will add further details to the major findings of the current project that
both legal and extralegal factors are associated with incarceration.
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